

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Science and Personality

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SCIENCE AND PERSONALITY

BY

WILLIAM BROWN

M.A., M.D. (Oxon.), D.Sc. (Lond.)

Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford; Psychotherapist to King's College Hospital, London; Hon. Consulting Psychologist and Lecturer on Medical Psychology, Bethlem Royal Hospital, London

WITH A FOREWORD BY

SIR OLIVER LODGE

D.Sc., F.R.S.

NEW HAVEN : YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1929

'The mind is its own place, and in it self
Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n.'

Printed in Great Britain

FOREWORD

by SIR OLIVER LODGE, D.Sc., F.R.S.

THIS strikes me as an extraordinarily well-informed book. Seldom do we find a writer apparently almost equally at home in psychology, mathematical physics, and psychical research. That the author is a medical psychologist goes without saying, for that is his profession, and he has recognized qualifications in the pathological branch of the subject. That he has studied mathematics is not so well known, but any one with adequate knowledge who reads the early chapters on relativity and the quantum will realize that even in those subjects he is an unusually competent amateur. As for the unorthodox subject of psychical research, the author's critical and candid mind, combined with extensive pathological experience, is of high value, and he is on the Council of the S. P. R.

His actual experience of our phenomena may not be of long standing, but he appears to have possessed some trace of psychic power himself, and his qualifications as an investigator are undeniable, so his contributions near the end of the present volume will be read with interest. Of the middle part of the book, when the author is on his own subject, I do not presume to speak. I have not even read this portion yet, but am entitled to say that his chapter on physics is an admirable summary of the present-day position; and any one can see that his treatment of

specifically psychic or mediumistic faculties is characterized by carefulness and common sense.

As a Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford, a practising psychotherapist in Harley Street, a mathematical physicist in embryo, and an open-minded investigator of subjects at present looked down upon by the majority of the scientific world, the author occupies a unique position; and, judging by the parts that I have read and my personal knowledge of the writer, I feel sure that this book, even more than his previous one, *Mind and Personality*, will be recognized as one of real value.

OLIVER LODGE.

20 *February* 1929.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE following volume contains the substance of a series of three lectures delivered at Yale University in March 1928, and repeated in the United Congregational Church at Bridgeport, Connecticut, on the Dwight H. Terry Foundation. Its general purpose is the consideration of religion in the light of science and philosophy, and although the main science chosen for discussion has been that of psychology (also in its applied form of psychotherapy), the attempt has been made to preserve a due perspective by not omitting a consideration of the physical and biological sciences in their more general, or philosophical, aspects.

The book represents a somewhat fuller treatment of the subject than was possible in the lectures, and may be regarded as a sequel and completion of my previous book, *Mind and Personality*, since it is an attempt to deal more thoroughly with the problem of personality in its relation to science and to the general concept of 'value'.

Although much of the discussion is abstract and philosophical, it is based upon scientific evidence gained by close and prolonged observation, in hospital and consulting room, of disturbances of human character and conduct. Philosophy without science is empty, science without philosophy is blind.

It is only after much hesitation that I have included the chapters on Psychical Research in this volume. The sole merit of the material brought forward is that it has been

obtained *at first hand*, and may serve as an illustration of the kind of phenomena upon which inferences as to the possibility of survival of bodily death are based. I most emphatically do not claim that my own evidence possesses any strict scientific cogency. My personal belief in survival, so far, is mainly based on other grounds, viz. on what may be called 'internal evidence' as to the nature of man's spiritual heritage. But as a scientist I feel that these phenomena of apparently super-normal (or at least unusual) mental power are worthy of the closest scientific investigation, and have an important bearing upon the question.

I have to thank Sir Oliver Lodge for his great kindness in reading parts of the book in proof and in contributing a foreword. My thanks are also due to the editors and publishers of the *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine*, the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, the *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, *British Medical Journal*, *Lancet*, *Scientia*, and *Quest*, and to the Bethlehem Publishers, Inc., and the Waverley Book Company, Ltd., publishers of *An Outline of Christianity*, for their kind permission to reprint material which has already appeared in their pages. This material has undergone thorough revision and amplification in many directions. Finally, I owe a very special debt of gratitude to Mr. Carl Lohmann, the Secretary of Yale University, without whose encouragement these lectures would not have been delivered.

W. B.

HARLEY STREET, W. 1.
January 1929.

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I

INTRODUCTION

'Religion . . . shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine. Since the relation may be either moral, physical, or ritual, it is evident that out of religion in the sense in which we take it, theologies, philosophies, and ecclesiastical organizations may secondarily grow.'—WILLIAM JAMES, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

IN an introductory lecture one may be expected to give a first general impression of what one means by religion, before considering it in relation to science and philosophy. Many definitions of religion have been formulated. The religious feeling has been defined by Schleiermacher as a feeling of 'complete dependence'. One finds Professor A. N. Whitehead[1] saying that it is 'what we do with our solitariness'. Professor J. Bissett Pratt[2] defines religion as 'the attitude which the individual takes up towards the determiner of his destiny'. Religious feelings are feelings aroused in the individual so far as he considers, subconsciously or consciously, his relation to God—the Determiner of his destiny. I myself have suggested[3] that among the most general mental attitudes towards existence the religious attitude should be considered as distinct from (1) the logical attitude, the attitude of thinking things out, (2) the aesthetic attitude of appreciating beauty and ugliness, and (3) the ethical attitude of recognizing moral obligation and different degrees of good. Religion and religious experience are based on a fourth general mental attitude—a very concrete attitude, the attitude of the

[1] *Religion in the Making*. Cambridge University Press, 1927.

[2] *The Religious Consciousness*. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1921.

[3] *Mind and Personality*. University of London Press, Ltd., 1926.

individual towards the universe so far as he envisages it as something upon which he completely depends and to which he attaches ultimate value. One may think of the individual facing the world with the question, 'What is all this?' The answer is given him in the various sciences, in which there is being gradually worked out a systematic knowledge of the external world and also of the 'world within'. That is knowledge. Or again, he considers the distinctions of the beautiful, the less beautiful, and the ugly, and finds in himself the power of appreciating these distinctions, which power can be developed more and more adequately in the course of his life through self-discipline. Thirdly, he observes that there are different types of actions, some better than others in the given circumstances, and some characters better than others, so that he learns to discriminate between the good and the less good, between good and evil, both of character and of conduct, and he recognizes duty when he sees it. There again he attains discipline of character which gives him ever-deepening insight into the moral aspect of the world.

Now so far as we consider these three separate aspects they seem to represent three distinct and equally fundamental ways of responding to the universe. It may seem that this is all one can do with the universe, viz. appreciate it logically, aesthetically, and ethically. But these three are abstract points of view, from which distinct and mutually exclusive aspects of existence are dealt with. Logically, there must be a further attitude, the attitude of the entire man to his entire environment, and this attitude may be named the religious attitude—the attitude which he takes up to the totality of reality—the whole universe—and according to which he may more or less explicitly order his life. But this position needs a certain qualification. If we consider ordinary usages of speech, and note the way in which the word 'religious' is used by different

people at different stages of history, we find that it involves something more definite than this. There is the distinction of 'religious' and 'irreligious', of 'sacred' and 'profane'. A person whom men call irreligious may yet have an attitude towards the totality of existence. He may take up the attitude of an extreme scepticism or agnosticism, —although we must admit that a sceptic may be religious, and the agnostic certainly is as a rule not without religion. The irreligious person is one who sees no particular value in existence as such, in the universe as such. It does not appeal to him. He is in it and he has to exist and adapt himself—which he does—with a view to the various purposes of achieving happiness for himself and for others, and yet with no particular interest, no particular emotional feeling towards the universe. He may feel that the universe has no claim on him. He may endeavour to get out of it all that is valuable to him, but he does not trust the universe. Distrusting it, he may feel from day to day that chance and circumstance may land him in serious difficulties, that the universe does not care for him and why therefore should he care for the universe? That would be a definitely irreligious attitude. It would indeed be an attitude taken up towards the entire universe, but one could not call it religious. Or again, there is the pessimist who feels that the universe is a huge mistake, or is a process which is attempting unsuccessfully to retrieve its earlier mistakes. Such an attitude as that may sometimes be irreligious. But it is an attitude which does not essentially exclude religion. Indeed, there is a well-known historical religion which is of this nature—which looks upon the desirable purpose of life to be an escape from the wheel of continual rebirth, and a negation of the will to live—not by killing the body, because that is not sufficient, but by killing the desire for life and all that life means, at its source. That is a form of religion and the

attitude is a religious attitude, and yet it is a pessimistic attitude. So that we need a qualification. What sort of a qualification may be given? It seems to me that the qualification is suggested by the word 'value'. We set a certain value upon the universe. We look upon it as a system of values. So far as we value it, and, secondly, worship it or hold it worthy, so far we are adopting a religious attitude. By adding this qualification we find ourselves in a position which allows a place for the subsidiary uses of the word 'religion'—as when one speaks of a man making money his religion, or his love for another person his religion. It means that he adopts an attitude of worship, of holding it worthy and valuable in a pre-eminent degree—in an absolute degree, looking upon it as a value absolute in nature, not relative.

We are thus brought to the general question of value. Psychologically the only ultimate value is satisfaction of desire. But the desires of the individual tend to fall into systems, because there are certain things he desires for the sake of other things, and his whole life is a system of desires linked up one with another. Ultimately there must be some final end to which all other ends are subordinated. This final end is absolute value and all the others are relative.

So far as the individual is interested in religion or takes a religious attitude he is considering a value that is ultimate and not merely relative. But even that is not all; we must distinguish still further, because such an ultimate end may be happiness, or it may be summation of pleasure.

In the hedonistic view, the final aim which controls all other activities is considered to be the desire for the maximum of pleasure. Obviously that cannot be called a religious attitude. Pleasure is a value, but why is it a value? It is a value for the sake of the individual. Thoroughgoing hedonism is the worship of oneself. If it is to be

called a religion it is simply the religion of extreme narcissism or self-love, making oneself one's god, and since that is to reduce it to an absurdity, we need to go further for our definition of religion.

We may get some help by considering the matter historically. We see that in earlier times religion tended to be a social matter. If we go back to very early times we find that there were two parallel paths of development, one of religion proper, the other of magic. In magic the suppliant attempted to get an answer to his prayer and to satisfy his gods by special forms and ceremonies in which some compelling power was supposed to reside. In religion similar forms and ceremonies were used with the purpose of influencing some deity, some all-powerful or more powerful person, some god in the polytheistic sense. In following up the historical development of these two mental tendencies we should be probably correct in holding that the final outcome of the process of magic is modern science. We manipulate nature, modify nature by all sorts of means to-day to get results which are helpful to some impersonal and final development; whereas the final outcome of religious development is seen in the various higher religions of the present day. According to Sir James Frazer magic is more primitive than religion. Religion superseded magic when magic proved itself finally unsatisfactory. What could not be gained by the imperious methods of incantation was attempted by the humbler and more cautious methods of prayer.

A general characteristic of these earlier forms of religion was that they manifested themselves as group activities. The forms and ceremonies were such as to be carried out by the group and were regarded as of importance to the welfare of the group. The welfare of the individual was subordinated to the welfare of the group. Where there was antagonism between one group and another there was

antagonism between one religion and another. The god of one tribe was regarded as distinct from the god of another tribe. So that whereas at the beginning, in earliest times, we may assume that the individual was regarded as part of the group with no independent existence apart from the group—his values were relative to the values of the group and he had not succeeded in generalizing these distinct values as extending over the entire universe—the progress in religious outlook must have been in the direction of individualization and character-development, but on a universalistic basis. True religion must be true for all. This insight was not gained until within fairly recent times in the world's history. It is religion independent of any particular individual or group, and it is in this sense that Professor Whitehead says that religion is 'what we do with our solitariness'—when we consider the value we give to existence independently of the special values involved in social life. Yet if we consider that more closely we find a difficulty, because obviously it cannot mean *eliminating* social values. Subsidiary values are values with reference to special experiences. If we generalize too ruthlessly we may find that what we get is a form of religion without any content. We have emptied it of content. We must get these individual values, these values within the group, &c., and organize them.

To some of my readers it may seem strange that I have taken all this trouble to elaborate the obvious. Those who take religion seriously, as the most important thing in life, no doubt feel that it is clear already—why worry about it therefore—why discuss it further? It is given us in the Christian religion, which we accept. But the problem of these lectures is not to duplicate any work of the theologian or ecclesiastic, it is to consider religion in its most general aspect, so far as it has a meaning for the individual, whatever special doctrine he may hold, or whether he has

any real religious beliefs or not. One could dogmatically give one's own view. That could be quite easily given in a few words, but I am trying to lead up to it by a consideration of more general possibilities. I am endeavouring to show that some of these definitions which I have quoted are not adequate. We need something more precise and definite, and we find it in the conception of *value* (in the domains of thought, art and morals), and of *worship*. The man who pursues truth for its own sake and studies science in an impersonal way, with rigorous self-discipline, is really showing his belief in a religion and is taking up a religious attitude. He has come to terms with it and considered its relationship to all that can be found out about, or experienced in, the universe. So that when we contrast religion with science and philosophy the difference is a difference of point of view. Science may be made a religion, and in so far as it is made a religion it is made more than mere science. Philosophy may be made a religion, and in so far as it is made a religion it is more than mere philosophy. Science and philosophy are both merely abstract. Religion is essentially concrete.

The problem of the relation of science to religion has been an acute question for many years, and in course of time has undergone repeated restatement. During the last few years further attempts have been found to be necessary, because of the revolutionary changes both in the general religious outlook and in scientific and philosophic conceptions.

Quite generally, as regards physics of a century ago, the difficulty was that physical laws were held to be blind, and assumed to be exact and impersonal, and to represent matter as something which was distinct from mind, distinct from soul and spirit, and yet potentially capable of accounting for life and mind; and it was because of the backwardness of the mental sciences, especially of psychology,

that the general effect of advances in physical science during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was to weaken religious feeling and to discourage any kind of religion. This earlier scientific method, this method of measuring rather than classifying, which was at first found so helpful in physical science, was also used in the biological sciences, including physiology and psychology, and produced there the same impression of blind chance, of blind necessity. The still earlier way of looking upon matter as 'never mind' and mind as 'no matter'—mind one thing and matter another, completely distinct one from another, which was emphatically set out by Descartes, if not originated by him—*that* has been found to be less and less satisfactory. In its place we have the doctrine of emergent mind as something which is an emergence from physical activity when it reaches a certain degree of complexity. The word 'emergence' is used to avoid the fallacy that matter produces mind. It is meant to be a historical statement of fact that as biological processes, which are at bottom physical processes, become more and more complex and occur in more and more complicated parts of the nervous system, they carry with them forms of reality which are mental in nature. These mental processes are assumed to follow the same *kind* of rule or law of manifestation as their biological antecedents and concomitants. The general impression produced is one of determinism—of lack of freedom. The individual is brought more and more within the grip of necessity—of complete determinism. But that is the result not so much of scientific discovery as of scientific method. That is what I shall try to make clearer in subsequent lectures—that it is the scientific method which produces that impression. One could have predicted years ago that as science progressed, such would be more and more the impression produced, on the purely scientific plane. According to this method, one

looks for causes and conditions, and if one cannot directly observe them one postulates them, one assumes them; one is not dealing with freedom, because one cannot on these lines deal with freedom. Even if there were freedom one would not be able to deal with it. That which is spontaneous escapes; yet at the other end of the scale we have volition, deliberate choice, which cannot be linked up with earlier stages of mental development without admitting such spontaneity. It is like trying to fit a coat which is too small for one. If one buttons it over one's chest it gapes over one's abdomen, and if one buttons it over one's abdomen it gapes over one's chest. One cannot bring the two together in the same system. So from the philosophical point of view we have to consider whether reinterpretation may not be necessary.

In psychology, although we take account of values, we take account of them merely as being interrelated with one another in a temporal way. We consider the mind as a sequence of mental processes. But beside that the mind has its own system of values which to a certain extent transcends time, although it may take time up into itself, and religion is the ultimate reaction of mind to value. Looking at it from that standpoint we see that just as philosophy is more than the sum-total of the various fields of science, being rather the criticism and adjustment of scientific concepts, so religion is more than science and philosophy. It takes both up into itself in the complete concreteness of experience. Instead, therefore, of regarding scientific advance as freeing us from the 'superstition' of religion, we may find that in the advance of science religion is needed more and more to restore the balance, and to keep us from reaching views which are a mere caricature of existence, and which are utterly out of harmony with our deepest aspirations and feelings.

II

THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

THE subject of this course of lectures is a consideration of the relation between scientific knowledge, so far as it has been acquired, and the theory of values, with special reference to the problem of personality. Although science and life are continuous with one another, and are parts of the same thing, yet there is a fairly clear plane of demarcation between the two. Whereas science is moving in the direction of ever-increasing abstractness, self-sufficiency, and objectivity, the philosophy of life, guided indeed by the discoveries of science, is moving in a direction of its own, viz. in the quest for standards of human valuation, and for objective satisfaction of spiritual needs.

PHYSICS

In the domain of physics the two outstanding theories of special philosophical import at the present day are the theory of relativity (Einstein) and the quantum theory in its various forms.

Einstein's theory falls into two parts, (1) the special theory of relativity, and (2) the general theory of relativity. In the special theory of relativity attention is limited to the consideration of physical objects in a state of uniform movement of translation with respect to an observer. By combining the general principle of relative motion with the assumption that the velocity of light *in vacuo* is constant, whatever the velocity of the observer, and is a limiting quantity, Einstein was able to explain the paradoxical negative result of the well-known Michelson-Morley experiment, without needing to have recourse to additional special hypotheses, such as that of Lorentz.

The special theory of relativity may be regarded as an

attempt to bring greater objectivity into the physical world. The world of matter, as studied by physics, is a world which is supposed to be common to all observers. The physicist is supposed to have eliminated, as far as possible, the effects of difference of individual standpoint. Physics gives the truth about the physical world independently of any individual standpoint—although, of course, not independently of an observer *as such*.

The general advance which Einstein has made is to point out that there has been an oversight here. Although the *difference of point of view* of different observers had been allowed for and discounted, yet the *relative movements* of observers had not been allowed for. This movement, although always effective, only shows its effect clearly when it is considerable: when it is of a magnitude that is comparable with the velocity of light. Then what is observed in the physical world looks different to this extent, that distances in the direction of motion are diminished, and physical time, as measured by clocks, &c., is slowed down. Thus, to obtain a completely objective view of the physical world as independent of any particular observer (not of an observer *as such*), we must take account of, and abstract from, the relative movement of the observer. If this is done, we find that the facts and the laws of physics become still clearer to us. This is so in the case of the special theory of relativity, with reference to uniform motion in space far removed from other portions of matter, i.e. where the first law of motion holds good.

THE GENERAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY

But in the proximity of matter we find acceleration, i.e. relative movement which is not uniform. The observer may be regarded as in acceleration with respect to the object, or the object may be regarded as in acceleration with respect to the observer. Einstein devised the *general*

theory of relativity to cover such cases of non-uniform relative motion, and in doing so he elaborated his new theory of gravitation. Indeed, this theory of gravitation is an integral part of the general theory of relativity. Einstein showed, by reference to his (now well known) hypothetical cases of the accelerated chamber and the rotating disk (A. Einstein: *Relativity*, Methuen, 1920, pp. 67, 80), that the gravitational field which is found round matter can be, as it were, mimicked. An artificial gravitational field can be produced, and one can arrange for the removal of that gravitational field again for another observer in appropriate relative movement. Moreover, 'a gravitational field of force is precisely equivalent to an artificial one, so that in any small region it is impossible by any conceivable experiment to distinguish between them.'[1] This is known as the *Principle of Equivalence.*

In the special theory of relativity, limited to cases of uniform relative motion, the laws of Euclidean geometry hold good if one brings in time as an additional co-ordinate in a special way[2]—so that one has a four dimensional Euclidean space-time continuum. The measurements of distances or intervals can here be made with reference to ordinary Cartesian co-ordinates. But in the general theory of relativity, which deals with non-uniform motion in gravitational fields, something more flexible than Cartesian co-ordinates is required, with reference to which the measurements of intervals can be carried out. Einstein found what he needed in Gaussian

[1] Eddington, A. S., *Space, Time and Gravitation.* (Cambridge University Press), p. 76.

[2] viz. taking $\sqrt{-1}\ ct$ as a fourth dimension, where c is the velocity of light *in vacuo.*

The characteristic formula for the measurement of a distance or space-time 'interval' in cases of uniform relative motion (special theory of relativity) is:

$$ds^2 = -dx^2 - dy^2 - dz^2 + c^2dt^2.$$

co-ordinates, systems of curves intersecting one another to form a flexible four-dimensional frame of reference for the measurement of space-time intervals in a non-Euclidean spherical or ellipsoidal space-time continuum. With reference to this Gaussian system, the formula for a space-time interval is much more complex, and includes a number of measures known as potentials.[1] The value of these potentials varies with the positions in space where there is matter. These potentials thus give the measure of gravitational force at various points in the continuum.

In accordance with the principle of equivalence, it is clear that gravitation itself may be regarded as dependent upon a difference of point of view. A gravitational field can be abolished in any small region by an appropriate transformation of the co-ordinates of reference. The general theory of relativity means the identification, in some sense, of gravitational forces with space itself.

Instead of saying with Newton that there is an attraction at a distance between objects, one may say that objects in a gravitational field tend to move in certain directions, along certain paths, by virtue of the characteristics of space itself.

One may say that space has non-Euclidean geometrical relations, or a sort of curvature, where matter is present. This does not involve a surrender of the hypothesis of the ether, but an identification in some sense of ether and space.[2]

[1] The general formula for a space-time interval is:

$$\begin{aligned} ds^2 = {} & g_{11}dx^2 + g_{22}dy^2 + g_{33}dz^2 + g_{44}c^2dt^2 \\ & + 2g_{12}dz\,dy + 2g_{13}dx\,dz + 2g_{14}c\,dx\,dt. \\ & + 2g_{23}dy\,dz + 2g_{24}c\,dy\,dt + 2g_{34}c\,dz\,dt. \end{aligned}$$

The coefficients, or g's, in this formula are the 'potentials'.

[2] Professor E. T. Whittaker has summed up the modern theory of gravitation in the following words: 'Thus gravitation acts so as to make the total amount of the curvature of space-time a minimum; or, as we may say, *gravitation simply represents a continual effort of the universe to straighten itself out*. This is general relativity in a single sentence.' British Associa-

Thus the entire science of 'field-physics', or the properties of fields of force (gravitational, electro-magnetic, &c.), may be assimilated to the science of geometry, and may be regarded as a generalization of the science of geometrical relations. Euclidean geometry is the theory of the interrelations of Euclidean space—space far removed from matter, where the first law of motion holds good—whereas the laws of gravitation, i.e. of the interaction of particles of matter, and the laws of electro-magnetic phenomena can be shown to be properties of a more generalized space and can be represented by differential equations of a particular type. Like the laws of Euclidean geometry, the laws of gravitation or the laws of matter in relation to space can be shown to be laws of identity.

The general conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that the physical world of measurement is a closed system, and that Einstein has shown it to be still more self-contained—still more objective. The 'objective', for philosophy, is 'what we are constrained to think in order to make our thought consistent with itself' (B. Bosanquet: *Essentials of Logic*, p. 13). Gravitation is explained in terms of these potentials of which we have spoken, which are coefficients of what are called intervals; intervals are measured by clocks and measuring rods; to the question, 'What are clocks and measuring rods?', the answer is that they are made of 'Matter'; matter in its turn has been shown by Einstein to be explicable in terms of mass, momentum, and stress; finally, to the question, 'What are mass, momentum, and stress?', the reply is that they are explained by the potentials. Thus the circle is complete. Potentials are explained in terms of intervals; intervals in terms of clocks and measuring rods; clocks and measuring rods are explained

tion for the Advancement of Science. Report of the Ninety-Fifth Meeting at Leeds, 1927. Presidential Address to Section A, p. 23.

in terms of matter; matter is explained in terms of the fundamental conceptions of mass, momentum, and stress, and these in turn are explained in terms of potentials.[1]

These considerations show in a clearer light what is meant by the accuracy of physical science. The laws of field-physics are *identities*—merely an extension of the laws of geometry. Just as the laws of geometry are unalterable, so these more generalized laws are unalterable characteristics of the physical world.

This physical world comes into relation with individual minds through conscious perception. Matter, for the plain man, is that which is, or may be, present to conscious perception.[2] So soon as one has a Mr. X observing matter, one has Mr. X's consciousness in touch with all the rest of the circle—the potentials, the intervals, the measurements of time and space, and, finally, mass, momentum, and stress. There is thus on the one side something which is self-supporting, as it were—something quite objective—and yet which is in relation to individual consciousness through perception.

Furthermore, one may conceive a number of imaginary worlds obeying the laws of this circle, and the difference between the imaginary worlds that may obey these laws and the real world is that the real world is in relation to direct perception, whereas all the imaginary worlds are cut off from that.

Perceptual consciousness introduces two things into this system of temporal and spatial relations. On the one

[1] The argument of this paragraph has been summarized from the excellent discussion of Professor A. S. Eddington in 'The Domain of Physical Science', one of the essays in *Science, Religion, and Reality* (Sheldon Press, 1925). See also *The Nature of the Physical World* (Cambridge University Press, 1928) by the same author, in which this and other arguments are most brilliantly worked out.

[2] Cf. J. S. Mill's definition of matter as 'a permanent possibility of sensation'.

hand, it introduces actuality, and on the other the process of becoming—of going on or persisting. This illustrates the difference between time as we learn about it in physics and time as we experience it. It is important to distinguish the two. The distinction is still more apparent in the case of consciousness beyond the perceptual level.

If the above chain of reasoning is, in the main, correct, we find nothing in Einstein's theory of relativity which would in itself indicate a loosening of the bonds of physical determinism, or would justify an interpretation of the term 'relativity' in any subjectivist sense. Apart from the fact that it deals with relative motion, the theory is misnamed, and it really gives us an external world of yet more pronounced absoluteness and objectivity (if we may so express it). Nevertheless, it achieves this by a method of abstraction. Physics deals solely with the metrical properties of the world—those aspects of the world that are measurable—and shows that this is a closed system. Modern physics is giving us an ever clearer conception of the objective. In natural philosophy we may remain idealists, but we must be objective idealists.

Yet, by demonstrating the close interrelation of space and time, the theory of relativity has destroyed the older traditional conception of material substance. As Bertrand Russell says, 'A piece of matter has become, not a persistent thing with varying states, but a system of interrelated events.'[1]

THE QUANTUM THEORY

Having very inadequately attempted to summarize the position in field-physics and its lesson for us, I come to the domain of what may be called intra-atomic physics, the movements of electrons within the atom. Whereas the

[1] Introduction to Lange's *History of Materialism*, p. 11. (Kegan Paul, 1925).

atom itself is supposed to obey the laws of field-physics, scientists are finding that the movements of electrons within the atom cannot be fitted into the general deterministic scheme. According to the quantum theory, energy is radiated from the atom not in continuous quantities but in exact multiples of a minimum amount or *quantum* of energy. The quantum varies with the frequency of the emitted radiation-energy, and is measured by multiplying the frequency (or difference of frequencies) by a very small constant known as Planck's Constant. There are various theories as to how these quanta of energy are radiated from the atom.

The important fact for us to note is that, as things are at present, it is impossible in theory to predict the movement of any particular electron when it brings about the radiation of a quantum of energy. According to the theory of Niehls Bohr, the electron is supposed to move suddenly from one orbit to another orbit, without, apparently, passing through any intermediate positions, and at a moment which cannot be completely predicted or is not completely determined. This theory thus seems to imply a discontinuity of space and a discontinuity of time in intra-atomic dynamics, and a certain degree of indeterminism.

In the domain of physical science we thus find on the one hand the laws of field-physics, which are laws of identity and have nothing to do with spontaneity or freedom, and on the other hand the laws of movement inside the atom—in the very centre of the physical universe—which apparently cannot at present be brought into harmony with the physical principle of determinism. That is, there is a loophole for freedom or spontaneity or chance within the heart of matter.

It may be that, with the further development of mathematical physics, the deterministic principle will be re-

affirmed. In the work of Heisenberg (matrix theory), and especially in that of Schrödinger (wave mechanics), new possibilities have been opened up; although Jordan, Born, and others contend that the continuity that Schrödinger has reintroduced is a continuity of probabilities only, and that the discontinuity and indeterminism in actual intra-atomic activity still remains. But it is interesting to note that even where the physicist gives himself as full scope as possible to work out a deterministic scheme, he has not as yet completely succeeded.

BIOLOGY

Let us turn now to biology and physiology. Here the modern trend in science seems to be summed up in the word 'Emergence' (Lloyd Morgan, S. Alexander). Like the word Mesopotamia, it may have a comforting sound, but it covers a multitude of difficulties. The situation is this: that as material changes in the living organism become more complex, new properties may suddenly emerge, properties that could not have been predicted from a knowledge of the interacting forces—of the antecedent chemical and physical factors. A simple example below the biological level is the chemical combination of oxygen and hydrogen to form water. Water has properties that cannot be inferred from the properties of oxygen and hydrogen as independently observed; on combination new properties emerge. So at higher levels, point by point in the scale of evolution, ever more complex forms arise, new properties, new characteristics emerge, the characteristics of life emerge from inorganic properties, the characteristics of consciousness are superimposed upon vital characteristics,[1] the characteristics of intellect supervene

[1] According to a more plausible view, there is emergence *within* mind, but not *of* mind. For example, will and personality emerge from simpler forms of mental activity, but mental activity itself is primordial in the universe.

upon mere conscious awareness. According to one school of thought, that is all we know and all we need to know about evolution. Evolution is emergent, and something new is produced moment by moment. But if we think again about this, we see that it is none too satisfactory a theory. No doubt it is better than the theory of pre-formation—that whatever comes out of an evolutionary process was there already in the antecedents of that process, and that if we could see into these past movements we should see along with these past movements the promise and potency of future results. Yet the alternative view of emergence is also unsatisfactory. It is irrational because we have apparently a creation of something out of nothing, and we feel that out of nothing can come nothing (*ex nihilo nihil fit*).

We may see the problem in more satisfactory proportions if we remember that besides the process of change, in time, there is a ground or background of such change. The change itself implies something that does not change, viz. the Eternal or the Absolute.

If we re-envisage the theory of emergence from the point of view of an eternal background, of something beyond time, it no longer appears so irrational. Oxygen has its particular properties and hydrogen has its particular properties, yet each are parts of the universe, and this is a third something which will be a support for the ultimate emergent, viz. water.

Likewise with the production of living phenomena from inorganic matter. With increase of complexity there arises consciousness, and with a further increase, intellect and will. Here again, there is reference not only to what is a sequence in time, but also to something eternal. It is thus possible to work out a philosophical position which does not reject this view of emergence, but supplements it and makes it more rational.

III

THE BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES

LET us recapitulate and amplify our account of this doctrine of 'emergent evolution'. The adjective 'emergent' emphasizes the fact that in the course of evolution there is an emerging of new properties, of new characteristics, not adequately explicable in terms of previous change. In the course of biological evolution something new is created—there is continuous creation. That creation may be regarded as (1) occurring according to a determinate plan or definite rule, so that it does not involve freedom, or (2) as a process of free creation. It is not easy to decide between these two alternatives. It depends on the temperament of the scientist whether he will adopt the view that emergence is deterministic—such that properties and characteristics proceed to change *according to rule*, without any shadow of variation, or that the emergence of new properties occur with some amount of spontaneity and a degree of freedom in the forces working in the background. Strictly, if we keep to the physical aspect of biology we find that it is descriptive and does not deal with any conception of underlying causes. But anyhow, if we try to be in earnest with this doctrine of emergence, we may believe that the appearance, say, of higher and higher degrees of conscious activity and more complex forms of self-regulation, supervening upon or correlated with increasing degrees of complexity in biological processes or physiological processes, are instances of such emergence. It is, however, doubtful if we should be right in holding the doctrine of emergence of the mental from the non-mental.

Here we must remember that the change—the apparent

sequence of development—is not self-explanatory. We have to bring in the conception of something else, namely, a background which does not change, and, if we do that, then this principle of emergence is not so unintelligible. What emerges is not merely a consequence of previous change, but it represents or manifests a characteristic of the timeless or eternal background, of the Absolute or of God. So that even within the realm of biology we are faced with a contrast between the temporal and the eternal, and we find that for an adequate rational appreciation of the situation we must assume the Eternal.

There are two concepts of evolution, viz. (1) evolution *within* the universe—of organisms that are struggling with one another, with survival of the fittest, &c., and (2) evolution *of* the universe. These two concepts of evolution are really quite distinct. The second or metaphysical concept of evolution is quite distinct from the concept of individual organisms developing in relation to a definite environment. The universe itself has no environment. It has everything within itself. It is not in time. Time and space are within it. If now we look back even to the physical and chemical world from this point of view we find, even there, emergence. When oxygen and hydrogen combine to form water, the properties of the new substance are distinct and are not such as we can infer from the properties of oxygen and hydrogen as independently observed.

Considerations such as these show that science when followed up in its own domain and according to its own rules leads on to something other than science—leads on to philosophy or metaphysics.

In the biological world we find a tendency towards the development of systems, unities, totalities of greater and greater complexity and closer and closer unity of organization; and again if we look back to the world of chemistry and physics we see the same principle at work. Molecules,

atoms, and electrons are not entirely distinct from one another, just by chance interacting with one another, but are parts of a unity. Their behaviour is modified in relation to a material system of which they form part. Even in the physical world the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (A. N. Whitehead).

The most fundamental of the sciences is not physics or chemistry. The latter are abstractions from the point of view of measurement. They abstract from the factor of organic activity. Biology, as the science which deals with this factor, is the most fundamental physical science. The laws of chemistry and physics may be regarded as quantitative aspects of biological activity. This view is not crude vitalism, or neo-vitalism, but it is a view that saves us from the doctrine of blind mechanism which would seem to follow from the other way of putting things—of putting physics at the basis of reality and explaining degrees of reality in terms of degrees of mechanical complexity—explaining the animate in terms of the inanimate.

PSYCHOLOGY

When we turn to psychology we have the question of soul and mind as dependent on or relatively distinct from the brain. We have to ask ourselves whether the mind is distinct from the brain. Again we have to remind ourselves that physical science has from the beginning abstracted consciousness and has left us no means of linking up the mind with material change. What we observe is activity of the mind in relation to physical change in complex parts of the body, but we have no direct knowledge of the nature of this relation.

There is nothing to prevent us from holding the view that, although self-conscious mind may have developed out of simpler forms of biological process, it gradually achieves a greater and greater degree of independence, and is able

to react upon the body with an increasing degree of freedom and determination of psychical activity, and eventually may survive physical death. We cannot say for certain that the opposite is proved by modern science, viz. that the mind cannot survive bodily death.

It is more definitely within the realm of psychology that we come into relation with the question of religion. We come to it through the intermediary of the doctrine of values.

THEORY OF VALUE

Psychology, as a science, considers the mind from the temporal point of view, and endeavours to establish laws of mental activity as a sequence of mental processes in time. But the mind also shows a non-temporal aspect, which is the aspect of value. It has the power of forming the ideal of knowledge and considering the extent to which actual experience falls short of knowledge. It can form an ideal of beauty, and can consider and state reasons why any particular product or activity falls short of such a standard in fact. It can form an ideal of duty, of goodness, of perfection, and can state conditions under which the mind falls short of that standard of value. These are the well-known eternal values of goodness, truth, and beauty. They are non-temporal, they are out of time, and yet they occur within the individual mind, they are appreciated by the individual mind in process of time. In writings on the subject we find as a rule these two aspects set one against the other—eternal values on one side and individual mental processes on the other. It is as if we come to a blank wall and can but say 'How good!' 'How beautiful!' 'How true!' But we need to go farther. We need to show the *conditions* under which beauty is appreciated and the conditions under which it is created. It is the same with goodness and with truth. And here we have to come back

from philosophy to psychology. Philosophy by itself is barren. It is through psychology, through observation of actual life and conduct, that one may obtain ever deeper knowledge of these values.

RELIGION

Various definitions of religion have been given. We may say that religion is the attitude which the mind takes up towards the totality of existence. Or again, that it is the feeling we have of complete dependence upon the universe. That is Schleiermacher's definition. But neither of these definitions by themselves, nor both together, really cover the ground. An irreligious man may take up an attitude towards the entire universe—an attitude of contempt or ironical depreciation or mere neutrality and indifference. The feeling of dependence too is not by itself adequate. If we consider the state of mind of people who call themselves religious and quite obviously are religious we always find an element of *worship* present—worthship, appreciation of value—the feeling that there is a supreme value to which the human mind can have some sort of relation and to which it naturally responds—a reality which excites adoration because it is good. And how are we to relate this object of our worship to the reality of values of which I have been speaking? The relation seems to me to be a relation of the concrete to the abstract. The general values of truth, goodness, and beauty are all abstract—all aspects of real existence. And they all go together. One is not superior to another. They are all on a level with one another. It is, e.g., absurd to speak of a work of art as being aesthetic but non-moral or immoral. The different classes of values are distinct from one another because they are different sides of the same entity, viz. God. A view like this is not pantheism. It is indeed a view of God as including everything, but in

degrees. Values are recognized as possessing degrees for the finite individual, but there is an order of precedence or hierarchy of values which may probably claim objectivity and universality. It is through experience itself that one gains a deeper and deeper appreciation of values, while attaining greater power to realize them. Degrees of value are degrees of reality. Good is the real thing, and evil is a falling away—something less complete and real than good. Truth is the real thing and error is a falling away from truth. Beauty is the real thing, and ugliness is a falling away from beauty. In psychology we consider the conditions and factors which play a part in causing that falling away. If we turn to the biological side we see a similar contrast between health and disease. Health is the metaphysically real thing, and disease is a falling away from health for various reasons. In physical medicine disease is explained by lesions of tissues, injury of tissues, through bacterial infection, &c. But a great deal of illness, physical as well as mental, is merely functional. It is a disturbance of internal adjustment or of the adjustment of the individual to his environment. In medicine, therefore, we find that so far as there is any definite structural or 'organic' disturbance, it has to be dealt with by physical means. In functional disease, or in the functional aspect of disease, it is the change of mind in the patient that is important, and this is a change from the simple to the complex, or from unity to multiplicity. Health is a simple thing; it is disease that is complex. Truth is simple; error is complex. There is one way of hitting the mark, but innumerable ways of missing it.

PSYCHOTHERAPY

This brings us to the problem of psycho-therapy, or of psychology as it is used to correct inadequate or faulty mental functioning. There are two general forms of

psycho-therapy: one is suggestion and auto-suggestion, and the other is analysis. First as regards suggestion and auto-suggestion. Its importance is seen in this, that in the form of bad auto-suggestion it is the cause of a great deal of illness, a great deal of falling away from health. If we investigate the situation farther we find that it is a matter of fear, which in its turn is a matter of lack of faith. We find that suggestion treatment benefits the patient because it neutralizes bad suggestions that have come unwittingly into the mind and have worked unconsciously, and it thus puts the patient on the right road towards health.

We see further, when we analyse these patients and get to the background of their minds, that ultimately suggestion is always a matter of faith. Just as bad suggestion is a matter of lack of faith—fear, anxiety over small things—so beneficial suggestion is really and fundamentally faith. Suggestion is often described in the text-books as if it were a passive thing—as if the implanted idea tended to realize itself according to the law of ideo-motor action, by its own momentum as it were, but actually there is much more than that going on in the mind. The mind takes up an attitude, which is an active thing. It develops the will to believe that it can get well, and there is a reason for that will—viz. a belief in the 'worth-whileness' of things, an appreciation of values. We come back to the doctrine of value. Patients need to be helped to realize once more that life is worth while, or that certain aspects of life are worth while and worth taking trouble about. If they can get that view of life they are on the road towards faith and health. In this respect it can be said that modern psycho-therapy is in harmony with the teaching of our Lord in the Gospels as regards the regaining of health.

What can we say about analysis? That is a deep-going disentangling of the mind, a readjusting of fundamental impulses and tendencies. Analysis is a bad word because

it implies the breaking up of the mind into its constituent parts, a result which does not and cannot happen. On the contrary, as a person is analysed his mind becomes more and more unified. Analysis removes bad and disturbing effects of chance experiences of the past with their emotional reactions which have become fixed in the unconscious. The person becomes more himself. His true self is released. The method of analysis is a method of release through self knowledge (autognosis). The patient is released from bad effects of his past physical and social environment. He is able to be more himself, and in the course of the analysis he is able to appreciate more fully what values mean and how values change and deveolp from stage to stage in the course of life. So that analysis is a definitely educative and ethical process and has a direct bearing upon religion. Certain analysts have attempted to explain—and explain away—religious feeling in terms of infantile experiences of relations towards father and mother (Oedipus complex) or in terms of a regression, a stepping back to a more infantile attitude towards life. In support of this view they wrongly emphasize the 'sense of sin' as an essential element in religion. But although the early relations to parents, &c., are most important for later life, and the process of regression or stepping back to an earlier stage of development can occur with detrimental effect, yet the religious attitude as such does not show itself in course of analysis as merely due to that. It may be that the religious view, just as the ethical view, or aesthetic view, or logical view, has been disturbed and distorted by past experience. Just as a person may have slight delusions about a fact which can be cleared up under analysis, so the religious attitude may be *purified* by analysis, but it is not removed. It is only those who think of analysis as a merely reductive thing—reducing things to their elements—who could hold the other view. The mind

is Janus-like; it looks forward as well as backward. It has reference to what has gone before, but it also looks ahead. Here we see the important contrast between time as it is measured in physical science and found to be in relation to space (space-time), and time as it is experienced by the living mind. In the one case time is spacialized; time is a sequence—one thing after another. In the other case it is an interpenetration. Within the 'specious present' there is also past and future.[1] This interpenetration brings with it a degree of freedom, a possibility of self-determination. As we can look before and after, we can, on the basis of that, transcend time. Thus, so far as we are conscious at all, we have some degree of freedom. But that freedom is very slight. We find greater freedom coming with organization of the mind and reflection about the mind. Self-knowledge brings with it self-control and in that way a greater freedom, and also brings with it a power to transcend the temporal. Here again, in contrasting science with religion, we find psychology in an intermediate position between the physical sciences on the one side and the philosophical sciences and religion on the other. In psychology one finds this transition from and through the temporal to the eternal. Every individual has had experience of that transition. In the appreciation of works of art there is such a transcending of time. Even in the appreciation of music (an art in which temporal relationships seem of its essence) the listener must transcend the mere sequence of the notes.

In religious experience this transcendence of time may become still more pronounced. A very important element in the religious experience of some people is what is called

[1] As William James has said: 'The practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time.' *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, p. 609.

mystical experience. The term mysticism has often been used in very vague and varying senses, but it has a definite and intelligible sense as denoting an immediate experience of union with the spiritual universe or communion with God, involving the transcendence of individuality. Indeed our individuality as such is an abstraction. Each one of us is more than his own individuality. Personality as distinct from individuality carries with it an element of universality. The individual is part of his family, his group, his nation, and of humanity in general, and can rise above merely individual feeling in these respects. But he can also achieve a feeling of identity with the entire spiritual universe, or of communion with God, in which, although individuality is transcended, the full scope of personality is attained. He can develop that experience and cultivate it. In doing so he must of course be careful to avoid just the opposite result—the intensification of narcissism—the worship of his own individuality. As one reads the literature of mysticism one finds very often that the experience described as mystical has been just the opposite of true mysticism—has been an over-intense feeling of individuality in which the individual's emotional energy has become fixed upon himself. It has been more and more completely withdrawn from the world; but instead of being projected upon or linked up with the divine, the emotional energy thus withdrawn from the world has been turned in on the person himself. He may have a feeling of emancipation from the conditions of space and time, but this is really due to an excessive narcissism, a degenerate movement in the opposite direction to that of religion. Subsequently he may get very grave reactions to such experiences. Patients have reported more or less prolonged periods of deep depression following upon such experiences of apparent mystical communion—presumptive evidence that the latter was

also morbid in nature. Such experience is not true mysticism. Mysticism is not just a pleasant subjective feeling, but an awareness of an object and a feeling of union with that object. It is not a merely subjective thing, it is the extreme of objectivity. Indeed the whole burden of my argument is to emphasize the importance of objectivity throughout. It is a remarkable fact that while the greatest genius in physics, Einstein, has increased the objectivity of the physical world for us, one of the greatest theologians, Baron von Hügel, always emphasized the importance of objectivity—of getting beyond the merely subjective—in matters of religion. The immediacy of true mystical experience comes as the fruit of much mediated experience and vigorous mental and spiritual activity. Self-discipline, both intellectual and practical, and a continued striving after sincerity and purity of motive, prepare the soul for its illumination.

Another characteristic form of religious experience is the process of conversion. This is a change of mental attitude, whereby the soul turns from a merely naturalistic outlook on life to a spiritual outlook—from the standpoint of the temporal to that of the eternal. Such experience may come suddenly, as a sudden conversion,[1] or it may arise as a gradual development through a period of years. In the latter sense possibly we should say that conversion is a normal and an essential element in all religious life.

Finally it should be pointed out that, in any consideration of the relation between religion and science, it is important to see the matter in true perspective. We must not think about it in terms of one science alone. The physicist,

[1] Sudden conversion is probably the result of a subconscious process of incubation, and therefore not so sudden or inexplicable as it appears to be. It may sometimes be accompanied by hysterical or other morbid manifestations, yet we cannot infer from this that the process of sudden conversion is itself a morbid one.

for example, if he thinks of his science as the only real science and of others as less fundamental, less necessary, less significant for the truth of existence, is going to prejudice his religious life. The person who thinks merely in biological or psychological terms or merely in ethical or philosophical terms will be doing the same thing. These various sciences all have their places, and ultimately religion corresponds to an adequate sense of truth values. Religion must include these truth values in their right proportions, together with the values of aesthetics and of ethics. If we can distinguish one general trend of thought at the present day I think we should say that it is in terms of organism, of plurality in unity, in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Throughout the world-process there is a striving towards a greater and greater degree of systematization—a building up of wholes of an ever greater extent and ever greater degrees of systematization. But this process leads on to the development of self-conscious personalities, as distinct from mere individualities, in personal relationship with one another and with a personal or super-personal God. In religion we find that this experience of development of personality gives us a deepened insight. We cannot deduce what truth is. We can only find out by experience, and if we turn to the Gospel story, we are more and more impressed with the essential truth, from the scientific point of view, of the doctrines of Jesus, and in particular we feel that certain sayings of His such as 'He that loses his life for My sake and for the gospel's sake shall save it', though not easily thought out in terms of ordinary concepts, do carry with them a truth which is quite in harmony with all that we know of the world and of human nature.

IV

MENTAL UNITY AND MENTAL DISSOCIATION[1]

IT is important to realize that the problem of mental unity and dissociation is in direct relationship to the problem of unity and dissociation in the physical and physiological spheres. The point of view from which we should first approach it is that of biology. The general tendency throughout evolution seems to be towards the building up of totalities or wholes, in which each separate activity takes place in relation to the whole. The general conception is not that of a purely mechanistic scheme in which we begin with particles of matter, and consider how they interact with one another to produce a more and more complex system, but one in which there is a guiding unity from the beginning. We may indeed, as metaphysicians, assume that there is a guiding unity of the entire universe. But short of such an ultimate generalization we find that observation itself reveals this tendency towards a progressive development and multiplication of unities, in relation to which individual activities occur.

I. BIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

In one sense, biology may be regarded as the most fundamental of the sciences, and even the simpler physical and chemical activities occur as parts of systems, which may be likened to organisms in having an environment to which their reactions are adjusted. This biological point of view needs for its completion the psychological point of

[1] Presidential Address to the Section of Psychology of the British Association at the Leeds Meeting, 1927. The paper was supplemented by descriptions of cases illustrating mental dissociation.

view, which is not something distinct from the biological, but a continuation of it. Psychology is a completion of biology as a science, and gives further meaning to it. The unity of the organism becomes more intelligible when we think of it as a mental, and in part a conscious unity. It is a unity in plurality. Physically, the organism is a unity of parts in spatial relation to one another; psychologically, it is a system of mental tendencies in relation to one another. What we find physically is a reaction to an environment in the form of reflex action, simple or conditioned. Psychologically, response to external stimulation is the satisfaction of conation (i.e. of striving), and, at higher levels, satisfaction of desire, &c. Biologically, it is the struggle for existence, with all that this involves. Psychologically, it is a conscious striving first of all for something that the individual does not know—towards a goal which he gradually realizes, gradually learns to understand as he achieves it or fails to achieve it. However helpful the biological concepts of tropisms and conditioned reflexes may be as explanatory factors, the psychological point of view throws further light upon the situation. The ultimate factor that has to be considered is something that is *purposive*—a general striving—which factor has to be assumed in order that the theory of conditioned reflexes will work.

2. NORMAL AND ABNORMAL DISSOCIATION

Unity of mind, then, is something which develops. In its general form it is there from the beginning, but it only exists in relation to a multiplicity. There is a one-and-many relationship from the beginning. Moreover, the individual himself is, to some extent, an abstraction. He belongs to a species. He has a history, and his history is, in part, the history of the entire species. The history of the species is part of the history of organic evolution, and

the history of organic evolution is part of the history of the universe—if, indeed, we may think of the universe itself as having a history. But within the individual experience there are partial activities that may struggle with one another just as individual members of a species may compete with one another, and in this nisus or striving towards more complete unity and greater complexity and more adequate adaptation to environment, the process of dissociation shows itself as essential and normal. Right from the beginning we must realize that dissociation is just as normal and necessary as association. The mind as it grows must be able to reject, and also must be able to segregate, one activity from another. Different activities must be insulated from one another to a great extent within the organism, just as in an electrical machine there must be insulation of the wires. This insulation is what is meant by normal dissociation or disjunction. And from the pathological point of view there can be disturbance in both respects—disturbance of association and disturbance of dissociation. Experiences may become associated in such a way as to blur the clearness of vision of the individual as regards appearances and values, just as, more obviously, dissociation may go beyond its proper function and tend to destroy the unity or totality towards which normal striving is directed.

3. THE NATURE OF MENTAL ASSOCIATION

The earliest associationist doctrine of psychology was unsatisfactory because, among other things, it failed to distinguish between the process of experiencing, or the act of experiencing, and the content or object of experience; and its aim seems to have been to describe the mind as a sort of mosaic of contents of experience joined up to one another according to the laws of association by contiguity and similarity. But association is primarily between the

acts of experience. These acts of experience are differentiations of the fundamental striving—that which Spinoza called the *conatus in suo esse perseverare*, 'the striving to persist in one's own being'. This striving has an object. There is always an object—the environmental changes which the individual has to face—and corresponding with the complexity of the environment there is complexity developing within this general striving, forming a complex system of conations. This conation involves the two other well-known aspects of cognition or awareness, and of feeling-tone. Associationist psychology erred in failing to allow due weight to the conative side, and in attempting to range the different kinds of feeling on a level with the different kinds of objective experience. But even according to the associationist scheme, dissociation or disjunction was necessary for a complete explanation of normal mental activity. Side by side with the principles of association by contiguity and similarity, there was the principle of dissociation by varying concomitants. Only by such a principle could the important processes of discrimination, comparison, and abstraction be brought within the circle of associationist doctrine. The general scheme of explanation was wrong, in that it dealt with contents of experience when it should have been dealing with acts of experience; and the general scheme of mental activity which we put in the place of this associationist scheme is that of systems of mental tendencies included within, and in subordination to, a wider system—tendencies towards knowledge and action, and involving feeling. One such system of explanation is that in terms of instinctive-emotional dispositions organized within sentiments, with the sentiments in their turn subordinated to one all-inclusive sentiment or master-interest. A sentiment is an organization of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object. What are organized are not the

presentations or representations, not the contents of experience primarily, but the processes or acts of experience. The tendencies of experience, and the activity and organization of these tendencies, bring with them an organization of the objects; and so our memories, which are retained and which are used for the retention of past experiences, fall into systems because the acts of experience corresponding to those memories fall into systems. And from that point of view we see that the dissociations of memory—the gaps in the memory continuum, known as amnesias—find their true significance in the segregation of corresponding acts of experience.

The question then arises, if we reject the associationist scheme according to which the mind is built up of presentations and representations cohering together in systems, are we to regard the unity of the mind as an aggregation of mental activities and tendencies? Are we to put in place of our mosaic of mental contents a collection or a colony of mental tendencies? The reply is 'No', because we do not have these mental tendencies separate from one another—just coming together and cohering, just as we do not have the mental contents coming together and cohering. Both subjectively and objectively, we must assume at the beginning a generalized striving and mental tendency, with a generalized objective—e.g. 'the great big buzzing confusion' of which William James speaks as the world of the new-born babe—a continuum of sensation and movement on one side, and a continuum of mental striving on the other. The general mental striving which we assume at the beginning becomes gradually differentiated in relation to the needs of the organism, and the demands made upon the organism by its environment—a differentiation superimposed upon the differentiations accumulating in the history of the race, and handed on from generation to generation in the form of instinctive

endowment and inherited aptitudes. The individual inherits not only separate instincts, but also the tendency towards an organization of those instincts. He inherits the beginnings of sentiments, as well as instincts. He is already a one-and-many unity, with his mind a plurality of part-tendencies and processes, and his task in life is to carry that organization to a higher stage. The demands made upon him by his environment bring with them movements in two directions—in the direction of greater unity and greater organization, and also of greater complexity—a greater degree of differentiation and discrimination. Discrimination is necessary because he has not only to accept, but also to neglect or reject, and this neglecting or rejecting involves dissociation, just as acceptance involves association.

4. THEORIES OF PATHOLOGICAL DISSOCIATION

As regards dissociation in pathological cases, the writers of the last generation thought of this in terms of associationist psychology, and in the doctrine of Prof. Pierre Janet one finds that standpoint still apparent. In his description of cases of hysteria and multiple personality, he implies a general background of explanation, according to which personality may be regarded as a synthesis of mental presentations some of which can be split off from the main mass. This view is similar to the colonial view of personality which we find in the writings of Ribot. But if we remind ourselves of the fact that experience involves an act of experiencing, we see that the situation is rather different. The power of recall is an essential aspect of conscious memory. On the other hand, unconscious memories are unconscious or latent mental activities directed towards past events. They are not passive, but involve a certain amount of mental energy. And so we pass from Pierre Janet's theory to the theory of Prof. Sigmund

Freud, and we find that the dissociation which is taken as a fact in Janet's theory is explained in Freud's theory in terms of mental conflict and repression. These memories become inaccessible to the individual because the mental tendencies corresponding to them are in conflict with other tendencies of the individual and incompatible with his more fundamental interests. So they are extruded by an active process of repression—they are barred from consciousness.

That process of repression and extrusion, though pathological in these cases, need not be necessarily so. We must not look upon extrusion itself as essentially pathological. It is because we have restricted the word dissociation so much to the pathological side that we find it so incomprehensible to us. It is because we have thought too much in terms of mental unity that cases of multiple personality seem to be inexplicable. Actually the most normal mind is a multiplicity. We are all many selves. We have to face the world from many different angles. We have many different interests. Interests in the most normal mind may conflict and be incompatible with one another. And it is a condition of mental health that such conflict can be resolved by elimination or by a higher synthesis. What makes the dissociation of multiple personality pathological is that the elimination is not complete—that dissociation in normal mental activity is a successful rejection, and that dissociation in a pathological case is unsuccessful—is an incomplete and therefore an unsuccessful rejection. A tendency that is pathologically repressed is, as it were, rejected and accepted at the same time—rejected by clear consciousness, but still clung to by the mind.

It is misleading to look upon the problem of mental dissociation and multiple personality as something standing by itself, as if we understood mental unity and were

perplexed by the appearance of multiplicity. Multiplicity is an aspect of the normal mind, just as much as unity is, and unity needs explaining just as much as multiplicity does. Those two problems must be solved together, and kept in relation to one another all through.

5. MULTIPLE PERSONALITY

Many of the classical cases of multiple personality are fully explained along these lines. They are cases of alternating personality with reciprocal amnesia, as it is called, in which each personality is unable to recall the experiences of the other. The two individuals *A* and *B* alternate with one another. *A* has his own system of memories and, when he disappears and makes way for *B*, *B* has his system of memories distinct from the memories of *A*. We may explain this in terms of two general systems of interests which are mutually incompatible and in conflict with one another. As a rule, one part of the personality is more fundamental—i.e. more stable, than the other. But difficulty arises in cases where one personality is shut up within its own memories and experiences, while the other personality has access to those memories as well as to its own. *A* may have his system of memories but be quite ignorant of *B*, except from indirect evidence, whereas *B* not only has a special set of memories, but also has direct knowledge of *A*'s memories, thoughts and feelings. This is a difficult problem which needs to be faced. We find an analogous, though not identical, situation in most cases of deep hypnosis. When a patient passes into the hypnotic state, he may remain fully aware of his waking consciousness, and may have free access to the memories of his waking self. But on awaking he does not, as a rule, remember his hypnotic experiences. The relation is a one-sided one. The hypnotic personality is acquainted with the waking personality and all its memories, but the

waking personality is not acquainted with the hypnotic personality. The range of the hypnotic personality is wider than the range of the waking personality. This similarity between one-sided multiple personality and the hypnotic personality is significant, when we remember that such cases have been investigated by the hypnotic method. Pierre Janet, Morton Prince, and others used the hypnotic method in studying cases of multiple personality, and the criticism has been made against them that in doing so they were manufacturing personalities—that the personalities were artefacts produced by the method. Every one recognizes that these investigators are psychologists of exceptional ability and circumspection and honesty of purpose, thoroughly trained and alive to the possibilities and difficulties of their method. We cannot dismiss their observations as false observations, or as misunderstandings on their part. But we must nevertheless allow for the influence of the process of hypnotism in the result, and as contrasted with that earlier period of investigation—the hypnotic period in psycho-pathology—we find that, now that hypnotism is seldom used and has been replaced by deep analysis, cases of multiple personality are not on record. The psycho-analysts to-day seem to have no such cases to report. Moreover, if we contrast the very large number of cases of severe nervous disturbance caused by the late war with the absence of cases of multiple personality there, we may become still more impressed by the argument that it was the persistent use of the hypnotic method that was mainly responsible for the complexity of most of the earlier cases reported.[1]

[1] Cases of extensive amnesia, fugues, &c., were numerous during the war; but the first aim of the army doctors in the battle areas was to remove these amnesias and reassociate the patients as quickly as possible, so that the latter might be either returned to the line or sent down to the base with the minimum of delay.

The movement of thought is always towards system and unity. Thought abhors arbitrary distinctions. Thought is baffled by cases of multiple personality because they are so different from the ordinary cases of everyday life. If we can build a bridge between one group of cases and the other, then we may feel that we are likely to have not only a more satisfying but a true explanation of the situation.

We must therefore approach the question of dissociation from the normal side—as manifested in a relatively normal mind. No mind is completely normal, since no mind completely solves its problems from day to day, and it is the failure to solve mental problems which is one of the general causes of the symptoms of psycho-neurosis and mental disease. Dissociation and multiple personality are not to be contrasted with association and mental unity. Pathological dissociation should be contrasted with the dissociationist processes of the normal mind. It should be regarded as a failure of the normal process of dissociation.

6. AUTOGNOSIS INCREASES MENTAL INTEGRATION, HYPNOTISM MAY DIMINISH IT

The unity of the normal mind, although it is there from the beginning, is a striving towards a more and more complete association; it constitutes an urge to a greater and greater degree of completeness of systematization and inclusiveness, but it is never really complete. In the most normal mind there is a falling away from complete unity. There is in the activity of this unitary mind not only a normal process of disjunction or dissociation, but also a certain degree of abnormal dissociation. In cases of multiple personality this abnormal dissociation has become so pronounced as to be apparent to the whole world. The process of deep analysis or psycho-analysis fails to reveal cases of thorough-going multiplicity, and the reason is that the process itself is a process of unification. As the

individual is being analysed, the failures of adaptation in his past life are cleared up, so that his mind is enabled to work more and more normally. Analysis is not a good term for this process. It is more than analysis, it is a process of self-revelation or *autognosis*. The individual learns to know himself better, and in the process of analysis there is actual development of the mind going on. There is a development in the direction of the normal and the unitary. Any dissociation that is encouraged by the method is a normal dissociation, not an abnormal dissociation. It is another expression of the same truth when we say that repressions are overcome in the process of analysis, because repressions are often pathological dissociations—dissociations that are not complete and not thoroughgoing.

In contrast with this process of autognosis, the process of hypnotic investigation carries with it a tendency to abnormal dissociation. A person who is easily hypnotized is a person who is already, to some extent, dissociated; in hypnotizing him we take a wedge, as it were, and drive it into his mind and split him up still more. No wonder the results give us an appearance of dissociation; but it would be very dangerous for us to take these results at their face value and draw inferences from them as to the structure of the normal mind, or even of the mind of the person we have been experimenting with. This general line of criticism seems valid as against such a theory as that of Prof. W. McDougall in the last chapter of his *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, in which he works out a theory of the Self as a system of monads which form a hierarchy, in which there is one dominant monad, the conscious self, and a whole number of subsidiary monads that are, in a normal mind, adequately subordinated to the chief monad and are in relation to the chief monad through telepathy;[1] but in a

[1] Unlike the monads of Leibniz, which 'have no windows', and are in a relation of pre-established harmony.

case of multiple personality one of these subsidiary monads may break loose and become insubordinate. This is an ingenious theory, and it may be true, but in the present state of our knowledge it would seem to be a case of explaining *obscurum per obscurius*. Telepathy may be a fact, but it is something about whose *conditions* we know next to nothing, and therefore not very suitable to take as a fundamental factor in an explanation of the working of the mind.

The mind can act at different levels on different occasions and under different circumstances. In many of the classical cases of multiple personality, the subsidiary personalities represent a regression to more juvenile forms of behaviour and of ethical valuation. This is clearly apparent in 'Sally Beauchamp' of the Miss Beauchamp case, and in the 'B' personality of the 'B.C.A.' case (Morton Prince). Such manifestations are not accurately described as 'split-off' personalities. Indeed, any spatial metaphor is inappropriate. In other cases the tendency to dramatization, natural to the human mind, may play an important part. Mutually incompatible ideals of character may be simultaneously or alternately aimed at, and identifications in early life, based on love and admiration for relatives, &c., may introduce incompatibilities which reveal themselves under circumstances of stress in later years as the grounds of pathological dissociation.

7. AB-REACTION AS A METHOD OF OVERCOMING MENTAL DISSOCIATION

As regards the problem of the *removal* of pathological mental dissociation in hysterical patients, much was learnt from the wide range of cases dealt with during the war. While treating shell-shock cases in the field in France I found that a large proportion of the cases showed a more or less extensive amnesia for events that had occurred immediately

after the shell explosion. These patients were easily hypnotized, and under light hypnosis the lost memories could be immediately restored. But I soon discovered that if I recalled at the same time the terrifying emotion that had originally belonged to these experiences, there was a tendency for the accompanying hysterical symptoms—deafness, mutism, tremors, paralysis, contractures, &c.—to disappear spontaneously, without the necessity of giving explicit suggestions to this end. The more complete I made the working-off of the emotion, or the 'ab-reaction', to use Breuer's original term, the more complete was the recovery. In cases seen by me previously in England I had also restored lost memories by light hypnosis, but had not produced intense emotional revival and had not seen collateral symptoms disappear. But again, towards the end of the war, I was seeing more chronic cases in Scotland, and then found that amnesias of longer standing could be cleared up with accompanying ab-reaction of the emotion of fear; and that with the ab-reaction there was observable that tendency for the collateral symptoms to disappear at the same time, such as I had observed so frequently in France.

These are observed facts, and I endeavoured to show in a paper some years ago[1] that they could be explained in terms of a theory of reassociation. The amnesic patients fresh from the trenches showed a twofold dissociation, namely (1) a dissociation of the memory of events immediately following upon the shell explosion from mem-

[1] 'Hypnotism, Suggestion, and Dissociation', *Brit. Med. Jour.*, 14 June 1919. My theory and practice of ab-reaction was developed in relation to *hysterical patients of a special type*; it is only as applied to such cases that I advocate the method, although my observations (on many hundreds of patients of this type) have also a wider bearing on general psychological theory. The matter is fully discussed in my *Psychology and Psychotherapy* (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1922) especially in chapters i, vi, and vii.

ories of earlier and later parts of the patient's life; and (2) a dissociation of these memories, as mere intellectual awareness, from the accompanying emotional reaction of fear—tremors, sweating, mutism, paralysis, &c.—which are of a physiological nature. The physical reaction of fear, thus dissociated from its psychical counterpart, had become relatively permanent instead of being transitory. The patient no longer felt the emotion of fear—at least, of just that fear which the shell explosion had aroused—but did show its physical manifestations in the form of hysterical symptoms. By re-arousing the whole of the lost experience in all its emotional vividness I overcame *both* dissociations. The physical manifestations became linked up with their psychical counterpart, and this in its turn was linked up with earlier and later memories of the patient's life. In this way the mind was completely re-synthesized, and the physical symptoms came once more under the sway of the entire mind (the complete personality) and could disappear.

In addition to ab-reaction, I advocate the thorough thinking out of the whole psychological situation by the patient, so that he may be brought eventually to understand himself adequately. This is the process of autognosis, or self-knowledge. The patient is encouraged to obtain as objective a view of his entire mental condition as is possible.

8. AB-REACTION AND TRANSFERENCE

Dr. C. G. Jung[1] has explained the beneficial effects of ab-reaction in terms of 'transference'. By transference is meant the emotional rapport (conscious and unconscious) which springs up between patient and physician, and

[1] He writes: 'It must, above all, be emphasized that it is not merely the rehearsal of experience that possesses an unconditional curative effect, but the rehearsal of experience *in the presence of the physician*.' *Brit. Journ. Med. Psych.*, vol. ii, 1921.

which enables the patient to live again, in the course of an analysis, through earlier experiences of his life in relation to the physician, and thus become freed from their harmful effects. The following case illustrates how ab-reaction can bring benefit without the factor of transference coming in. It is a case of a man of considerable education who had for some years suffered from obsessive fear, the origin of which he could not fathom. He would wake up in the morning with this fear weighing upon his mind. After reading about the method of ab-reaction, as used in the treatment of shell-shock patients, he thought that he would try to cure himself by a similar method. He endeavoured to recall earlier and earlier memories of his past life, using the method of concentration—to all intents and purposes producing a light degree of self-hypnosis. At length he seemed to get this memory: it was half a memory, half a waking vision. He seemed to be in a sort of native compound in India. He experienced intense heat, such heat as he never remembered experiencing in his life before, and seemed to see a black kid lying on the ground with its throat cut, and blood pouring out of the wound. He felt intense terror as he went through this experience. This terror grew and grew 'like a bubble'. It got bigger and bigger and at last burst, and all at once the fear began to subside again and eventually disappeared, and he remained free of it afterwards. As far as one could make out—he came and told me of it afterwards; I had not treated him at the time—he had cured himself of the fear by bringing up this memory. He could not be certain that the memory was a real memory, but thought that it probably was, because he had lived in India up to the age of two, when he left for England and had not returned since. It was thus probable that it was a real experience; if not so in all its details, the central kernel of the experience was probably real, and its recall was effective in

curing him. It will be noticed that he did not ab-react this experience in relation to another person. He was not in a doctor's consulting-room, telling the doctor what he could remember. He was by himself. He had not even gone to a doctor beforehand, so that it could not be described as a transference towards the doctor in the latter's absence. He had not applied to any doctor for treatment at that time. He came on to me afterwards, simply to talk the matter out still further, and to learn whether he had been working on the right lines, and how he should proceed in order to ensure that the fearsome experience should not return. An example like this is a refutation of the view that the only beneficial effect of ab-reaction is the transference. Transference is indeed often the chief factor of cure, and in many ab-reaction cases transference is an additional factor. But an example like this shows that ab-reaction by itself has therapeutic value, in contradiction to Jung's view.[1]

Ab-reaction of repressed emotion sweeps away the repression, and so frees energy which had been previously needed to hold the repressed memories apart from the rest of the mind and away from clear consciousness. This freed energy is thus put once more at the general disposal of the personality. The previous 'fixation' of this repressing energy and its deviation from the common fund of energy of the personality probably explains, to some extent, the feeling of fatigue that generally accompanies a psychoneurosis.

9. PERSONALITY AND SURVIVAL OF BODILY DEATH

The unitary personality, as an organization of mental activities and mental powers, is not static but dynamic, and is in process of development throughout life. Although

[1] I record this case in *Talks on Psychotherapy*, University of London Press, Ltd., 1923, pp. 39–41.

it carries with it, as a physical correlate, a unitary working of the brain and of other parts of the body, this does not necessarily involve complete dependence upon the latter for its continued existence. The question of personal survival of bodily death is one which can be intelligibly and scientifically put, and which is in theory answerable along the lines of scientific observation and inference. The investigations carried out by the Society for Psychical Research during the past fifty years are of this nature, and the Society's results and provisional hypotheses can rightly claim a place in modern psychological science. Nevertheless, if due allowance is made for the possible working of such factors as conscious or sub-conscious fraud, telepathy between the living, and chance coincidence, the scientific evidence for personal survival of bodily death is not very strong.

For more convincing reasons (apart from the pronouncements of revealed religion) in support of this belief we still have to turn to philosophy, and in modern philosophical theories of *value* we find arguments that are far from negligible.[1]

[1] I have set out arguments from theory of value in my *Mind and Personality*, University of London Press, Ltd., 1926, pp. 309–18.

V

MIND AND THE THEORY OF CONDITIONED REFLEXES

THE unity and organization of the mind have a direct counterpart in the unity and organization of the nervous system, and we are therefore not surprised to find that physiologists and biologists, and even some psychologists, seek to explain the unity of experience exclusively in terms of reflex action. Following Herbert Spencer, they interpret an instinctive activity as a congenitally organized chain of reflexes, a series of reflex activities owing its adaptive nature to the working of natural selection throughout a long sequence of generations.

According to this school of thought, the first reflex produces a stimulus to a second reflex, the response in the second reflex serves as a stimulus for a third, and so on, until the activity is completed. Such an instinctive activity as the building of a nest would thus be described as follows. The bird is under the influence of a special internal general state, which makes it tend to react readily to the presence of (take more than ordinary interest in?) bits of stick and straw and hay, &c. It takes up these pieces of straw and hay, and that picking up of the straw serves as a stimulus for it to fly away to a certain place, to trees, and then to settle on a particular tree, and that serves as a stimulus for it to deposit the straw there. Thus step by step it gradually builds a nest. No reference to the consciousness of the bird is made, or is considered necessary, throughout this description.

In passing from the inherited instinctive reactions common to the species to the acquired reactions developed by the individual through experience, we find a number of scientists, under the leadership of the great Russian

physiologist Pavlov, attaching the utmost importance to what they call 'conditioned reflexes', where the reflex activity is aroused not by the so-called appropriate or natural stimulus, but by some other stimulus than the natural one.

To explain this further, let us take Pavlov's example, or the most prominent in Pavlov's book,[1] the secretion of saliva by the dog. The natural and appropriate stimulus is the presence of meat or other food in the mouth. The actual presence of meat in the mouth will reflexly produce the secretion of saliva. Later on, the mere sight of food will produce the secretion of saliva because the taste of the food has been experienced in immediate succession to the actual sensation or presence of meat in the mouth. The production of saliva from mere sight of the food is a conditioned reflex. The production of saliva from the presence of food in the mouth is a direct or unconditioned reflex. Pavlov found further, that in place of visual appearance of the meat he could put some other associated stimulus, such as the sound of a metronome beating at a definite rate, stimulation of definite points of the skin, or again other visual stimuli. These would all in their turn succeed in bringing about a secretion of saliva if previously presented to the dog a sufficient number of times immediately before the meat was given. Even the whirling of certain geometrical shapes by means of an electric motor in the dog's view would produce the secretion of saliva, if that visual experience had been previously associated with the ordinary natural stimulus, the presence of food in the mouth, a sufficient number of times. The secretion of saliva is recorded in a special way. It runs out through the parotid duct, from the parotid gland, into a glass apparatus con-

[1] *Conditioned Reflexes*. By I. P. Pavlov. Translated and edited by G. V. Anrep, M.D., D.Sc. (Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford, 1927.)

nected with a manometer containing an indicator. The indicator moves along the manometer tube in accordance with the amount of saliva secreted.

Originally Pavlov counted the drops of the saliva emanating from the parotid duct as a measure of the extent to which the gland was responding, but he found that he could get a more accurate record by using this manometer.

The arrangement of the experiment is such that the dog is in a room by himself, and the observer is in another room shut off. The dog doesn't see the observer. The object of this is to restrict the stimuli influencing the dog's action to just those stimuli that are being investigated. The utmost care is taken to avoid adventitious vibrations or other stimuli.

In Pavlov's laboratory at Moscow trenches have been dug round the building, and these trenches are filled with sawdust, so that the shaking of vehicles passing by shall not reach the dog's chamber. The essential in these experiments is that they should be pure, free from admixture of irrelevant stimuli. The experimenter must be sure that the stimulus he is using is the stimulus that produces the result.

Such reflexes as these Pavlov calls positive conditioned reflexes. Recently he has shown the possibility of producing negative conditioned reflexes. He has found that certain stimuli can be associated with experience in the dog in such a way as to suppress the secretion of saliva.

To give an example of the difference between positive conditioned reflexes and negative conditioned reflexes: Pavlov arranged for a metronome to be beating at the rate of 100 per second in the presence of a dog immediately before and also while the dog was receiving food, and therefore when saliva would be secreted. After a series of experiments the conditioned reflex was completely formed.

The number of times that the experiment needs to be repeated varies with the animal used, and in the case of a dog it may be roughly about 120 to 130. So much for positive conditioned reflexes.

Pavlov then carried out another series of experiments. He arranged the metronome to beat at 50 per second, and that meat should not be given to the dog. At first the dog finds 50 a second is rather similar to 100, and his nervous system reacts as if the 100 a second stimulus were being given, and saliva is secreted. I do not say the dog actually thinks or feels this. Pavlov is sure that for scientific purposes that is not the way to describe it. The nervous system of the dog tends to react to the 50 a second beat as he had previously reacted to the 100 a second beat with the secretion of saliva. The dog then finds that the meat is not given. This sequence is repeated a number of times, the metronome beating at 50 and the dog being denied food. As the experiments are repeated the secretion of saliva becomes less and less, and at last ceases entirely, with the result that every time the metronome beats 50 the secretion of saliva is suppressed, whereas if it beats 100 the saliva is secreted as before. Thus the 100 per second beat of the metronome produces a positive conditioned reflex, and the 50 per second beat produces a negative conditioned reflex. The positive reflex is an example of stimulation, and the negative is an example of inhibition. In one case there is stimulation of response, and in the other case inhibition of response.

Recently Pavlov has made a dog neurasthenic by giving stimuli between 100 and 50, so that the dog (metaphorically speaking) 'did not know where he was'. His nervous system didn't know whether he was going to be given food or not; at 75 the nervous system would tend partly to produce secretion of saliva and partly to suppress such secretion. The dog was in a state of oscillation between the two tendencies, and became neurasthenic. The dog

went off his food and became sleepless. He was cured of this neurasthenia by being given bromide.

The negative conditioned reflex is a very important part of Pavlov's general theory. Pavlov and his co-workers in Moscow have extended their experiments to other animals, and also to young children.

In the case of a young child it is arranged that the child shall lie on its back on a couch in a room separated from the experimenter's room, with a bulb fixed under the child's chin working a manometer, so that whenever it opens its mouth this movement is registered. An arrangement is rigged up whereby chocolates can drop into the child's mouth. That is the stimulus—the pleasant stimulus. Pavlov found the child would respond by opening its mouth when neutral stimuli were presented if they had been associated previously with the subsequent presentation of food. And what is very important is that, compared with the dog, the child developed a conditioned reflex much more quickly. Whereas the dog will require, say, 120 experiments to get the conditioned reflex thoroughly established, in the case of a child it may be established after 20 or 25 repetitions, and can also be abolished more quickly.

Pavlov has been doing this work for over twenty years, and he is collecting more and more enthusiastic workers around him, and is becoming more and more convinced of the view that the whole of life can be explained in terms of conditioned reflexes. He talks even of purpose as a conditioned reflex.

One might ask, 'If this is Pavlov's idea of human activity, what about religion? What about idealism of any kind?' Pavlov's view is that his theory of determinism is not antagonistic to religion, though he is not himself particularly keen on religion nor interested in it. His view seems to be that we cannot know too much about ourselves, which means that we cannot know too much about our

brains. The more we know about the way in which our brains work, the more satisfactory life will be for us and for the rest of the universe. Looking back into the past history of the race we see how many of the calamities which have befallen the race have been due to ignorance—to false views and false enthusiasms, from which war and suffering and misery have followed. The more we understand our motives, how we are moved to do different actions, the more we can control them. So it may be said that an educated person has more self-control than an uneducated person. Well, this is true as far as it goes, but Pavlov seems to suffer from some confusion of thought in limiting himself to the physical aspects. He is, as a matter of fact, unable to see the psychological aspect, and he relates how in those early years over twenty years ago, after great mental conflict, he abandoned the psychological path. He had previously called these reflexes (the secretion of saliva) psychical reflexes. He refuses to use that term now. He uses the term conditioned reflex to emphasize the fact that in his view it is physiological in nature, and has to be explained physiologically. Psychology cannot help us at all, he thinks, because psychological concepts are so vague and changeable. He avoids the consideration of consciousness altogether. Nevertheless, the fundamentally psychological conception of purposive activity (even perhaps in its more explicit form of *expectation*) has to be assumed in order to explain the special rules according to which conditioned reflexes are built up—especially the rule that 'the conditioned stimulus should begin to operate *before* the unconditioned stimulus comes into action' (*op. cit.*, p. 27).

The mistakes made by Pavlov, and by the Behaviourists generally, are in what they deny rather than in what they affirm. What they affirm is very important so far as it goes. There certainly are such things as conditioned

reflexes. No one can read Pavlov's work without being convinced of that. It is through the activity of the cerebral cortex that conditioned reflexes are built up and become active. The cortex of the brain (as distinct from subcortical levels) seems to be the physical basis for the production of positive and negative conditioned reflexes. These conditioned reflexes are of the utmost importance to psychologists as well as to physiologists. Every psychologist should welcome whatever help he can get from Pavlov and his followers. Where the psychologist would disagree would be in the denial that the psychological aspect as such has any importance for science. It is as important for science as it is for philosophy. The question is, in what sense have we to take Pavlov's own statement about self-determination by education—that the educated man has greater power over his destiny than the man who is not educated; and that he who knows more about the working of the brain has greater power. Knowledge is a psychological factor. It is knowledge that is an essential factor in freedom. It is somewhat of a mystery how knowledge can give freedom—knowledge of events that seem to be completely determined and linked up one with another according to definite laws. Yet when we know those laws we seem able to use our knowledge and direct our mind and our career. That direction of our life, although it may not interfere with the law of conservation of energy, or annul any of the laws of physical action, is a definite feature and factor in our life, and it is all the freedom that we need.

MIND AND MATTER

Even if we take the theory of conditioned reflexes, and that of Behaviourism generally, at its face value, we can yet escape the materialistic conclusion by again speaking in terms of 'emergence', reminding ourselves that what we mean by emergence is the appearance of something new

that is not adequately explainable in terms of its antecedents and yet that follows according to a definite rule as a real process from those antecedents. So conscious activity follows upon change in systems of nerve fibres, or, at least, the systematization of consciousness corresponds to the systematization of those nerve fibres and nerve arcs. The mind emerges from brain activity and gradually there emerges a higher and higher form of mental activity, a higher and higher degree of unity. The unity of the mind may diminish—there may be a falling away from unity in various ways, as there is in cases of morbid disturbance —but on the other hand if there is an urge towards unity, the extent to which the unity has been achieved may correspond to the degree of permanence of the mind. Just as Lord Kelvin thought of the 'indestructible' atom after the analogy of a vortex, as possessing a greater degree of permanence than other types of physical formation, so we may conceive of the mind as developing out of brain activity and through its unity or degree of integration acquiring sufficient power to enable it to survive the death of the body.

Such a view as that is indeed a kind of materialism, but it is not the crude materialism of earlier years. I think we can say that quite a number of people are now groping towards a view of the mind in relation to the brain which is different from the idealistic view of previous generations. The latter tended to brush aside scientific theories and to consider them of little or no importance. Nowadays we are not deceived by such objections. We feel that the knowledge of the physical universe is very solid, upon which we can act with great confidence, and we want to know more of it, and to get all the physical knowledge we can. Every sound philosopher is anxious to take full account of the findings of science, and in considering the fate of the mind any one who is now up to date would con-

sider it in relation to everything that can be known or surmised about the working of the brain.

And there is this possibility, that just as the evolution story seems to point to the development of ever more self-sufficing organisms, and a greater and greater degree of permanence on the physical side, so there may correspond with it, or there may be a tendency towards carrying over all of that permanence into another state obeying other physical laws. The physical universe which we know, and with which we come into contact in this life, may not be the only physical universe, and it is at least conceivable that all the reality of value that has been produced in each individual through his conscious experience of this life, in touch with physical matter, may be retained and preserved in relation to another universe, another part of physical reality. The mind having emerged from the matter of this world may itself survive in relation to some other type of material existence.

The advances in physics make it easier for us to imagine the relationship between mind and matter than was possible according to earlier doctrines. In earlier times scientists thought in terms of a 'billiard-ball universe', a number of impenetrable atoms continually colliding with one another. All that, of course, has disappeared. Such a physical universe as that seemed utterly foreign to mental activity. The new conception of matter, not as particles in space moving in time, but as an interconnected system of space-time events, brings one nearer to the conception of mental activity.

Bodily activity and mental activity are not now so separate or mutually exclusive in thought, for any one up to date in modern physics, as they were a generation ago, and it would be a rather ironical state of affairs if the ultimate saving of the position of the soul comes through Materialism rather than through Idealism. But probably it is more

correct to hold that modern materialism is itself becoming more and more 'idealistic' through the natural course of its development. Just now the mathematicians are nearer to the philosophers than the biologists are. The physiologist may feel that with nerve arcs and nerve cells he has something solid and definite which he can confidently think of in terms of chemistry and physics, and the chemist may build confidently upon physics; yet the physicist in further investigation of matter comes right up against metaphysics and psychology.

The physicist gets to know of matter through the senses—through direct perception—and all that keeps him from (as it were) falling into the psychological pit is his system of measurements. He weighs and measures, and abstracts from the rest of the world these measurable characteristics, and works them up into a system to produce theories of the physical universe, which are divided by very thin walls from theories of the Mind.

VI

ASSOCIATION, DISSOCIATION, AND REPRESSION

IT is important to remember that Dissociation, to be adequately understood, must be regarded as a normal function of the mind, quite as much as Association is, and that although the tendency has been to speak of Association as normal and Dissociation as abnormal, this leads to difficulties and misunderstanding.

ASSOCIATION

A general survey of the various classes of psychological association shows that they can be reduced to two general types, viz. association by contiguity and association by similarity; but, on further scrutiny, one finds that association by contiguity involves similarity, and that association by similarity involves contiguity.

First as regards association by contiguity: you see a flower, and you are told that the name of the flower is 'rose'; later on, you see perhaps the same flower, or another flower, and you at once find the name 'rose' occurring to your mind. The second flower, even if the 'same', is not identical with the first flower, but resembles it. It is because it resembles it that you have called up the 'same' name rose. And here again the name rose that comes to your mind is not identical with the original name. It is not heard as actually spoken, but is mentally reproduced.

Or expressed in symbols. In association by contiguity you have an experience *a* which is followed by experience *b*—the visual appearance of the flower, *a*, followed by *b*, the sound of the name 'rose'. But on a later occasion you experience not *a* but a_1, and a_1 calls up not *b* but b_1. a_1 is a flower similar to the original flower and b_1 has a certain

similarity to *b*. Thus, if *a* has been experienced simultaneously with *b* or in immediate succession to *b*, then a_1 calls up b_1. *a* is never reproduced in its exact form, nor is *b*, and the link is the link of resemblance or similarity, with identical reference.

Conversely with regard to association by similarity. Here the one experience may be represented by $a+b$, the other by $b+c$, and they are associated through the identical element *b*. Strictly, the association is association by contiguity through identity. The identity is, again, an identity of *reference*.

Every experience has two aspects, the process of experiencing and that which is experienced. When the individual sees the flower before him, there is the process of looking, the process of seeing, and the flower that he sees; and when a moment later he hears the name 'rose', there is the process of hearing and the name rose that he hears. So that instead of the association being between *a* and *b*, the matter is a little more complex. You have association between α *a* and β *b* (where the Greek letters represent acts of experience, in contrast with the objects thereby experienced). αa is the experience of seeing the rose; βb is the experience of hearing the name rose, and the association is built up between α *a* and β *b*.

And the question arises, 'Is the association primarily between α and β, or between α *a* and β *b*, or between *a* and *b*?'

William James and many others have been unhesitating in holding that the association is between the objects *a* and *b*—the appearance of the rose is associated with the name, and likewise as regards association by similarity. This leads to the doctrine of presentationism, according to which each person possesses his own panorama of experiences distinct from other people's experiences, with the danger of solipsism as an ultimate logical conclusion.

Let us keep to this very simple experience. You see an actual flower, and a moment later you hear the name 'rose'. Your attention passes from the one to the other and so you associate the one with the other. If you were in an entirely distracted state of mind when you saw the flower and heard the name rose, there would be no association built up between them.

Moreover, in the very simplest type of case, like the learning of a series of nonsense syllables, we find that earlier nonsense syllables call up later nonsense syllables, and that there is only a very slight tendency for them to be associated with those preceding. You start with *A*, and go on to *B*, and so to *C* and to *D*, &c. And if you start with *C* you tend to move from *C* to *D*, because that is the direction in which you learnt the series, and there is only a very slight tendency for an association to be built up between *C* and *B*, or *B* and *A*. This general rule is known as the law of forward conduction, and association is dependent upon it.

We must think of the mind as a form of activity, having a certain structure. It manifests different types of interest, the primary instinctive tendencies—self preservation, self assertion, and the rest—and these fundamental instincts are associated with the detailed experiences of life. The individual with these past experiences faces present reality, and in perceiving he really apperceives; he apperceives by virtue of his previous experiences. He has built up a system of past experiences organized round fundamental instinctive interests, which give quality or 'colour' to his mental activity. When he sees the flower, for example, and takes interest in it, his mental activity is modified accordingly. The act of looking is a part of his entire active mind, as represented by his various interests. A moment later he hears the name of the flower spoken, and there is a movement of mental activity from the one

experience to the other. So α passes into β, and you get then, apparently, an association between *a* and *b*, but of course the association isn't between *a* and *b*. It isn't that the flower, the visual experience, is associated with the sound primarily. These are parts of the real objective world. Their relationships are of a physical nature. The different objects of the world are related to one another according to physical laws, and you will get into confusion if you say that some of these objects of the physical world can be also related to one another according to another law, viz. the law of association. The law of association holds not between physical objects at all, but between the processes of experiencing—perceiving or remembering. The emphasis should be put upon the transition from one act of experience to another. Of course, at the back of all there is the *continuity* (G. F. Stout) of the mental stream.

Perhaps a more accurate description is to put the emphasis on the association of α and β, but to add that α carried with it a colouring of *a* by being experience of *a*. This experience of the object, of the flower that you see, leaves some sort of after-effect in the mind and modifies the mental activity, so that later the reproduction of α brings up with it *a*, and then that is followed by β *b*.

The ordinary doctrine is inadequate because it gives us processes of experiencing—perceiving or remembering —and objects perceived or remembered, and something in between which are called mental images, presentations or representations, which are supposed to reveal the objects to the thinker, but which might quite as well conceal them. The further question always arises: 'Is there resemblance between the object and the image?' So far as perception is true, the object and impression should be identical; so far as the memory is true the object and image should be identical. We know it is often not identical, and that is no doubt the reason why we have retained the

theory of ideas or the 'new way of ideas', which Locke first instituted and in so doing founded modern psychology. But this theory of ideas leaves us with further difficulties, and has made psychology apparently too easy. It has worked within limits, and has encouraged psychologists to concentrate their attention on the more intellectual presentational or representational aspects of experience. But modern psychology is moving along rather different lines, in that it emphasizes the importance of instincts as the expression of fundamental interests of the mind. Modern psychology is primarily in terms of interest, and the objects are not interesting in themselves. I mean that the mere scenery of the mind, as it were, that 'panorama' of which I have already spoken, is not in itself so important as the motive forces of the mind. So again we are emphasizing the α and β aspects as distinct from the a and b in associational processes, and this is where dissociation also comes in as a normal process of the mind.

DISSOCIATION

The mind, besides gaining an objective view of life by linking up interests one with another, has to organize its interests and make itself felt in the world. It reacts, and must act in a *differential* way. It must be able not only to accept and associate but it must also be able to neglect or to reject, to dissociate, otherwise the result would be a mere mechanical record—like a gramaphone-record produced in the brain—just a record corresponding to a sequence of physical events. The mind faces this sequence of physical change with a character of its own, and it can only get to understand the outside world, and obtain a true picture of it, by comparison and abstraction as well as by mere receptivity. It not only receives impressions from outside, but it must discriminate them one from another, and must be able to analyse by comparing and

abstracting. Thus it gradually builds up a view of the outer world and discovers order in the outer world.

The process of comparing and abstracting is a process of dissociation. In fact, it is sometimes formulated in another law, the law of dissociation by varying concomitants. This may be represented diagrammatically as a number of ellipses intersecting (*vide* William James).



Different objects of experience represented by these five ellipses, *A*, *B*, *C*, *D*, and *E*, all have something in common, viz. *X*, which by fivefold superposition becomes prominent and 'rolls out', disentangling itself from its associates.

This question of dissociation is of especial interest to us as bearing upon the unity of the mind. According to earlier psychological theory mental unity was to be regarded as a result of association processes, different experiences becoming associated and linked up.

But to be an effective unity the mind must be able to compare and abstract, and also to neglect and to reject.

What are the normal ways in which the processes of neglect and rejection may occur?

Firstly, through concentration of attention. The individual, by concentrating the attention along one line of activity, saves himself from being disturbed by subsidiary experiences, and in a way 'dissociates' these experiences. Baffled by noises in the street when he is thinking or talking, by increasing his attention on the subject about which he is speaking he may be able to dissociate the other temporarily. Obviously such dissociation must be going on all the time. If we take the analogy of an electric machine, we find that the different parts must be insulated

from one another, otherwise short-circuiting occurs. So it is with the mind. The different interests must be insulated from one another and must also be, so to say, mobile. In order to be mobile, an interest must be relatively dissociated from neighbouring interests and yet linked up with them. Dissociation is part of the more general process of organization or integration. The different interests must follow one another according to some sort of law or rule. This is well illustrated by the doctrine of the sentiments in normal psychology.

It is not easy to draw a clear line of demarcation between normal dissociation and pathological dissociation. They undoubtedly shade into one another, just as normal and pathological associational processes shade into one another.

Perhaps we may put it in this way; abnormal dissociation is generally of the nature of *repression*, whereas normal dissociation is of the nature of rational rejection or renunciation—although it may sometimes be unconscious and involve mechanical exclusion or disjunction. In repression the individual runs away from the experience, and does not adequately face it; he pushes it aside and yet a part of his mind continues to cling to it. The mind is divided against itself.

REPRESSION

Repression in morbid psychology is always directed towards the removal or avoidance of pain.[1] It is directed upon an instinctive tendency, more or less linked up with a certain presentation or idea—called by Freud an 'instinct-presentation'. The satisfaction of this instinct by itself would involve pleasure, as the satisfaction of every instinct does, but in particular circumstances it involves pain because other tendencies of the mind are simultaneously aroused which disturb or thwart it. The purpose

[1] In the sense of the German *Unlust*, or 'unpleasure'—not physical pain.

of repression is to remove this feeling of pain, or to prevent its occurrence. The repression pushes out of consciousness the corresponding ideas or thoughts and holds the instinctive activity in check. This instinctive activity carries with it a certain kind of emotional energy. Thus, if the instinct is the sex instinct, the energy is libido; if it is the self-assertive or the self-preservative instinct, the energy is some other form of vital energy.

Repression is often pathological.[1] The symptoms that occur in dissociated and repressed cases are due to a return of the repression. If the repression were completely successful the individual would be merely the poorer in energy, with his mind crippled to that extent, the energy corresponding to that instinctive drive being removed from the conscious mind. But repression never is completely successful, and there is always a tendency for the repressed instinct-presentation to return, to reassert itself, and the symptom that occurs is the sign of the return of the repression. The symptom-formation is a defence mechanism, the defence which the mind puts up against the repressed tendency.

To quote an illustration from Freud (which I won't vouch for in any other way). Freud has given a full report of the analysis of a boy who had a fear of animals, especially the fear of a wolf, and Freud thought his analysis showed that this originated from a libidinous tendency of the boy towards his father in early years, which had then been repressed. In this case the 'presentation' was the idea of the father; the instinctive tendency was sex in some form or another. Under repression the idea of the father disappeared from the child's consciousness completely. The libidinous energy came back into consciousness in the form of fear, and fear linked itself up through various experiences in early childhood with the idea of a wolf, so

[1] In my use of the term, not in Freud's.

that the child had the fear of a wolf. The fear of a wolf was the first stage in the evolution of a mechanism directed against the repressed tendency. This fear of a wolf then became extended to other animals, bringing with it a tendency of avoidance. The child acquired the tendency to avoid animals, and so became more and more restricted in its mental life.

I quote that as a case which Freud himself gives as an illustration, in vol. iv of his *Collected Papers* (Hogarth Press), in an article on 'Repression'. Freud's doctrine of repression involves a very definite doctrine of psychology which is quite different from ordinary doctrines of normal psychology. Freud believes in ideas and presentations which are unconscious or exist in 'the Unconscious', and thinks that they are active and have a certain amount of energy attached to them, as it were, which he calls *Besetzungsenergie*. Translated into English (or Greek !), the equivalent of *Besetzung* is *cathexis*, which means an occupying or charging (with energy). This cathexis, this charging of ideas and presentations with energy—libidinal energy in the case of sex, or energy of interest in the case of ego-instincts—this energy can be shifted from one presentation to another, and can be ultimately condensed upon one particular presentation, or group of presentations. 'Condensation' and 'displacement' are, in Freud's view, activities of what he calls 'the primary mental process', characteristic of the (systematic) Unconscious.

It is normal association and normal dissociation which enable us to pass in an orderly way from one interest to another, just as at a lower level we pass from the dominance of one instinctive tendency to another. The various instincts are in a state of normal dissociation from one another. They become abnormally dissociated when the satisfaction of one instinct, which in itself of course tends to produce pleasure, arouses or conflicts with other in-

stinctive tendencies or with higher and later developed tendencies of the mind, and produces or tends to produce pain. The mind protects itself from the pain by preventing the experience or past memory or mental tendency from rising into consciousness, and Freud calls this repressed material an instinct-presentation. He thinks of it as a presentation, or set of presentations or mental images, carried along by a certain instinctive tendency, this instinctive tendency being actuated by a certain type of energy. The type of energy in the case of sex is libido. In other instincts it is one or another kind of interest.

The result of repression may be either the complete removal of the instinct-presentation from conscious life, or the removal of the presentation from consciousness and the prevention of its coming into consciousness under ordinary circumstances, with a change in the affective tone accompanying the activity; if the affect does come into consciousness, it may be of the nature of anxiety, which is painful.

Or again the energy of the instinct is deviated from the actual experience of the presentation, and breaks through or may be shifted to other presentations, actuating them, and so may eventually reach consciousness in relation to another presentation altogether, very far removed in nature from the original presentation, so producing an unintelligible and mystifying symptom.

This description is too pictorial and obviously inadequate. Freud's conception of presentations as being either conscious or unconscious, and as being distinct from the instinctive tendency, which is in its turn distinct from the energy sustaining it—all this is much too metaphorical. Nevertheless, it is an attempt to read order into a collection of facts derived from the detailed investigation of psycho-neurotic symptoms which do not in general admit of more direct or obvious explanation. It is based upon

the findings of prolonged analysis (psycho-analysis), and can only be adequately tested and corrected by the use of similar methods of investigation ('deep' analysis).

Certain general criticisms are in place here. The various instincts are not observable in themselves; all that you observe are their effects, and their effects are their manifestations, and the manifestations are actual experiences of thinking, feeling, and so on. They are simple sequences of pulses in the stream of consciousness, and you find these various experiences linked up with one another in certain ways and you make deductions from what you observe of the stream of consciousness; you deduce the working of various instincts, helped out, of course, by considerations of biology. They are inferences. What you actually observe are pulses of the mental stream. From moment to moment the mind is active and you can classify the activities under the headings of self-assertion, self-preservation, sex, curiosity, gregariousness, acquisitiveness, &c. Then you may ask: 'How, through reaction with an environment, do these various tendencies to activity fall into a system?' The individual in order to survive must react systematically to the changes of his external environment, and so there are different systems of tendencies that spring up. These are what we call the instincts, and although we must admit that the doctrine of the instincts is a form of faculty psychology, such criticism is not a destructive criticism. The doctrine is a part of our general system of knowledge, as an hypothesis indispensable at the moment, like the physical hypotheses of the atom and its subsidiary parts, the electrons and protons, which we infer although we do not directly observe them.

But in inferring the existence of instincts we must be careful not to distinguish them too completely from the cognitive side of the mind—that is, the side of direct

awareness of external events, or of events within an individual's own mind. We must recognize that the cognition itself always involves an active process, the process of selection, the selection being based upon the degree of development and organization of the active mind thus far reached—reached at any particular moment—in the individual's life.

The principle of selectiveness as regards cognition is important, showing that the mind is active in deciding what it shall pay attention to, and shall preserve in memory. But besides this, when it is selecting and preserving, it retains within itself the power of modifying. Experiences are taken up into the living current of the mind, and in memory share the mobility of that current. It is in this way that we can understand the continuity between memory images and imagination images or phantasy.

The findings of deep analysis emphasize the reality of phantasy as an activity that may go on unconsciously, although this may seem to be a contradiction in terms.

Deep analysis reveals the existence of these phantasies not as simply a product of analysis. They are much too rich and varied in character and much too relevant to the individual's mental life and past mental history to be regarded as created *ad hoc*, at the moment that analysis is taking place. Although they apparently rise to consciousness in analysis, they were there in some form or another before—not in a static, fixed form of existence but in an active, changing form. They went through the process of formation and development before they were brought into consciousness and revealed by deep analysis.

The effect of deep analysis is to inhibit their growth by thus, as it were, ventilating them, and giving them a chance of coming into relationship with the more normal and realistic life of the individual. They then cease to bother him and no longer drain energy from his mind.

Similarly, the recall of emotionally disturbing past experiences may give mental relief and increase the degree of unity and spontaneity of the mind, showing that the previous amnesia (loss of memory) of those experiences was due to repression, or an active barring from consciousness.

VII

INSTINCT, SENTIMENT, AND VALUE

THE time has now come to propound a more precise and definite view of the mind, its structure, and its modes of functioning. In modern psychology we tend to think of the fundamental force of the mind as instinctive in nature, as a function of inherited machinery, as a system of inherited modes of response. The individual comes into the world with the power to respond in various ways to stimulation from his environment, and although these various modes of response are functions of his nervous system, nevertheless it is helpful to think of them also as corresponding to the different needs and fundamental tendencies of the conscious individual or the mental individual. These various fundamental reactions which do not need to be learnt are known as the instincts. Instinctive activity is that activity which is inherited and does not need to be acquired by the individual; and instinctive activity shows itself in various ways which are classified as the various instincts.

In endeavouring to enumerate the instincts one meets with the difficulty of deciding whether one has counted them all. A helpful 'principle of classification' is to consider the main classes of instinctive situations, the main needs and problems that the psycho-physical organism has to deal with. It then becomes apparent, independently of detailed experience, that instinctive activity can be classified under the following general headings. There is, firstly, the general instinct of self-preservation, and secondly, the general instinct of self-assertion, these two corresponding to the need for the individual to 'persist in his own being' (to use a phrase from Spinoza). Thirdly, there is the sex instinct which is inherited and does not need to be learnt,

but nevertheless is in process of gradual development after the individual has come into the world, and only shows itself in its full nature at adolescence and thereafter. The sex instinct has to do with the preservation and continuation not of the individual but of the race—of successive generations of individuals.

Besides those three fundamental groups or classes of instincts there is another large group which is of great importance in human life, namely the gregarious or herd instinct. This instinct, as will be explained more fully later on, has been classified by Freud under the sex instinct. There is, indeed, a certain relationship between the herd instinct and the sex instinct, but so also is there a relationship between the herd instinct and the instincts of self-preservation and self-assertion. The working of the biological factors of struggle for existence and natural selection helps to explain these relationships. It is therefore wiser to classify the herd instinct by the side of these other instincts. Like the others it may manifest itself in various ways, so that it is justifiably put down as a class of instincts.

There is a fifth instinct, or group of instincts, which is of fundamental importance not unconnected with the others. (In fact none of them are unconnected with one another. They are all parts of one another. They are all aspects of one vital urge.) This instinct is the instinct of inquiry, of observation and experiment and deduction—a form of cognitive consciousness in its most general aspect. The various mental tendencies of observing, comparing, abstracting, generalizing, are more and more complex forms or modifications of a fundamental tendency, which is not peculiar to man. There are the experiments of Koehler with apes. His work in Teneriffe showed that some species of apes are capable of a considerable degree of generalization and inferential activity. If we are to

be in earnest with our psychology of instinct, taking instinct as the most fundamental aspect of mental activity, we should find a place for intelligence there.[1]

The ordinary view, the view that I myself set out very briefly in *Mind and Personality*, is that instinctive activity should be contrasted with intellectual activity. Instinctive activity is independent of individual experience, and intellectual activity is activity which is acquired through individual effort and initiative. But further thought on the matter shows that, on the one hand, instinctive activity, though it has a beginning independent of individual experience, develops rapidly under the influence of experience. The various instincts of self-preservation, self-assertion and all the other forms of instinct are being continually modified through individual experience. And yet this modification of them through individual experience is a continuation of the instinctive urge and, in my own view, is not rightly identified with intellect. It is too big an assumption to say that the modification we see occurring in the individual's instinctive life is entirely the result of intellectual activity. If we consider the sex instinct in particular we see how definite the distinction is.

The sex instinct, although its potentialities are inherited at birth, does not manifest itself in its complete form until adolescence. During the preceding years a certain development of the sexual nature is occurring. According to Freud, that development is of a very complex character. The child starts life in a state which Freud calls 'polymorph perverse', with the rudiments of all the various sex perversions as normal tendencies of the mind. But these various tendencies are independent of one another and

[1] Professor Graham Wallas has set out a similar view in his book *The Great Society*, and elsewhere. Somewhat reminiscent of it, too, is Dr. C. S. Myers's view of Instinct in the Symposium on Instinct, *Brit. Journ. of Psychol.*, vol. iv, 1909.

have no definitely sexual aim, although they are (in Freud's view) activities of a sexual nature. Subsequently some of these tendencies may be repressed, others becoming more central and subordinating themselves to a fundamental tendency towards normal adult sex relations, which is the ultimate form of the fully developed sex instinct. That development is a development which occurs in normal individual experience. The individual is conscious all the time of these tendencies though he may not be explicitly conscious of them, and the development may vary both in its degree of success and of normality in different people. In the course of development the actual experiences of the individual play a part; and yet one may say that the whole development is instinctive. One would not say that it is an intellectual development. The intellect as such is a pervading but independent part. It is never absent at any moment of conscious life, but the development is the development of the instinct.

This fact is most apparent in the case of the sex instinct because, although potentially present at birth, it does not come into full activity until much later. A similar course of development is undergone by the self-assertive and the self-preservative instincts. Here again, although it is in relation to individual experience—the experiences through which the individual lives from day to day—it is essentially a development of instinctive activity and relatively independent of any intellectual activity that may be simultaneously going on. It seems to me that in a similar way the gregarious instinct is there in childhood although not then very strong. It is called out more strongly at school —at preparatory school and public school—and may become very strong at adolescence. Just before adolescence, the group-spirit becomes very strong, small boys forming gangs, clubs, and secret societies. Later on, in full adult life, the tendency becomes less pronounced again, after it

has served its purpose of enabling the individual to get into some degree of harmony and direct personal touch with his fellows. That is a course of development in relation to experience, but independent of any particular type of experience. Whatever the individual experience, there is the urge towards gregariousness, and with different nations and classes you find the result will be different.

If we contrast the development of intellect with the process of development of the various fundamental instincts, we can see that what I have called the instinct of observation, the cognitive instinct or tendency, has also a developmental history which is very susceptible to the process of education and can be actually improved enormously by well-chosen methods of education, but, independently of such methods, still passes through certain stages. The child starts life with a special form of generalizing tendency, a tendency to overlook differences and to assimilate one experience with another because of its neglect of differences, and although it seems to be generalizing, it does not generalize in the logical sense, it generalizes in the pre-logical sense. Later on, by virtue of experience, it learns to pay attention to differences, to compare and distinguish and later on to economize its thought by abstracting and learning to think independently of direct experience—to think in terms of concepts and symbols. The whole system of mathematics is one of the most prominent examples of that method. Of course this process of development of the cognitive instinct reacts strongly on the development of all the other instincts. But, whatever the instinct may be, its development reacts upon the development of the other instincts and we should be guilty of the old fallacy of faculty psychology if we did not remind ourselves that the individual is not a bundle of instincts. He is a modification of the *élan vital* (Bergson). He shows a mental urge which is differentiated at birth

in the direction of these various instinctive activities and experiences—a more and more detailed differentiation as the individual's life proceeds in relation to his environment, in the form of reactions to the environment. These instincts are different aspects of the fundamental urge which we can distinguish in the individual, aspects which are forced upon the individual by the conditions of his life. He has (1) to preserve himself, he has (2) to assert himself, and he has (3) to play his part in handing on the torch of life to succeeding generations; he has (4) to adapt himself to those other members of the group, clan, tribe, and he has (5) to become more and more accurately aware of events outside him. This fifth tendency—the development of the cognitive instinct—is the beginning of science. The further development of the mind depends on that cognitive instinct, and the cognitive aspect of the mental urge in the individual has its own tendency to develop independently of education or any sort of artificial training. It cannot develop independently of experience, because experience is the matter with which it deals, but it can develop independently of *any particular* experience just as much as the sex instinct can, or any of the other instincts which I have named.

There is a general observational or investigatory tendency. Watch one of the domestic animals in its behaviour to an animate or inanimate object. It shows a strong tendency to investigate. This tendency is still more apparent in a young child.

The ordinary view, which we owe to McDougall, and which he sets out in his *Outline of Psychology* and his *Social Psychology*, is that all this is due to instinctive activity, including the 'instinct of curiosity', but that intellect is different, that it is not in itself active. He is really voicing the opinion of Aristotle—'Discursive reasoning by itself moves nothing', *διάνοια αὐτὴ οὐδὲν κινεῖ*. McDougall writes

as if the instincts were the driving forces of the mind, like the steam in the boiler of the locomotive, while the intellect is merely the power of direction. But there is an instinctive cognitive activity, fundamental, present at birth, undergoing its own course of development in relation to the other instinctive activities. This is the activity, the instinctive urge, which has been entirely neglected by Freud (except in the form of sexual curiosity), and by most of the modern writers on instinct psychology.

These various instincts are also interests if looked at subjectively. Their activity manifests a certain kind of affective tendency—of feeling—and where there is a clash of tendencies emotion may arise. What seems to me more definitely the subjective side of instinct is not emotion, but the feeling of striving (conation) and interest. We are interested in events bearing upon our self-preservation, our self-assertion, or any of the other instincts, and these interests are also forms of liking and disliking, forms of love and hate in the wider sense. So that one can subsume the activities of the mind under the two very general headings of love and hate, of likes and dislikes, and these become more apparent when one considers further the course of development of the instincts in individual experience. How does that development proceed? It proceeds in the direction of the formation of what A. F. Shand has called Sentiments, which are organizations of instinctive dispositions. These various instinctive tendencies become associated with different experiences of actual events, of objects—of physical objects or social objects, inanimate objects or animate objects, later still with actions, abstract ideas, and concepts. In these fundamental organizations of instinctive activity or sentiments, one has potentiality of the different instinctive tendencies being aroused *according to a definite rule.*

In the sentiment of friendship one feels joy in the

friend's presence, sorrow in his absence, anger towards people who do him an injury, and gratitude towards those who help him. Different instincts are aroused under different circumstances and one's behaviour can so far be *predicted*, because it is known that one is on terms of friendship with the other person. If we know the likes and dislikes of people we understand their behaviour and can predict how they will behave in special circumstances. The key, the clue to their conduct, is in terms of their likes and dislikes, in terms of their interests. The most fundamental interests are the simplest forms of organization of the primitive instinctive urges. These interests or sentiments can come into relation with one another and can be organized and subsumed under more general forms of sentiment. For instance, the interest that an individual takes in the world of inorganic nature, the interest he takes in living things, the interest he takes in conscious individuals and their modes of reaction—all these various interests or sentiments may be subsumed under or form part of a more fundamental sentiment of love of scientific truth, an interest in scientific truth, involving the tendency to pursue truth and to fight for it.

Thinking along these lines we see that there must eventually be one all-inclusive system. The tendency is towards the building up of an all-inclusive system of interests, a system of sentiments within one all-inclusive sentiment. This supreme sentiment, named by McDougall the 'master-sentiment', will be a system of instinctive emotional dispositions centred about one supreme object. Such an object will be as general as possible and as all-inclusive as possible. What should that object be? Clearly it should be the universe as a perfected system, as the full realization of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. Thinking in terms of personality, or on the analogy of personality, one would say that the object is a personal or super-personal God.

In the philosophical system of Spinoza, the intellectual love of God, *amor intellectualis Dei*, is the fundamental, all-inclusive sentiment. This is not entirely satisfying, since the intellectual side is only one side of life, and there are other sides or aspects of experience that have to be allowed for. Anyhow the object would be 'value' in its most general sense, in its most complete and concrete sense; so that in working out the intermediate steps between simple sentiments and this all-inclusive sentiment we are led to consider the general theory of values. The term 'value' was first defined by Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations* as the satisfaction of desire, the satisfaction of some craving. On the lowest plane of generality one would say that the various values are satisfactions of various fundamental instincts. But these values become organized as the instincts themselves become organized (into sentiments), and in these sentiments one has the beginnings of a system of values. So that in working out the interrelation of the sentiments one is *ipso facto* working out the interrelation of values. The general tendency in the individual is on the one hand towards greater differentiation of detail, and on the other hand towards generalization. The progress of the individual is a progress from the generality of crude instinctive action, through specific and individual action, towards another form of generality, a generality of super-instinctive activity.

If one turns to the most general classes of values known —the so-called eternal values (the Good, the Beautiful, the True)—one finds that their characteristic is to be general. The Good is good for all. Anything that is good should be universal. Duty is something that must obey a universal law. It points to action according to a rule that can be made universal—made to apply to every one, with modifications in relation to the different positions occupied by people in the world's scheme. Similarly with Beauty. A work of

beauty is not merely something that gives pleasure to a particular individual, but something that should give pleasure to all individuals who have reached a certain degree of mental development. And similarly with Truth. Truth is not merely something that is useful to a particular individual, but is something that is true for all individuals when taken in the right sense.

Then the further question arises: How are these various values (the Good, the Beautiful, the True) related? *Qua* values they are the satisfaction of mental tendencies or desires; they are the objects of sentiments, or organizations in the mind. The sentiment for truth, the sentiment for goodness (moral sentiment), the sentiment for beauty —these three general sentiments, which include an enormous number of subsidiary sentiments, are in relation to one another. How are they related? They must be in harmony with one another. You cannot have a situation where a thing is beautiful, and therefore the object of one sentiment, but is not good, and is therefore repelled or rejected by another sentiment. What is truly beautiful is also truly good and is true. The three are conjoined, although in individual cases it may be one or the other aspect which is most prominent. But when the context is sufficiently expanded to cover the whole universe, the entire totality of what is, we believe that the three coincide. What does that mean? In the ideal limit of all-inclusiveness they are identical. The totality of things is good, beautiful, and true. That means that they are aspects of the same thing. These things are abstract, but the thing itself is not abstract. It is the most concrete thing there is.

It is all Reality. It is the universe or God.

Thus, from the philosophical point of view, God is a concretion of all the values. He is the concrete manifestation of the values.

These values, as soon as they have been classified, are

relatively abstract. You are considering an aspect (the aspect of goodness, truth, or beauty), but to stop there is really absurd. You have something that hangs in the air. You can say 'How good! how beautiful! how true!' But that is about all you can say, unless you again turn back to the individual concrete life. And therefore having made an ascent to the most abstract form of value you must pass in two directions from there, you must pass upwards to God, to the totality of things (the universe is not abstract, it is concrete) and you must pass down again to the individual manifestations of life, to individual experiences, and see them in the light of and in relation to the all-inclusive value.

In following up this line of thought one has come to something reminiscent of Plato's description, in the *Republic*, of the Idea of the Good. I have started out from an entirely modern conception of psychology and have taken the path which has been marked out by recent psychologists, and have just worked out its implications a little more. When it is considered philosophically one finds a similar kind of account to that of Plato. If you go back to Plato after reading modern psychology you are struck by his all-inclusiveness. There is so much in him that is analogous to the different movements in modern psychology. Perhaps he is more representative of modern thought than Aristotle is.

Finally we have spoken of interests as the fundamental units, as it were, of the mind. Interests are of the nature of friendships, alliances with persons and things; disliking is merely the negative process—exclusion. Interest may be considered as a form of love in the widest sense, and that brings you to a conception analogous to Plato's conception of Eros. He described philosophy as 'Eros *plus* dialectic'. Eros—love, and dialectic—the movement of thought from the general to the particular and from the particular to the

general. The conception of Eros set out by him is undoubtedly not the same as the conception of sex instinct with its appropriate mental energy, however widely the sex instinct may be taken. Eros means passionate emotion, interest with strong feeling. That interest is clearly not exclusively derived from the sex instinct. The latter may contribute its quota, but the instincts of self-preservation, self-assertion and so on, the instinct for truth, or the cognitive instinct, all contribute their share. And that is why one objects to Jung's use of the term libido. Libido simply means sex energy. Freud does not give any name to the energy of the other instincts, although they have their energy, and he does not say whether there is any interchange of energy between the ego-instincts and the sex instinct. With Jung the libido is taken in the widest sense of 'psychic energy' and he says that it corresponds with the *élan vital* of Bergson; but the word has its own implications. It suggests historical associations and original derivations, and is too misleading. Some more neutral term is needed. The term *élan vital* or 'vital urge' is probably the most general and most satisfactory term.

Again Jung has distinguished different types of normal personality, different psychological types. He has classified individuals under the two main headings of Intro-vert and Extra-vert, and under each heading he has four subsidiary headings—thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. He thus gets eight ultimate types. There are two fundamental objections to this. One is that although individuals may fall into classes their activities can only be explained in terms of the relation of each individual to his own particular environment. Ultimately the science is a science of individual psychology. It is not a science of types. The psychology of types does not really help you. I can say of my own psycho-therapeutic experience for many years that, although I have been acquainted with Jung's views for

some time, I find no reason to make use of his classifications in actual practice. I have come to the conclusion that they are artificial and really unnecessary. They are also misleading, because if you fully agree with Jung you lose all sense of truth entirely. The world seems different to different people, and different types have different viewpoints which can never come into harmony with one another, but which are all equally true (or false).

Secondly, the fundamental distinction of Intro-vert and Extra-vert which seems helpful is not really so. An Intro-vert is pathological, he is a person who is turned in on himself, who is morbid. He is not a normal type. The healthy form of mental activity is the Extra-vert type—the person who is in touch with reality. Reality is not merely the physical and social world, the objective, outside world, but also the individual's reactions to the outer world. The individual's mind is itself a part of that reality. The normal person is a person who is free from complexes, fixations, and projections, and who has a clear and direct view of events outside, sees them as they are, sees other people as they are, *and also sees himself as he is*, whereas the Intro-vert is a person who is morbid through shocks, unsolved mental complexes, fixations, disturbance of mental development, disharmony which attracts his attention to himself. His mind is held, and is unable to give him a clear picture of the world outside, nor a clear picture of himself. A very pronounced example of this is a person suffering from dementia praecox. He is most definitely intro-verted. The condition is a pathological one. The interests of some people are more definitely called out by external events, events of the outer world, others have interest in what goes on inside them, but that distinction is simply a distinction like any other. One person is specially interested in physics, another in psychology, but both are extra-verted. It is a matter of

classifying interests into subjective interests and objective interests—a distinction that is not a fundamental one. On the other hand, the distinction of the normal and the pathological is fundamental. We are all to that extent intro-verted, in that we do not get a completely unbiased view of the world; and the extent to which we are extra-verted and do get an unbiased view of the world is a measure of the revelation vouchsafed us. There is no true antithesis between revelation and science. Science *is* revelation. It reveals truth independently of individual wishes, desires, hopes, and fears. The study of science disciplines the mind and makes it more receptive of that form of revelation. Like the physical sciences, psychology is a form of revelation. Something may stand in the way. The individual may stand in his own light. Those who treat patients soon become aware of that. Patients themselves recognize it. They very frequently use that phrase, saying that they seem to be 'standing in their own light', and exclaiming 'if only they could get away from themselves!' Psychotherapy, when successful, enables them to get free of this introversion and subjectivity.

VIII

THEORIES OF SUGGESTION[1]

I

THE word 'suggestion' has been used in educational, scientific, and medical literature in slightly different senses. In the writings of educationists and purely scientific psychologists it has been used to indicate a general kind of influence brought to bear on the mind, an influence which is other than that of logical or rational argument. The mind can be influenced rationally and also non-rationally. Rationally, it is influenced, for example, when a child is taught the fifth proposition of Euclid,[2] in learning to understand the steps one by one in the right sequence and in the right connexion; but the child can be influenced non-rationally, in its learning of this and other school subjects, by virtue of its general mental attitude towards the teacher, by the views on life of its fellow students, even by the beauty or ugliness of the rooms and buildings in which it is taught, by the climate, by the fact of the weather being fine or dull, and in a hundred other ways. These are non-rational, although not necessarily irrational, influences. They may not be contrary to reason, but they are independent of reason so far as the child individually is concerned. We may regard this class of non-rational influence as influence by suggestion.

Again, the child may be misled in his reasoning process

[1] A paper read before the Section of Psychiatry, Royal Society of Medicine, on January 10th, 1928, and published by permission of the honorary editors of the Society.

[2] The name, *pons asinorum*, given to this proposition may exert a suggestive effect upon the child, in one or other of two ways, according to his temperament—namely, discouragement, or as a challenge to a more determined attack.

and may fall into error. Many of the conditions under which he falls into error can be put under the same heading of suggestion. In a general educational way we may use the term suggestion in a wide sense which covers all non-rational and includes irrational modes of influencing the mind. An individual may be influenced by inanimate objects, by social conditions, or by his fellows, not only non-rationally, but also *unwittingly*—that is, without realizing that he is being influenced. The weather may be depressing, and his fundamental mood may follow suit without his being explicitly aware of the fact; the influence there is an influence of suggestion. It may be considered a rational influence if he observes in the morning that the weather is bad, and infers from it (on the basis of previous experience) that he will have a bad day and will not be able to work so effectively as usual. But that view is not necessarily a true view; he may be mistaken in it. Even if it is a true view, so that the result is rational, it is not necessarily the work of reason.

The word suggestion in pure psychology has been used in an even wider sense. In Professor G. F. Stout's *Analytic Psychology* there is a chapter headed 'Relative Suggestion', but what he is referring to there is the effect of pre-formed associations on the activity of the mind. Certain experiences have been passed through and retained in memory, and if one experience is repeated it tends to call up the memory of another. One experience 'suggests' the memory of another experience. Suggestion, then, may work according to the rules of association, either of contiguity or of similarity; that is a very wide use of the term. An officer's gesture may suggest a certain movement to the platoon under his command, and they may spontaneously move accordingly without having received a definite verbal order. The response to the command may be regarded as due to suggestion. It is not necessarily rational—not a

form of persuasion, which is the word to use in speaking of the process of influencing a person by rational means. Giving a command or making a request may be, but is not necessarily, a rational method of influence. In its essence a rational method, it may on some particular occasion be either rational or non-rational. It should probably be classed under the general heading of suggestion, taking the word in its widest sense.

From these uses of the term suggestion—a suggestion which involves a non-rational influencing of the mind—we pass to the more medical side of the subject. In psychological medicine the use of suggestion has developed out of the earlier use of hypnotic influence.

I must first emphasize the fact that hypnotism and suggestion are not the same thing. The state of hypnosis is a state of mental dissociation, in which certain interests of the subject's mind may be appealed to while other parts of the mind remain in abeyance. When a person is hypnotized he is more ready to respond to the influence of the hypnotist because the dissociation of his mind prevents him from being able to call upon his reserves—to bring up other considerations. The hypnotic subject receives a command or request from the hypnotist, and his impulse is to respond immediately. Considerations tending towards a different line of action simply do not occur to him; they cannot, because there is a break in the mind. He cannot review the situation and consider alternatives, and certainly does not even begin to consider them. We see that in hypnosis he has become more suggestible, and that his increased suggestibility, or increased readiness to respond to suggestion, is in part the result of mental dissociation.

But the opposite relationship may hold good. Instead of suggestibility following upon the state of hypnosis, we may find a state of hypnosis following upon suggestion. Indeed, this is what generally occurs when a person is

hypnotized. The hypnotist suggests to the person that he will become more and more drowsy, more and more lethargic, but that he will continue to hear and understand what the hypnotist says to him, so that through suggestion from the hypnotist dissociation takes place. A person is robbed of the power of controlling his mind as a unitary system.

The procedure in the case of a patient requiring hypnotic treatment is as follows. After a preliminary general examination—that is, a physical examination and a psychological investigation of the conditions under which his illness had set in, which need not take very long, although a detailed psychological examination (autognosis) would require many hours—after this analysis, if the patient is considered suitable for hypnotic treatment, the physician asks him to lie down on a couch, to relax his voluntary muscles,[1] to fix his gaze on a small mirror or other luminous object held about ten inches from his eyes and slightly above the horizontal plane of vision—so that he has to turn his eyes slightly upwards and inwards—to look steadily at it, to fix his visual attention on it, and to think of sleep. The hypnotist then proceeds to suggest that the patient is getting more and more drowsy—that his eyelids are getting heavy with sleep—that he will soon be asleep, but will continue to hear what the hypnotist says to him. The patient's eyes close and he appears to sleep. The hypnotist may then suddenly hold his attention by speaking more urgently and more dramatically, saying, 'You may try as hard as you like, but you cannot open your eyes.' The mere fact that he is challenged in

[1] The patient may be given detailed instruction in the matter of muscular relaxation. If he directs attention to the small distal muscles of hands and feet he will find that relaxation of them tends to spread to the larger muscles of the arms, legs, &c. Deep and regular breathing also helps relaxation.

this way makes him suddenly lose the knack; there may arise the momentary fear, 'Perhaps I shall not be able to open my eyes', and such momentary fear may prevent him from opening them. He gets into a slightly emotional condition, and is ready to believe other statements made to him. If passes (with or without contact) are made down the arm and hand, with suggestions of rigidity and anaesthesia, the arm does become rigid so that the patient is unable to bend it, and it also becomes anaesthetic, so that a sterilized pin may be plunged deep into the flesh without causing any pain. In a deeper stage still the patient may become apparently quite unconscious, although subsequent investigation may show that he has retained an inactive dream-like consciousness throughout the experiment.

Hypnosis seems to proceed in stages, of deeper and deeper degree; but nowadays we do not speak of stages of hypnosis, because they have no definite order of sequence.[1] We find that the order in which they occur depends to a very large extent upon the way in which, or the conditions under which, suggestions are given. The patient falls into a hypnotic state, and in that state becomes more suggestible, more ready to respond to suggestions, verbal or otherwise, from the hypnotist, and these suggestions may be used to increase the depth of the hypnosis. One stage in a good hypnotic subject is that of waxy or plastic flexibility, where the limbs, put in any position, remain in that position like the limbs of a lay figure. This stage, like those previously described, is a state of dissociation. Indeed, most, if not all, of the phenomena of hypnosis seem to be phenomena of dissociation. The simplest is the patient's inability to open his eyes; again, if he clasps his hands together and is then

[1] The belief in a definite order of sequence of such stages was one of the errors of Charcot and the Salpêtrière school.

told by the hypnotist that he will not be able to separate them, he cannot do so. A further result of a dissociationist nature which it is very easy to produce in a hypnotic subject is amnesia. If it is suggested to the subject that he cannot recall anything that happened—for example, during the previous day—it will be found later that he is unable to answer any questions about this period of time. These are all instances of dissociation—dissociation of the power of recalling certain memories, of the power of contracting certain muscles, of experiencing certain sensations.

In a still deeper stage of hypnosis the hypnotist may seem to produce positive results instead of merely negative ones. If he suggests to a patient in a deeply hypnotized state that the latter will be able to see, say, a bright red light, the suggestion will take effect. What has happened is that the patient's imagination has been stimulated, has been set in motion, and continues working actively in a certain direction. You can take a blank card and tell him that you are going to show him your photograph, and he will see your photograph and describe it; and really, so far as can be made out, he does actually see something on the card. He projects on the card something that is merely in his own imagination. Here the difference between the hypnotized subject and the normal person is mainly a difference in the degree of activity and control of the imagination. When a person is hypnotized his imagination may become more active, but is under the control of the hypnotist; indeed, all hypnotic suggestion may be considered as an influencing of the imagination. The manifestations previously described may be regarded merely as the effect of an externally controlled imagination. An individual has been made to imagine that he cannot open his eyes; nothing having arisen to counter that imagination, it takes effect. The normal person can

call up a fairly accurate picture of another individual, but to see it at a definite spot and with a certain degree of steadiness may follow upon hypnosis, where the imagination is controlled by the hypnotist. It is not that the hypnotist has any occult power (magnetic, telepathic, or what not), but that his words and gestures call out a direct and inevitable response from the patient. *The patient is ready to believe and expect that what the hypnotist says will come to pass.*

Various theories have been devised to account for this, and I shall discuss some of them later on. One well-known theory is that of Freud—that these results follow because some bond of affection has sprung up between the hypnotized patient and the hypnotist. The patient responds to the suggestions of the hypnotist much as a young child would respond to the suggestions of a well-loved parent or nurse, in primitive credulity without afterthought or other consideration. Another theory is that by the process of hypnotism the patient has been thrust into a state of self-abasement, with the result that he is ready to accept orders from another person. This is McDougall's view: that the patient is specially ready to respond to the hypnotist because, under hypnosis, his instinct of self-abasement has been aroused to the exclusion of other instincts and tendencies. In hypnotized people McDougall assumes that the instinct of self-assertion is in abeyance. Such a theory is based on the conception of dissociation—dissociation at a very fundamental level of the mind—namely, dissociation of one instinctive disposition from the others.

Dissociation may increase suggestibility, or be increased by it. A person may for the moment 'forget' how to use certain mental powers, and then through fear become permanently incapacitated, or he may succumb to suggestions in other directions; or, again, he may fall into a state

of dissociation, not through mental suggestion from any one, but through some strong mental or physical shock. During the war large numbers of soldiers became readily hypnotizable under the influence of intense physical shock, either from shell concussion or from blows on the head received in other ways (falls, &c.). It is often difficult to exclude the effect of mental shock in these cases; but instances of purely physical shock, followed by dissociation, do occur. A person who gets physical concussion is almost invariably easy to hypnotize. This concussion probably brings about physical dissociation of the higher centres of the brain. The harmonious activity of the brain as a unit seems to be disturbed by such a general 'shaking up'. Drugs, such as alcohol, may produce a similar effect. Alcoholic persons are very easy to hypnotize, which is fortunate, because hypnotism can be used in curing them. An alcoholic person may appear to be absolutely incorrigible, but, to his surprise, he finds that he obeys suggestions under hypnotism. Anaesthetics, such as ether or chloroform, will also make a person more readily hypnotizable, and there is good reason for believing that they produce relative dissociation in the highest cerebral levels. Hypnotism was originally used for operations, and if chloroform had not been discovered shortly afterwards, no doubt hypnotism would have been used much more extensively for that purpose; it still has its uses to prepare and calm the patient's mind for an operation. It is very important that a patient, before undergoing an operation, should have his mind free from fear, should control his feelings, and not struggle against the anaesthetic. One of the best ways of bringing this about is to give him suggestion treatment beforehand, and I have done this in many cases. It has very definite effects; among others, it may save the patient from nausea after the anaesthetic. In many cases where the patients have dreaded the anaesthetic more

than the operation, suggestion treatment has freed them from this fear.

It is a fact that in hypnosis the patient falls into a special state in which he responds readily to suggestions from the hypnotist, and to a great extent the characteristics of the hypnotic state seem to be explicable in terms of suggestibility. The patient becomes more suggestible to the hypnotist, and on this basis Bernheim formulated his definition of hypnosis as a state of artificially increased suggestibility. A hypnotized person is made more suggestible than a normal person. But such a definition is not fully adequate to the facts, because it does not explain sufficiently how the increased suggestibility is brought about. Although in some cases suggestion from the physician or hypnotist produces the hypnotic state, in other cases, as we have just seen, mental shock and physical influences—such as physical concussion, the influence of drugs, &c.—may increase suggestibility or hypnotizability, and certainly it must not be forgotten that dissociation itself increases suggestibility; that was forced upon us by the experiences of the war. Among the thousands of shell-shock patients seen just behind the lines in France and elsewhere, 15 per cent. showed functional amnesia to a greater or less extent. These patients were in a dissociated state, and in many cases had not only lost the power of recalling their frightening experiences, but had also lost the power of speaking, hearing, walking, of controlling tremors, and of bringing them to an end. There was a sort of general dislocation of the mind as well as of the nervous system. I found that these patients were easily hypnotized, and that the more pronounced the dissociation the more easily were they hypnotized. A man who had lost all his past memory could be hypnotized at once; a wave of the hand would effect this mental transformation. If the loss of memory referred to but a brief period of the past, the

hypnotic state would not set in quite so readily, but every case of amnesia or dissociated memory was in some degree hypnotizable. Amnesia does not mean weakness of memory, but a loss of the power to recall a definite stretch of past experience. I observed six hundred cases of amnesia in France during the war; every case was hypnotizable, and memory invariably returned under hypnosis. Patients seen in England some months or years later were not so easy to cure; they responded less readily, but they did so eventually, nevertheless.

I am inclined to state as a general rule, admitting of no exception, that a person showing functional amnesia, *without psychotic symptoms*, is easily hypnotizable, and that in functional amnesia the loss of memory is easily cured by hypnotism, as well as any accompanying paralysis —mutism, &c.—of a functional nature. Facts such as these make it necessary to widen the definition of Bernheim, and to recall the earlier definition of Charcot, who used to say that hypnosis was an artificial hysteria. We need to combine the two theories (with certain omissions), and say that in the hypnotic state suggestibility is increased, but that a fundamental factor, to some extent of independent value, is a state of dissociation which works in harmony with suggestion; dissociation tends to produce increased suggestibility. The reason of this is obvious. If a person is dissociated he has no power of reviewing the situation and considering alternative modes of response. A certain mode of response is suggested to him, and he makes that response, but because of his dissociation he is unable to actuate other powers of the mind. The dissociation is not the same as increased suggestibility, for we can imagine a relatively normal person, a unified person, showing different degrees of suggestibility at different times. Moreover, although in mild forms of dissociation suggestibility seems to increase as the degree or extent of

dissociation increases, this correlation does not hold for extreme cases. When the dissociation is extreme, or the state of hypnosis very deep, the patient may be found to have become less rather than more suggestible to outside influence, or even non-suggestible in certain directions.

The extremely important work of I. P. Pavlov on *Conditioned Reflexes* should be referred to here. Pavlov explains sleep and hypnosis in terms of *internal inhibition* in the cerebral cortex—spreading to the subcortical centres in the case of the former, limited to the cortex in the case of the latter.

II

We have now to consider in more detail the factor of *rapport*, which is of such central importance in the theory and practice of hypnotism.

We have already gone beyond the earlier view of hypnotic suggestion, according to which it is regarded as a form of ideo-motor action, where, as Pierre Janet says, the suggested idea produces its full or maximum effect undisturbed by conflicting ideas. This theory is not sufficient, but itself requires further explanation. An idea, to produce an effect, needs to be in relation with some source of energy. Such a source of energy is any one of the instinctive 'urges' or other conative and affective tendencies. According to Freud's theory, the affective tendency concerned is of an erotic or sexual nature—not the tendency of ordinary sexual love, but a sexual tendency inhibited in its aim (*zielgehemmte*), manifesting itself in a readiness to rely completely upon the hypnotist, to be at one with him, and to grant him vigorous and wholehearted co-operation. This is the well-known factor of 'transference' (*Uebertragung*), so named because it is believed by Freud to be a reanimating of affective tendencies felt by the young child towards his elders in the

bosom of the family. Freud quotes with approval Ferenczi's observation that there are two main and contrasted methods of hypnotism—namely, the method of command and the method of soothing and coaxing. The former corresponds to the attitude of the father towards the child, the latter to the attitude of the mother. [Compare Pavlov's purely physiological distinction of (1) monotonous stimuli of small and medium intensity repeated for a long time, producing hypnosis slowly, and (2) stimuli of considerably greater intensity, producing hypnosis quickly (in animals).]

At first sight all suggestion seems to be in essence auto-suggestion, since it must be accepted by the patient if it is to work at all; the patient has to make the suggestion his own. But there is the converse possibility that all suggestion may be hetero-suggestion—that the individual may never be able to accept anything from himself, but must always accept it from without, either from people or from the books he reads or from physical events in the outer world; so that even auto-suggestion would be hetero-suggestion. The person who applies Coué's method of auto-suggestion, and benefits thereby, owes his success to the influence that Coué has had upon him, the lectures he has heard, and the books he has read. How can this be brought into line with the Freudian doctrine of hetero-suggestion? Dr. Ernest Jones has recently attempted to solve this problem in an important article on 'The nature of auto-suggestion'.[1] He follows Freud in maintaining that the success of hetero-suggestion is due to the re-arousal of early feelings towards the father, in which the hypnotist

[1] 'If the primary narcissism has been released and reanimated directly, by concentration upon the idea of self, the process may be termed "auto-suggestion"; if it has been preceded by a stage in which the ego-ideal is resolved into the earlier father-ideal, the process may be termed "hetero-suggestion".'—*Brit Journ. of Med. Psychology*, 1923, vol. iii, p. 209.

is put in place of the ego-ideal or super-ego, which, as distinct from the ego, is modelled upon the father. The doctrine of Freud is that in earliest years a little boy loves his father according to the narcissistic or identification type of love—he identifies himself with his father; but he loves his mother according to the dependence or 'anaclitic' type, because his various physical wants are satisfied through her.[1] His love for his mother involves the desire to have her to himself, which arouses, by reaction, a feeling of hostility towards his father. This feeling of hostility towards his father is then repressed, by virtue of his previous identification with his father, and thus is inaugurated the contrast between the ego and the ego-ideal or super-ego. He incorporates in his own mind the character of his father as he sees him, and if he represses this hostile feeling towards his father, and develops a bad conscience about it, that bad conscience corresponds to a conflict between his ego and his ego-ideal. The child incorporates in himself the disapproval of himself which he must assume that his father would feel if his father knew. Thus the ego-ideal in his own mind corresponds with his conception of his father. When a person is hypnotized, and accepts suggestions from the hypnotist, he puts the hypnotist in the place of his ego-ideal.

In auto-suggestion, according to Ernest Jones, there is a regression—a stepping back to a still earlier psychological situation, a situation of primary narcissism. Before the ego-ideal has been formed the child's sexual energy, his libido, is centred on himself. It is so in earliest years when he identifies himself with his father; there the libido

[1] More accurately, because 'in the first phase of their development the sexual instincts have no independent means of finding satisfaction; they do so by propping themselves upon or "leaning up against" the self-preservative instincts.'—S. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Eng. Trans., p. 61, International Psycho-analytical Press, London, 1922.

remains fixed on himself. In the practice of auto-suggestion an individual is returning to this earliest stage and concentrating upon the idea of himself. Thus the ego-ideal is reduced to the father-ideal in the case of hetero-suggestion, and reduced still farther back to the narcissistic fixation on self in auto-suggestion, which is an intensification of primary narcissism, a pronounced form of regression, and therefore bad. It means an impoverishment of the ego, the withdrawal of much energy which should be available for getting into touch with the world around and the people around, and which should enable him to live his life and make his contribution to general existence; it is a drawing of the libido back upon himself. If Ernest Jones's theory, as a further development of Freudian doctrine, is correct, it is not easy to understand the beneficial results of auto-suggestion. The improvement in physical health is not easy to explain on this theory, nor the fact that the more normal and healthy the person is, and the greater his powers of concentration, the more effective is the practice of auto-suggestion in his case. In functional illness therapeutic auto-suggestion helps to restore the patient to health, and may also greatly improve his general mental outlook on life.

Here I would urge that, as used to indicate a form of psychotherapy, auto-suggestion is an inadequate and misleading term. If we take the word literally we have something which usefully indicates the pathological effects of bad auto-suggestion—the way in which a person may become ill through his imagination, or become more severely ill than he need. But the term does not satisfactorily indicate the nature of therapeutic suggestion as a correction and improvement of function. Any regression to narcissism must also mean a stepping back from the state of health and a movement towards some form of illness. It might be urged that improvement through auto-suggestion is

apparent rather than real, and that actually there *is* an impoverishment of the mind—that what a person gains is gained at too great an expense. But we do not find that those who benefit by auto-suggestion become more self-centred; on the contrary, they become more self-confident and more free from fear of disease. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere,[1] auto-suggestion in its literal form is only a stage in a process of mental development towards an adequate form of volition. Instead of being distinct from volition and a rival of volition, it is a contributory factor in complete volition. An individual who is the prey of bad auto-suggestion in a certain direction is suffering from diminished power of will in that direction. When treated by therapeutic auto-suggestion that disability is removed. The belief and faith in himself, which is essential to complete volition, is restored to him. Belief and faith in oneself is auto-suggestion; but this is not to be identified with narcissistic fixation upon oneself. There is no reason for bringing in libido here. The instinct of self-assertion has its own form of energy, quite distinct from the libido of the sex instinct, and contrasted with it as the spirited principle (*τὸ θυμοειδές*) is with the appetitive principle (*τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*) in Plato's *Republic*.

McDougall explains hetero-suggestion in terms of the instinct of submission, or of self-abasement. The patient under the dominance of this instinct surrenders his own views and accepts the views of another person. In the presence of the hypnotist his instinct of self-assertion is in abeyance, and he succumbs completely to the promptings of the instinct of self-abasement. As a theory of suggestion this view seems too limited. The operation of *any* instinct —powerful, profound, and independent of other instincts —will increase suggestibility and produce suggestion

[1] *Mind and Personality*, University of London Press, Ltd., 1926, pp. 180, 272.

effects. A panic-stricken person will respond vigorously to suggestions of danger; if angry, he will readily respond to any suggestion that he is being insulted. A chance remark, of which in other circumstances he would take no notice, he interprets in a special way. Othello, under the influence of jealousy, responds to the suggestions of Iago, without any help from 'transference' or self-abasement. Not only individual instincts, but also individual sentiments[1] (not to mention complexes), functioning in relative dissociation from the rest of the mind, may be responsible for pronounced suggestion effects. It is really a *tour de force* on Freud's part, and quite unnecessary, to argue that the affective tendency is ultimately always of a sexual nature, even when the word sex is used in its very widest sense and care is taken to add that the sex tendency is 'inhibited in its aim'. We can accept transference as a factor; we can believe that an individual may respond in an unconscious way to personal influence, after the type of his response in early childhood to his father and mother; but if a suggestion effect is response independently of reason (though not necessarily contrary to reason) this may occur through the activity of other instinctive forces besides that of the libido.

McDougall has defined suggestion as the acceptance of a statement or of an idea independently of logically adequate grounds for such acceptance. According to this definition, whenever we consciously act according to reason we are acting independently of suggestion, whereas when we act independently of reason (though not necessarily contrary to reason) we are acting according to suggestion. We know what is meant by acting according to reason. 'The desire to do what is right and reasonable as such' (Henry Sidgwick) is a definite factor in our lives, and

[1] A sentiment is an organization of instinctive-emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object.—Shand.

whenever we act in that way we are relatively free from suggestion. According to McDougall's definition, apart from that, *all* our action is under the influence of suggestion. Neither the sexual factor postulated by Freud nor the instinct of self-abasement on which McDougall himself relies exhausts the possibilities of explanation. Among other affective tendencies, of special importance in this connexion, there is the gregarious instinct, or 'urge' to act in harmony with one's fellows. Freud interprets the action of this instinct in terms of the libido; he holds that the gregarious instinct explains nothing, and is itself in need of explanation. What happens in the action of the group is that there spring up libidinal relationships between members of the group towards one another, and in all of them towards the leader of the group. He proceeds to sketch out a far-fetched theory to explain how this situation arose in prehistoric times—an explanation in terms of the original family as a horde of people living together and ruled by an all-powerful father. His doctrine is that this all-powerful father of the horde is himself merely narcissistic and self-assertive; he does not need to love any one else, his libido is fixed upon himself; but through his persecution of the sons of the family, and his suppression of them, by thwarting their sex tendency, he in some mysterious way makes them love one another and love him, and so brings about the beginnings of morality and the group spirit.[1]

Freud sums up his theory of love, hypnosis, and the herd instinct in the following sentences:

'*Being in love* is based upon the simultaneous presence of directly sexual tendencies and of sexual tendencies that are inhibited in their aims, so that the object draws a part of the narcissistic ego-libido to itself. It is a condition in which there is only room for the ego and the object.

[1] The evidence, such as it is, in support of this theory is to be found in *Totem and Taboo*.

'*Hypnosis* resembles being in love in being limited to these two persons, but it is based entirely upon sexual tendencies that are inhibited in their aims, and substitutes the object for the ego-ideal.

'*The Group* multiplies this process; it agrees with hypnosis in the nature of the instincts which hold it together, and in the replacement of the ego-ideal by the object; but to this it adds identification with other individuals, which was, perhaps, originally made possible by their having the same relation to the object.'[1]

Without denying all truth to Freud's theory of love, hypnosis, and gregariousness, I must say that my own experience of the facts, gained through use both of the method of suggestion and also of the method of deep analysis in investigating and treating cases, does not bear out the theory in its entirety. The theory is not adequate to cover all the facts. I find similar difficulties with Ernest Jones's theory of the nature of auto-suggestion. I can quite see how regression towards the narcissistic level may occur—how an individual may hide his head in the sand and refuse to face reality, crying peace when there is no peace; but that he would get beneficial results of a permanent nature by such a line of conduct is another matter. An appeal to narcissism might explain the state of mind of a man who stands in the corner of an asylum ward, taking no notice of any one, but just immersed in his own fancy and in his own mental aberration; or the state of mind of the hypochondriac, with distribution of libido so disturbed that even his bodily organs cannot function adequately or without pain. But that good, or therapeutic, auto-suggestion is of this nature I cannot believe. Auto-suggestion is based on confidence and the abolition of fear. The individual who uses auto-suggestion knows this, and it is definitely admitted that auto-suggestion works better in a more healthy person; the healthier he is the better effects he can get. Auto-suggestion is a method of will training.

[1] S. Freud, op. cit., p. 125.

In holding such a view the possibility is not excluded that in hypnosis archaic affective tendencies and beliefs may come to the surface and make themselves felt, and that an individual may produce certain results by virtue of the strength of these primitive beliefs which are not justified by modern scientific knowledge, although such beliefs may make a great difference to the individual himself. In him there may be a desire for the miraculous —a desire to believe in the miraculous—which may be liberated under conditions of hypnosis, or suggestion treatment, and may produce results; not that it will produce a miracle, but it may counteract the excessive scepticism and doubt and despair which are so often characteristics of the modern mind. Consequently, bad, or pathogenic, auto-suggestion is perhaps the best example of auto-suggestion in a literal sense—that is, the working of an idea under the influence of an instinctive tendency, in this case one of fear and apprehension. Freud might say that fear is due to bad conscience, and that bad conscience is due to the working of the Oedipus complex, so bringing in the libido doctrine. Therapeutic auto-suggestion goes further, because it replaces the feeling of doubt and fear by a feeling of confidence. The result suggested can then occur, so far as it does not conflict with any of the fundamental laws of nature, and can occur to a maximum degree. The instinct of self-assertion (supported by its own distinctive form of energy, not by libido) may play a prominent part in bringing about a realization or actualization of the suggestion; but the integrated personality, with its entire reserves of instinctive energy, may, by an act of *faith*, fulfil more adequately the purposes towards which auto-suggestion is half blindly pointing.

IX

THE INFLUENCE OF MIND ON BODY. THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND

MUCH has already been said about the nature of suggestion and the influence it may have over the body and the mind. We may say, in general terms, that in suggestion, as well as in the more conscious processes of persuasion, instruction, &c., there are no actual limits, of which we are aware, to the influence of mind over body. What we find by experiment is that the mind influences the body more and more, the more confident and determined we are in our perseverance with mental methods. In speaking of power over the body, I am thinking of the power of the imagination over the working of the nervous system and I am thinking not only of direct suggestion—hypnotic or waking suggestion—but also of the effect brought about by a prolonged course of analysis—by drawing up into consciousness the unconscious mental disturbances of thought and feeling, allowing them to alter as they come into consciousness; and through that alteration, through that translation of the unconscious into the conscious—through that process itself there is often a great improvement in bodily health.

Further, we have to remember that the endocrine glands such as the thyroid and parathyroid glands, the suprarenal glands, and the sex glands, &c., are in peculiarly close relationship with the sympathetic nervous system, and that on the other hand their secretions are of the utmost importance to the general healthy functioning of the body; and we can influence the activities of the endocrine glands mentally—through mental influences brought to bear on the sympathetic nervous system; thus we can once more reach other parts of the body—influence the health of

other parts of the body. We must not forget the converse relationship—in the other direction—the physical treatment of the body by injections of extracts of the endocrine glands or by ingestion by the mouth; these endocrine extracts may influence the nervous system and, through the nervous system, other parts of the body and so improved health may result. What our modern knowledge points to is a very much closer relationship between body and mind than was previously realized.

The theory explaining it, or helping to explain it, is the theory of the unconscious mind. Psychologists of an earlier generation tended to limit the term 'mental' to what was present to consciousness—clearly or vaguely—or in immediate awareness. People like Schopenhauer and von Hartmann had held a less restricted view of the nature of the mind and had considered that there was such a thing as unconscious mind. In Schopenhauer's view the whole activity of the universe was mental in nature—a manifestation of the will to live (*Wille zum Leben*)—something mental although not reaching clear consciousness except in higher forms of human and sub-human life. Von Hartmann had attributed great power to the unconscious, but for both Schopenhauer and von Hartmann from the scientific point of view the unconscious was an empty term. It was a statement of their belief, but the actual laws of its working were unknown to them. It is only in the last generation that we have become acquainted with the laws of working of the unconscious. There are still some philosophers who prefer to follow William James and identify 'mental' with 'conscious', including under the term 'consciousness' the subconscious activity at the fringe or margin of consciousness.

The close study of hypnotic phenomena and of the dreams of normal persons convinces us that changes can occur outside and beyond the margin of consciousness,

which show by their mode of working and by their effects that they are essentially mental in nature, though unconscious.

This may be well demonstrated in hypnotic experiments, expecially in the phenomenon of post-hypnotic suggestion. I will give an illustration. You take a suitable subject—one who shows tendencies to dissociation—a person who walks in his sleep, or has had functional amnesia as the result of a mental shock. You throw him into a hypnotic slumber where he is conscious of what you say to him and able to respond to your influence, but is oblivious or neglectful of all else and appears in every other way to be asleep. You suggest to him in this hypnotic state that so many hours later, at a definite time—say three o'clock in the afternoon—he will get up and turn on the electric light, or that he will go and offer a certain person a cigarette. You then wake him up and find that he has quite forgotten all that has been said but thinks he has been sleeping. He has a vague feeling that things have been happening but he can't say what. He remembers nothing about it. You leave him to himself. When the time arrives he will feel an impulse to go and turn on the electric light, and if asked why he did so he will make an excuse or give a reason *ad hoc*, for the occasion. He will look a bit flurried or uncertain and then will say, 'It just occurred to me to turn on the electric light,' or 'I wanted to see if the mechanism was working properly'. If instructed to offer a cigarette to a person he carries out this suggestion at the time appointed, and on being asked afterwards why he did this he replies that he did it because he thought that that individual would like a cigarette. Although the true explanation of his action is concealed from him, he feels that there must be some reason for it, so he proceeds to make one up, without being consciously aware of what he is doing. That is known as *rationalization*.[1]

[1] Not to be confused with 'rationalization' in economics!

It corresponds to the term 'justificatory reasoning' which Ribot used. In this hypnotic case you have direct evidence that in the interval between the hypnotizing of the person and the carrying out of the hypnotic suggestion there was present in the person's mind a form of mental activity, a mental tendency, a tendency of a mental nature, capable of bringing about both mental and physical results. The mental result is the resolution or impulse to turn on the electric light or to offer the cigarette; it is a tendency of which the patient is unaware until the moment comes—until the hour strikes. The sort of evidence one has for the existence of this mental activity is similar to the evidence as to the mental nature of the people around one. None of us can (telepathy apart) look into any one else's mind. We can only observe his behaviour, and we infer from it that he is acting according to certain motives. Any one who is himself hypnotized may observe himself and notice that certain results follow, and may infer therefore that something mental was occurring in his mind of which he was not directly aware.

Our evidence for the existence of unconscious mental activity, then, is similar in nature to the evidence for the conscious mental activity of people other than ourselves. Dreams are further illustrations of the same thing. People who dream may at first consider that their dreams are very irrational and unimportant, but if they investigate these dreams and trace back the various incidents to earlier experiences and memories, they find that the dream has a meaning in terms of underlying unconscious desires and cravings, which in themselves are not present to consciousness and only come up into consciousness in the process of analysis; and yet according to the canons of evidence —convergence of evidence and internal coherence— these facts indicate, with a high degree of probability, the effective existence of such unconscious mental tendencies

(the 'latent', as distinct from the 'manifest content' of the dream) before the process of analysis reveals them to consciousness. Such is the type of evidence we have of the existence of the unconscious.

We use the term in many different ways. We may mean just that which is not conscious, and in that case there would be a very wide field. Sticks and stones, tables and chairs, and all the objects of nature could be regarded as unconscious in that sense. We must limit it more strictly than that. We may consider it as those memories in the human mind of which we are not at the moment aware—the many memories of our past experience of which we are unaware. These fall into two classes, viz. (1) memories which can come into the mind and reach consciousness under simple conditions of concentrated attention or through a simple process of association. That is one part of the unconscious, called by Freud the Pre-conscious. Beside those memories there are (2) other memories and mental tendencies which are inaccessible to the conscious self under ordinary circumstances and can only be revealed by means of a special technique—by methods of free association or by methods of hypnotism, &c. These memories and tendencies are found to resist being called back into consciousness. Resistance is observed in the individual. The individual finds it apparently impossible to recall such memories; there is a gap in his mind and he needs to be urged or otherwise influenced before he can bring up the memories. So the inference is made that these tendencies and ideas are in a state of repression—that they have been repressed—cut off from the main consciousness by resistance, by a process of repression. This is known as the 'True or Systematic Unconscious'. The true unconscious is that part which is in a state of repression. But there is also another part belonging to the unconscious, namely, the repressing force. It has been

found in recent research by Freud that there is that force bringing about repression, and that it has its origins in the very earliest years of the child's life. This force is known, and has been known for many years, as the 'Censorship', and it has always been described as something situated on the border between the pre-conscious and the unconscious, preventing unconscious tendencies and memories from becoming conscious. It has been found that this repressing force belongs to the unconscious rather than to the conscious, and arises from the reaction of the young child towards his parents in the earliest years. It arises from what is known as the Oedipus complex. It has been called by Freud the ego-ideal or super-ego, and it is originally built up on the model of the father or mother. It is well known what the Oedipus complex is supposed to be. The young child is attracted towards one of his parents more than the other, generally towards the parent of the opposite sex, and tends to conceive feelings of hatred and jealousy towards the parent of the same sex. He then represses those feelings, rejects them, and there arises in their place a 'bad conscience'. This repressing force is the super-ego,[1] and the super-ego is built up on the pattern of one of the parents or both.

Let me try to explain it more fully.[2] Freud has pointed

[1] 'The broad general outcome of the sexual phase governed by the Oedipus Complex may, therefore, be taken to be the forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these two identifications [father-identification and mother-identification] in some way combined together. This modification of the ego retains its special position: it stands in contrast to the other constituents of the ego in the form of an ego-ideal or super-ego. The super-ego is, however, not merely a deposit left by the earliest object-choices of the id [the libido]; it also represents an energetic reaction-formation against those choices.' S. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, p. 44 (Hogarth Press, 1927).

[2] I am here covering the same ground as in the latter part of chapter viii, but trust that this amplification of the argument will not be found superfluous.

out that the young child can love his parents in two different ways—one narcissistically, according to the process of 'identification'. He considers that the earliest form of love is that of identification. The little boy identifies himself with his father. Secondly, the little boy loves his mother, but according to a different type of love—the 'dependence' type of love, the 'anaclitic' type of love. His feelings are of a sex nature although they are not developed sex; they are not of the same nature as sex feelings in adult life, but they are of the same general material though unconscious of their aim. And these feelings are felt towards the mother according to a dependence type of love because the child is dependent upon his mother for the satisfaction of his various needs—food, &c.—and his feelings are 'propped up against' (a phrase Freud uses) the other more instinctive feelings of hunger, &c. He loves his mother according to the dependence type and his father according to the identification type. A little girl may feel love for her mother of the identification type as well as of the dependence type.

The child loving the mother (we will take the case of the little boy) wishes to have her to himself, although he loves his father according to the identification type, and he finds that feelings of hostility arise in his mind towards the father because he wishes to have his mother to himself. One of the characteristics of love is its exclusiveness, and so there are feelings of hatred and jealousy towards the father.

I do not find Freud saying this, but I assume that here again the child being in the situation of identification with the father realizes what his father would feel if his father knew his own feelings of hatred and jealousy, and so reacts to those feelings as he instinctively realizes that his father would react, namely with disapproval; and so he must disapprove of these feelings; and what is that which carries

out the disapproval? It is what Freud calls the ego-ideal or super-ego. It is incorporated in his own mind with the father ideal, and that idea of his father—that father ideal—is the source and foundation of his super-ego. However artificial this account may at first sight appear, we find some evidence for it, as I shall explain —evidence for accepting, or at any rate taking notice of, such a form of description as Freud gives. Freud says here that the repression of the Oedipus complex occurs through the activity of the father ideal in the boy, and that father ideal is better called the ego-ideal or super-ego built upon the idea of the father with whom the little boy has identified himself and whom he admires —although the word admiration is not mentioned by Freud. Admiration, to my mind, is a mental state accompanying the process of identification. We identify ourselves with those whom we admire. The little boy admires his father. He thinks his father is perfect in every way, partly because he has no reason for thinking otherwise; and he loves his father according to that type of love—the narcissistic type—and he gets feelings of hostility to his father. Since he has identified himself with his father he proceeds to judge, to blame, to censure those feelings of hostility, to repress them, and at the same time represses his feelings of love, of the dependence type, toward his mother, leaving the feelings towards his mother of the nature of affection. So you get a repression of the feelings of hostility towards his father and of the feelings of a modified sexual nature towards his mother by virtue of this super-ego, and this super-ego is there in the unconscious besides the repressed libido—the repressed sex feeling. There is the repressing super-ego also in the child's mind, now forming part of the unconscious. The child is not conscious of this. He may be conscious at the moment, but he very soon ceases to be aware of it, and later,

when he passes into the latency period—between the ages of (say) five and ten or eleven—where anything of a sex nature has very little interest for him, all this is forgotten and he becomes apparently non-sexual through the years of boyhood, until adolescence, when the whole thing sets in once more. So according to this doctrine there are two crises in an individual's life—two sex crises—the first one about five or before, between three and five, the time during which the Oedipus complex is repressed or got rid of. In the case of the neurotic it is only repressed, it is not completely got rid of. In the case of the ordinary normal person it is destroyed and you have what Freud calls 'the passing of the Oedipus complex'. But it has occurred through the activity of the super-ego. The latter remains there as part of the unconscious. The boy in his boyhood years is never quite aware of this, of course, although the super-ego shows indirectly in his character. In the case of some forms of neurosis it shows itself as part of an irrational feeling of bad conscience. Freud writes as if the super-ego is the cause and origin of the conscience as such.

In the early years of the Psycho-Analytic Movement there seemed to be a tendency to depict the human individual as much more immoral or unmoral than he appeared to be. Further investigation of the repressing force apparently shows that the individual is also more moral than he seems. So that the modern doctrine of analysis says that the individual is more moral, and at the same time more immoral, than has been thought.

Such a phrase as that is unsatisfactory, since it employs the term 'moral' in an inadequate sense. The mere feeling that certain things should not be done—without giving any justification for it—is not true conscience and not true morality. Morality is a process of mental development, becoming more and more apparent as the individual's

mind develops, and as his personality becomes more systematized, more disciplined, more rationalized, more intellectualized, the individual gets a more and more general outlook on life and learns to submit to general rules—rules that are valid for all individuals. There is no question of this in the working of the super-ego in the early years of childhood. All that it does is to repress certain tendencies by virtue of identification with the father. On the other hand, such a factor as this is helpful in the explanation of pathological conscientiousness. That is a difficult problem. One realizes that conscience is a good thing. It is one of the fundamental values of human life. Like Truth it is not to be questioned, so far as it is real conscience, but the fact that we may have a false conscience needs explanation. The fact that we can become less conscientious than we should is relatively easy to explain, but that one should find a deviation in the other direction is more mystifying. One finds on analysis that this over-consciousness is sometimes associated with events in the child's very early life—irrational identification with a certain kind of mental attitude associated with the father and mother in the early years.

Another way in which this pathological over-conscientiousness may show itself is the following. In the treatment of a patient one may find the analysis coming to a standstill because the patient is convinced that he does not deserve to get better. He has a feeling of guilt, which one tries unsuccessfully to dissipate. One finds no reason for it in his ordinary life until one gets back to his earliest years. There Freud claims that it can be shown to be guilt arising out of the Oedipus situation. It will be seen at once what a very close bearing all this has on the problem of religion and the sense of sin.

The young child has an idea of his father as perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, &c. Later on he becomes dis-

illusioned and finds that his father is not so powerful or magnificent. And yet there remains this ideal of omniscience and omnipotence which is then projected away from the individual, as the conception of a God all-powerful and all-loving.

Some Freudians also bring in another factor in explaining religion and religious feeling—the process of regression or of stepping back to a more infantile attitude towards life. The individual has a desire for the conservation of the three ultimate values of truth, goodness, and beauty, and for the possibility of a continued existence after death, &c., and finds no satisfaction for this general desire in his experience and knowledge of the world. But his desire is insistent and overwhelming, and in his desperation a mental reaction occurs. His mind regresses to a more infantile attitude, to the attitude which he had to his father and mother in his very earliest infancy. The feeling surges up in his mind that he must have certainty, though he is so sceptical and doubtful at first. Out of that mental conflict there comes this unwitting regression, bringing with it a feeling of blissful peace—a feeling that he is safe in God's hands. This feeling may develop gradually, or it may come suddenly as a conversion experience.[1]

This is a very crude theory, and I have brought forward criticisms of it in my *Mind and Personality*. There is an additional criticism of very general scope which may be brought against it. The theory is formulated simply in terms of temporal sequence, explaining everything in terms of what goes before, independently of any criterion of truth. The whole Freudian system is absolutely bare and lacking in any criterion of truth. Freud himself hardly ever refers to the intellectual side of life. His whole system is worked out in terms of affective mental processes, and he shows

[1] Freud gives his theory of religion in *The Future of an Illusion* (Hogarth Press, 1928).

how very much greater scope they have than we had previously thought—how they can modify our behaviour and so force us to rationalization, to justify them or explain them afterwards. His whole theory of the mental life seems to be in terms of instinctive and affective mental processes going on in a deterministic way, according to the strict principle of blind determinism. So far as one can discover, reason only comes into his mind as rationalization. If that is so, the question arises, 'How can he be sure of the truth of his own theory?' *Qua* theory it is an intellectual construction; it is not merely a summary of scientific observations. He makes his observations in the light of certain hypotheses, and crudely adjusts and modifies the hypotheses to fit the facts; but the making of the hypotheses involves some criterion of truth, i.e. of intellectual validity.

In the same way there should be a criterion of beauty. Some Freudians[1] undertake to explain aesthetic processes as 'reaction-formations' to sex activity from moral sources, but they have no criterion of aesthetics. Nor has Freud himself any criterion of morals. Finally, he has no criterion of religious experience. All through he is explaining things away instead of explaining them, and he is producing a theory which is impressive because it is so all-embracing. It is a theory which I will classify with all theories of the kind—it is a theory which explains away everything and therefore in the end explains nothing. The striving for generalization can find some kind of justification—on account of the economy of mental effort, simplicity, ease of mental activity, and security. Moreover, so long as you are contemplating only one area of a science, people considering some other area will find theories

[1] Freud himself holds that the problem of aesthetic processes will be for ever inaccessible to psycho-analytical investigation. I owe this information to Dr. Ernest Jones.

which may conflict with yours and may destroy them, but if you can give new names to everything and use them as you wish, you are in a better strategic position for fighting for your own theory. A scientist, however good an investigator he may be, has a tendency to fight for what he thinks to be true, and is anxious to possess the truth and to hold it against all comers. The dangers for science of an exaggeration of this tendency, in the direction of extremism and reactionism, are as serious as they are certain.

X

THEORIES OF MENTAL ANALYSIS

WE may now turn to a consideration of the questions of mental conflict, repression, and the general nature of psycho-analysis and other forms of mental analysis. It was through the method of psycho-analysis that Freud came to form the idea or conception of repression. Freud discovered that if he encouraged a patient suffering from psycho-neurosis to talk out his life in great detail for an hour at a time in a state of passive reverie, along the lines of so-called free association (which means saying whatever comes to his mind), at certain points in the analysis the patient became hung up, and either nothing came into his mind to say, or he remained silent in the presence of the physician. At certain points of the analysis difficulty arises. What is observed is resistance on the part of the patient's mind, if not conscious, then unconscious, in the carrying out of the method. The patient has promised at the beginning that he will faithfully carry out the method, but he finds that he is unable to do so, and becomes silent, sometimes because he does not care to tell the analyst what is there, and sometimes because nothing occurs. In either case there is what may be called a resistance, and the duty of the physician is to urge the patient to go on talking, promising him that something will come. Originally, at the beginning of his work in earlier years, Freud would put his hand on the patient's forehead and say, 'Something is coming into your mind', and he found that worked. Later on he gave up that particular procedure; he found that it was not necessary or desirable. He observed that what came to the patient's mind on these occasions was generally something of special importance in relation to the symptoms. What he

observed was resistance, either conscious or unconscious, and he *inferred* from that that there was repression. He thus built up his view of mental conflict and repression as the cause of psycho-neurotic symptoms, the patient's personality being at war with certain fundamental and instinctive tendencies, and dealing with them inadequately by the mechanism of repression. Repression is unconscious. It is not that tendencies have come into the patient's mind and he has rejected them, rather have they been rejected before reaching consciousness. In repression the tendencies really do not reach consciousness. The censorship is there to bar their way, and to prevent them reaching consciousness.

Freud's modern view of the censorship is that it is identical with the ego-ideal or super-ego. In earlier years the child has formed an ideal of personality—of his ego—on the pattern of his father or some person connected with him, and that ego-ideal itself acts as a resistance and is responsible for repression. All this goes on in the unconscious. Freud's theory of psycho-analysis is based on a special theory of the working of the sex instinct in mental development. In his earlier cases he was struck by the great frequency in which neurotic disturbances were of a sex nature, and he proceeded to extend the sex explanation over a wider and wider area, using it to explain cases that seemed, on the face of them, to be anything but sexual in origin. He used the term sex in a very wide sense, and at the present time he envisages the situation in any form of psycho-neurosis as a conflict between the ego instincts and the sex instincts. He considers psycho-neurosis to be the result of failure of an adequate solution in such conflict. Where the conflict is not rationally solved, there occurs repression of the libidinal or sex-tendencies that belong to what he now calls the 'Id', the impersonal part of the mind. What is repressed is a certain kind of sex energy

(libido) of a nervous, and ultimately of a physico-chemical nature. This libido is repressed, and then has to find some outlet, and finds it in a distorted form, and in such an illness as hysteria the symptom is the satisfaction of two general mental tendencies—one is a repressed mental tendency, a repressed wish, as Freud calls it, and the other is the repressing force of self-punishment.

Freud uses the word wish in a very wide sense. We psychologists use the word wish for something obviously conscious, a tendency towards some satisfaction the idea of which is present in consciousness, so that wish lies for the psychologist between will at the one extreme and desire at the other. Desire, wish, and will are three stages of mental development. Desire may be unconscious; a person may not know what he wants, yet may be restless and in a state of tension. In wishing he does know what he wants, he wishes a certain result; and in will the development proceeds still further, and he decides that so far as in him lies he will get what he wants. We can wish for the most impossible results, but we can only will what we know or think to be possible, because what we will we will within ourselves. What we will depends upon what we believe we can do. Professor G. F. Stout has well defined volition or will as a desire qualified by the judgement that so far as in us lies we shall bring about the fulfilment of the desire because we desire it. Will is more than wish, wish is more than desire. Thus it is well not to use the term wish in the way Freud does. Where he speaks of an unconscious wish, we should speak of a mental tendency towards some object, in which neither is the tendency consciously felt in its true form, nor is the individual aware of the object in its true nature. The hysterical symptom satisfies the repressed tendency of the unconscious, which is of a sex nature according to Freud, and also satisfies an opposing tendency of self-punishment. The symptom may not appear in

obvious relationship to the sex instinct, taken at its face value. Freud's view is that as analysis is carried out in detail, sooner or later we come on the sex motive. Our own theory is much wider—that besides sex instincts many other fundamental instincts may be responsible for the production of nervous symptoms. The instinct of self-preservation, with its emotion of fear, the instinct of self-assertion with its emotion of self-esteem, the gregarious instinct with its corresponding emotion of satisfaction, or loneliness—these instincts are just as primitive as the sex instinct, and may play their part in the formation of the symptom. But I shall probably be most helpful if I consider first the type of cases that can perhaps be explained in terms of the sex instinct—the sort of case that seems to fit in with the Freudian scheme and to bear out the Freudian views, and helps to convert people to the Freudian doctrine.

Quite a large percentage of one's patients are of this nature. Their symptoms are due to repression of sex in one form or another. We must discriminate. There are various forms of sex activity. We have to make a start somewhat similar to Freud's theory of sex. We have to remember that the manifestations of sex are varied. There are different partial processes of a sex nature, a number of different tendencies which may show themselves separately in early life, and may later on converge and fuse to form the normal sex instinct of adolescence. Here we may agree with Freud that there is one big problem that meets us on the threshold of our researches, namely the problem of perversion and inversion, modifications and distortions of sex activity. Sex activity is not so simple as it seems. Biologically its end and purpose is the perpetuation of the species, but in actual conscious life we find a number of conscious tendencies which seem to have very little to do with that biological purpose of perpetuation of

the species, and yet which carry a great deal of sex energy with them and can cause a great deal of trouble and disturbance. What stimulated Freud to produce his general theory of infantile sexuality was the large set of facts about abnormal sex life—the so-called perversions and inversions—and those who work at psychotherapy, endeavouring to help patients on the mental side, are all impressed by the apparent frequency with which these modifications of sex activity occur. Naturally a doctor dealing with cases which suffer from nerve illness may be expected to find a large number of these abnormal cases. Freud claims that it goes further than that. Without entering into too much detail here, it is well to emphasize the great importance of sex difficulties, and the real dangers that beset the path of youth in this domain. Freud has his own solution of this general problem. I would suggest a rather different theory for some of the cases. Originally it is not always anything like so abnormal as it seems to be, but through chance occurrences, chance experiences, the individual life may be disturbed. I can elucidate this best by special examples. One case I have been recently dealing with is of an individual who finds that whenever this particular instinct is aroused there is a strong tendency for him to tie a cord tightly round his neck, and to tie it tighter and tighter. One traces back his mental history and finds that he has had this impulse for many years; it dates back to the age of four, when his nurse playfully threw a lasso over his head and pulled at it. What had happened in his case was that a strong association had been built up between that particular experience and the feeling of physical and mental attraction. Although in his earlier years such physical and mental attraction need not necessarily have been definitely sexual, yet later on, at adolescence, it took that form, with the result that all sex energy tended to go in that particular direction. Again, one finds that through friend-

ships formed in early life the instinct may become inverted, i.e. directed towards the same sex, not because there is any hereditary tendency that way, but simply through force of circumstances.

It is an important problem of social psychology to consider all the various factors that make for psychological disturbance of the sex instinct. When one doubts the universal validity of Freud's theory of the psycho-neuroses, it is not that one underestimates the importance of these disturbances of development in the sex instinct. One feels that they should be much more generally known than they are, that there should be much more general knowledge about the subject, so that parents, knowing more about it, may be more able to help their children, to watch over them, and save them from unfortunate experiences, or early neutralize the after-effects of such experiences. Some of the crimes committed, partly unwittingly, by nurses and others towards young children are almost unbelievable. In the analysis of one's patients one discovers and has to deal with the results of such criminal carelessness. This particular instinct is easily disturbed. Even if one does not say with Freud that it is invariably the disturbance of sex instinct that causes nervousness, one does find that where there is nervousness there tends to be, as a result if not as a cause, a disturbance of the sex instinct. Disturbance in education, in the upbringing of young children, a disturbance in the child's emotional life, can so easily interfere with the working of this instinct, and if it is pushed off the main path it tends to go on developing in the wrong direction, and to get more and more fixed. Why? Because the development of this particular instinct along the normal path is beset with all sorts of difficulties, economic, social, &c. Control is needed, and has to be very strong, and instead of control repression can so easily set in. Repression sets in with regard to the abnormal

elements of the situation, and that is one of the central parts of Freud's theory, when he says that there is repression not of normal but of abnormal sex instincts. One of his aphorisms is 'Hysteria is the negative of perversion.'

There is this general problem we have to consider—the conflict between the sex instinct and the rest of the mind. We have to remember that in this particular instinct development can be easily disturbed by accidental experiences of one kind or another, even by experiences that seem to have nothing to do with sex; so that knowledge of the psychology of the sex instinct is of the utmost importance to educationists. One need not be a Freudian—i.e. accept the Freudian theory in its entirety—in order to adopt such a position. Experiences in early years can influence the later development of sex, and experiences at the time of adolescence or just before can have very important effects on the development of this instinct. At different periods in the history of civilization we find these sex difficulties becoming specially apparent. This is specially so in modern European civilization, since the war. There seems to be very much more disturbance of the development of this instinct than there was twenty years ago. If this is really so—and I infer from my own experience of dozens of cases that it is so—it is a serious problem to be faced and dealt with. The sad part about it is that so many people think fatalistically that it cannot be avoided, and cannot be helped. It can be helped. If you go into the patient's past history at his private or public school, or even later, you will see how it arose, and also how patient after patient will get it into his own mind that he is abnormal, and be proud of it, and may even think that it is a sign of genius. I had a case of that nature, who under analysis at first thought he was such and such a type of person; later on in the analysis he became less sure about this; now he is quite convinced

that deep down he was normal, and that it was his fancy and imagination which had been led astray by false ideas, and that in rather an obsessive way he had let his sex feelings follow them, producing conflicts that were purely fictitious. His ultimate symptom was agoraphobia, a fear of crossing a wide space; he could not walk unaccompanied and always had to go about in taxis. By working off his phantasies the symptom disappeared. These cases all fit the same general explanation, except that the details are varied. I quote it simply to emphasize the spuriousness, the artificiality, of this apparent abnormality in some cases. And if individuals were encouraged to take tutors and schoolmasters into their confidence, and to go to doctors and talk these things out early, they could be saved from a very great deal of serious mental suffering.

That must suffice for the part played by the sex instinct in mental conflicts and repressions. There are so many cases of psycho-neurosis due to sex-disturbance, that we can understand how it has become so popular as a theory of functional nervousness, why there are so many people who are enthusiastic Freudians, and why Freud himself thinks he can make it apply to all. This theory in essence takes you back to the Oedipus complex. It is the belief that the young child in the first years of life responds to parents in ways that are in essence sexual, although, of course, not of the same kind as the response after adolescence. Without accepting that, we may say that certainly the foundations of the sex instinct can be disturbed in early life, and the instinct, when it shows itself in adolescence, may show itself in perverted or inverted form, because of these earlier disturbances.

But there is plenty of evidence that besides this instinct other instincts will produce symptoms. I have already referred to the large number of cases of shell-shock during the war, in which the chief factor was the over-stimulation

of *the instinct of self-preservation*, and the stress of mind entailed in attempting to face danger without running away. Freudians have tried to twist this round to fit into their theory by saying that these symptoms of shell-shock are symptoms of repressed narcissism or repressed self-love; that in shell-shock the libido (sex energy) turns back upon the self, so that you get increase of self-love, and that increase is repressed and can only show itself in the form of symptoms—a very strained theory and quite unnecessary. We can explain the symptom more simply and naturally by saying that it is a repression of a reckless desire for safety. The individual desires safety *at all costs*. So far as his conscious mind is concerned, he desires to escape wounds and death, but with honour, without letting down his comrades, without losing his self-respect; but under certain conditions, where a shell bursts near him and he is buried by the earth thrown up by the shell, or stunned by fragments of earth, in that state of semi-consciousness the opportunity is given to his repressed desire for safety in the form of apparent disability—inability to walk, to speak, or to control tremors. These symptoms are a satisfaction of his repressed desire for safety. This explanation is not, indeed, true of all cases of shell-shock. Quite a proportion are due to direct physical causes, but it is true of most hysterical cases—about fifteen per cent. of all the cases.

In other cases the instinct of self-assertion may play a part in producing symptoms. The individual finds himself unable to face reality adequately, unable to satisfy himself, to do as well as he would like to do, or ought to do. Yet it is intolerable for him to lose his self-respect, and so instead of that he becomes ill. His feeling of inadequacy is changed into a feeling of illness. Thus, in an examination he may think for a moment that he is unable to answer the questions, and promptly have a bad headache. He may fall ill before an examination because,

subconsciously, he has a feeling of being inadequate to the situation, which he does not like to admit even to himself. It is better for him to face the situation and recognize it. If he does so, the symptom disappears, and he is much more able to do himself credit.

Then, again, much functional illness may be due to a desire for sympathy and consideration from others, a desire which is unconscious. So far as the desire is conscious, it expresses itself in depression and general reproachfulness. It is to the extent to which it is unconscious or unwitting or not clear to the patient himself, that it is the foundation of hysterical symptoms. We find quite a number of symptoms of that nature.

Finally, there are symptoms based on the gregarious instinct. Epidemics sometimes illustrate this. In some cases people may fall ill in order (subconsciously) to be in the fashion. One often finds that people who succumb to epidemics are people who must be in the swim. Whatever the special interest, they follow that interest, and so if there is an illness sweeping the country they suffer from that illness. It may be rightly objected that this is a question of germs, but there is also the question of resistance, and resistance is often diminished through the working of the gregarious instinct, and more frequently through the feeling of fear. In other cases you have a number of these instincts working together. In a complicated case you may be able to analyse the influence of the two classes of instincts, sex on the one side, and the instincts of self-preservation, self-assertion, gregariousness, on the other.

On the basis of this doctrine of repression Freud has built up his theory of the unconscious. He believes that mental tendencies can exist and persist without being conscious, and that they retain their mental characteristics while unconscious. And he draws a distinction, as we have already seen, between the systematic unconscious and the pre-con-

scious. The pre-conscious includes all the past memories that can easily come into consciousness with alteration of distribution of attention, and whose recall would not meet with special resistance. The memories of the pre-conscious are those that can rise into consciousness without any special resistance having to be overcome. By the tendencies of the systematic unconscious are meant those that can become conscious only after a certain resistance has first been overcome—the resistance of the censorship. Even then they do not show in their true form. They pass into the pre-conscious.

This theory of Freud's is not accepted by all psycho-analysts. C. G. Jung does not emphasize the distinction between the pre-conscious and the unconscious. He believes, indeed, in the unconscious, but he makes a distinction between the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious. The personal unconscious consists of those mental tendencies and memories derived from the individual's past life, the collective unconscious comprise those derived from the race. The collective unconscious includes the various instincts, and other general mental tendencies, together with certain archetypes or so-called primordial images of great generality.

Alfred Adler appears to make little use of the conception of the unconscious state. He apparently thinks, mainly, if not entirely, in terms of the nervous system and of conscious mental activity. Certain forms of conscious mental activity are checked and changed into other forms of conscious mental activity through the mediation of the nervous system. Adler appears to make little or no use of the conception of the libido. He holds that many forms of psycho-neurosis, even when apparently of a sexual nature, are not sexual in origin, but derived from the working of the instinct of self-assertion or the 'power instinct'. Again, whereas according to the Freudian doctrine prolonged analysis is held to be neces-

sary for most forms of psycho-neurosis in order to remove the patient's symptoms, Adler contends that quite a number of patients suffering from severe psycho-neurosis may be cured in a very few hours, in conversation helping the patient to realize where he went wrong in the past, how he deviated from his true *life-line*, to see in what way his symptoms fulfil this desire for safety, and how far the course of his mental development has been disturbed through an excessive desire for safety, an excessive fear for himself and his reputation. Such a patient, taking these remarks to heart and altering the plan of his life with reference to them, gradually finds himself relieved of his symptoms.

Our duty no doubt is to suspend judgement at present on all these matters. We can only come to conclusions on the basis of experience. We need to see cases analysed by different methods, and then compare the results obtained. What we do find is that sometimes patients after continuing analysis with one type of physician for a long time without much result, may show great improvement under a different line of treatment. Sometimes a person analysed by a Jungian makes little progress, and the case is cleared up by a Freudian, or vice versa. Sometimes both analyses have been tried without much result, and then the Adler process may succeed. The moral of that is that the truest theory is probably that which has the widest scope, which is willing to allow for the workings of all the various primitive instincts, and is not too anxious to reduce them to one. Ultimately no doubt all instinctive tendencies must be reduced to one fundamental life tendency. The science of psychology has not advanced anything like that far at the present time. Much of Freud's theorizing is an attempt to reduce a number of ultimate factors (i.e. ultimate for present knowledge) to one or two.

MENTAL RECONSTRUCTION

Finally, there is the question of synthesis. Some people think that they are merely stating a truism when they say that psycho-synthesis is necessary as well as psycho-analysis. But psycho-analysis is not merely analysis. In itself it involves synthesis. The patient tells you his past life, and at the same time a change is occurring, and the parts of his mind that become (metaphorically speaking) separated from one another, join up again in a new configuration. So that the mind under analysis is rather like water. If you cut water you find the two sides come together again immediately. What may often happen, and does generally happen, is that in the course of the analysis a person gets nearer to his true self and sees what his fundamental interests in life are. He may have been following interests that are not natural to him, he may have been led astray by accident. But now, knowing what his real desires are, he is still left with the difficulty of deciding how to follow them up and adapt them to the demands of social life. For this he needs a philosophy of life. The symptom is a sign of a failure of adaptation. He has failed to adapt himself to the demands of life, and develops a psycho-neurosis instead. He has for years perhaps avoided his duties in certain directions. He now finds it necessary to consider exactly what his duties are. In analysis the symptoms disappear, he becomes more aware of the demands life makes upon him, and he needs some sort of theory of life to decide how far he may be expected to meet those demands. He needs some sort of faith, and he may turn to the analyst for that, and it would seem that he is right in doing so. Freudians tend to consider that the work of the psycho-analyst is completed when the analysis is carried through, and the patient sees himself as he is. The patient is to be left to himself to make his

arrangements henceforth in life. The other extreme is to say that the doctor should make the decision for him, and tell him what he has to do. That seems just as bad as the Freudian attitude. But there is a middle position, a Socratic investigation of the situation, leading the patient to understand himself more (autognosis), in which he is encouraged to talk out the general problems of his life, to think out for himself all the different alternatives, to bring up arguments for and against, and so eventually to make his decision for himself. Nevertheless, you have helped him all the time. He could not have done it without the help of some one. This is an important part of psycho-therapeutic treatment. It is an educative process of reconstruction, helping the patient to build up a general philosophy of life. Every one should have, and does have, a philosophy of life, but it is often inchoate and not clearly conscious. It is a great advance for any one to become psycho-analysed, because he can reconstruct his philosophy of life, change it from vague instinct or convention into a clear-cut philosophy. The process is a form of Socratic reasoning, very much more thorough than Socrates himself was able to use 2,000 years ago, but the same type of thing.

Further, one should also emphasize the gradual increase of self-knowledge (autognosis) that is obtained, and the alteration in emotional values that occurs. Gradually, from week to week and from month to month, the patient can report a change in his general emotional attitude towards life. The result is of the nature of a drawing-off of emotion. The patient becomes less emotional as a result. Some special cases may be found to become more emotional, but they are usually not very suitable cases, being on the borderline of very severe nervous breakdown. Most normal people would find in analysis that they would become less emotional without losing actual force. Take

a special instinct like the instinct of escape. In the process of analysis the fear becomes less and less, but the instinct of escape remains quite as effective as before. The analysis seems to be educative not only of a person's intellect and reaction to life at higher levels, but seems to be educative of the various primitive instincts themselves. They become more manageable, and less under the influence of fear of failure. That may be an alteration not of the instinct itself, but an alteration in the controlling factors, the higher forces of the mind which adjust the working of the instinct in special circumstances, which control its reaction. The actual talking out of one's earlier fears and experiences seems to diminish the general tendency to fear. Similarly with anger, the process of talking it out has a most pronounced effect, not only bringing the emotional tendency more under control, but eventually making it disappear altogether. The result is an alteration of one's whole system of personal values. So many of one's values before were closely linked up with the physical self and with childish conceptions of life. Now, as soon as that path is closed, the values have to look elsewhere for their support, and may find it in a more general, impersonal, and genuinely spiritual attitude towards life.[1] The personality becomes more and more freed from 'fixations' upon past experiences, from the tendency to 'regress' to earlier and more infantile attitudes of mind in the face of difficulty, from 'compensations' and other forms of self-deception. It thus becomes more capable of true religious experience—the experience of personal relationship with a personal or super-personal God.

[1] This is the process of 'sublimation'—blessed word!

XI

MENTAL ANALYSIS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY[1]

THE time has now come to consider the methods and results of mental analysis in a more detailed and concrete way. The first question that arises is one of terminology. Freud has most definitely introduced a new method of investigation into the science of psychology—the method which he calls psycho-analysis. Unfortunately the matter is confused by the fact that he has also applied the same name to the theories which he has gradually built up in relation to his investigations. And it is a question worth considering whether it would not be better to employ a different term for one or other of these things. The term nowadays tends to be used by Freudians themselves to refer to this body of doctrine which Freud has built up and which his followers have whole-heartedly accepted. But the theory must be kept distinct, to a certain extent, from the method. It is true that this cannot be a complete distinctness, since the two have relationships to one another. But it is one thing to investigate the mind and obtain data as the result of such an investigation, and it is another thing to build up theories to explain such results. We need one term for the method of investigation, of obtaining the material, of discovering new facts in psychology; we need another for the body of doctrine. As far as one can make out it is the body of doctrine of Freud's that has predominantly acquired the name 'psycho-analysis', and so one would suggest that the method should be renamed. Here again there is a difficulty. Freud invented the method and he gave it the name 'psycho-analysis', which

[1] A paper read before Section J (Psychology) of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Glasgow, Sept. 7th, 1928. Reprinted from *Scientia*, with kind permission of the editor, Professor E. Rignano.

is fairly descriptive, so it might be thought that there would be an objection to the change. Nevertheless we need a more general term to represent something more general. Looking to Freud as the psychologist who has led the way in all modern investigations of this nature, we yet feel that there is scope for work in similar directions by other people. Indeed, investigators like Jung, Adler, Stekel, and many other independent analysts hold that it is possible to carry out investigations of a similar nature without adopting the definite body of doctrine of Freud himself.

I would therefore propose as a more general term the phrase '*deep analysis*'—analysis of the depths. Indeed one finds Freud himself speaking of depth-psychology (*Tiefen-psychologie*). Psycho-analysis as a method of investigation is a method of investigating the depths of the mind—it is deep analysis of the mind. On the other hand, a term like deep analysis is descriptive and yet does not commit the investigator to any particular doctrine or to any particular method of investigation. Deep analysis is analysis of the depths of the mind—of the more primitive 'layers' or 'strata' of mental functioning—but that analysis can be carried out in different ways by different people, or by the same person on different occasions.

A fundamental part of the Freudian method of psycho-analysis is the method of 'free-association'. The patient lies on a couch for an hour at a time, falls into a passive mental state, an uncritical, receptive state of mind, and allows whatever comes into his conscious mind to obtain expression in speech. He speaks out what occurs to him, and this process of so-called 'free-association' results in the gradual production of more and more material from parts of the mind not previously accessible to conscious observation. Resistances are observed and the patient from time to time has difficulty, on the one hand in finding

anything in his consciousness, and on the other hand in imparting it to others—to the physician. Freud originally inferred from such observed resistances the factor of 'repression'. He came to the conclusion that mental tendencies were kept out of clear consciousness by the active force of repression. This method of free-association was the means of overcoming resistances, or evading or outflanking them, thus bringing into consciousness what was previously unconscious.

Other people can carry out similar methods, and it is interesting to see what sort of results are obtained. Freudians contend that there is very little theory about it, that it is almost all on the level of observed fact; but if one investigates according to this method one gets results that do need interpretation and do not carry their explanation with them, although they do carry their beneficial effects with them. It is important to distinguish between the therapeutic effects of analysis and the theoretical conclusions one may draw from the results of analysis. Prolonged analysis of this nature—using the method of free-association, overcoming resistances (helped out by dream-analysis and in other ways), encouraging more and more material to come into consciousness from the unconscious —does result in benefit to the patient. The patient's mental illness becomes alleviated. His symptoms may at first increase in severity and then may disappear. The underlying causes of the symptoms have been reached, underlying mental factors have become conscious, and in becoming conscious have fallen under the sway of conscious control, whereas in the unconscious they were out of control and so persisted in a mechanical way.

That is all we can say independently of any theory. That happens. When we proceed to ask ourselves why it happens and what exactly were the mental disturbances and mental experiences underlying the symptoms and

causing the illness, we meet with difficulties. We cannot without more ado accept Freudian interpretations *en bloc*. We need to be as empirical as possible in this matter. It is new work and we must get new material if we are to make any advance in theory.[1]

In a typical case of deep analysis one would be analysing a patient for at least seventy or eighty hours,[2] at the rate of three hours, and preferably four or five hours, a week. One finds that the patient tends first of all simply to talk out his past life—various incidents of his past life come back during the first eighteen, twenty, or more hours. Then phantasies of various kinds may come up into his mind. He seems to live in a waking dream as he lies on the couch, and may tend to discuss various abstract questions, or the more concrete problems of his own present life, with emotional intensity. Still later in the analysis he may tend to recall earlier and earlier memories of his childhood years with great vividness. *Of course there is great variation from case to case.* One of my most instructive cases is an Oxford graduate, a novelist, who suffered from obsessions and was very severely ill when he first came to me, so ill that

[1] In this chapter I am basing my remarks on experiences that I myself have had in analysing patients. It is now many years since I first studied Freud and began the practice of deep analysis. I first lectured on Freud in 1912. In April 1913 I wrote an article in the *Lancet* on Freud's Theory of Dreams, and in September 1913 I lectured on 'Freud's Theory of the Unconscious' before the British Association. More recently I have myself been analysed by a leading Freudian for several months, involving ninety-two hours of analysis, as a scientific experiment on my part, not as treatment. But I base my views upon the results of much more prolonged analyses of a number of my own patients.

[2] In my experience, only a minority of one's patients require such prolonged courses of deep analysis—as e.g. those suffering from severe obsessional neurosis and anxiety states. In my own practice I find that quite fifty per cent. of my patients (suffering from functional nerve trouble) recover after a course of about ten treatments by mental analysis and suggestion, with instruction in the use of auto-suggestion.

he was considered to be a mental case. He is now in his third year of analysis and is steadily improving, passing through the different stages above mentioned. Recently he has been re-living incidents of his early childhood with emotional and almost hallucinatory vividness. On one occasion he became disturbed by feelings in his throat, and thought he had got mumps. He feared that he might give me mumps and infect my consulting-room with mumps. There was no question of his having that illness, but it became clear from the subsequent analysis that he was going through a childhood experience of an attack of mumps with hallucinatory vividness. He felt it as an immediate or actual experience *before* he recalled it under analysis as a memory of early childhood. On another occasion his tongue and gums felt sore and he thought he had an ulcer on the tongue. He brought up under analysis a very vivid memory of cutting his teeth. On yet another occasion in the course of analysis he suddenly jumped up from the couch and ran out of the room feeling very much disturbed inside, thinking that he was going to vomit. Continuation of the analysis brought up vivid memories of gastro-intestinal disturbances in very early years. What has been recently happening is that he has been re-living, in great detail, experiences of his fourth, fifth, and sixth years. He has come to that after a long process of analysis in which he has been giving me later and earlier experiences; but it has narrowed down more and more to those particular years—round about the fifth and sixth years.[1] He has felt great resistance. He has shown it in this way, that directly he gets on the couch he says: 'I wish I had not come. It is not the right day for me to come. I ought not to have come to-day.' He frequently says that. There is strong resistance there which has to be dealt with.

[1] More recently the memories recalled have belonged almost exclusively to the third year of childhood, and still more recently to the first year.

Nevertheless, he persists in coming for treatment, and wastes no time during the analysis-hour.

This is the type of result one may get if the analysis proceeds long enough. The patient is re-living his life and is passing through memories and attitudes of mind which he experienced in earliest childhood and has not experienced in that same form since. As the individual goes through these experiences his attitude towards the analyst changes. It seems to correspond to his attitude to the people round him in those early years. It is almost like an illusion. He himself cannot always understand his feelings. There is a general underlying feeling of dependence on the analyst. In one whole class (though not in all cases) the patient will persist in coming for treatment even in spite of discouragement and is perfectly docile; he will do anything that the analyst suggests. Yet his feelings towards the analyst change from time to time, in relation to the analytic situation. If we employ the Freudian term 'transference' for this phenomenon, we shall find it necessary to distinguish two different but allied uses of the term, viz. (1) in the sense of general dependence on the analyst, of more and more whole-hearted reliance on the analyst—general transference, positive transference—and (2) in the sense of the varying moods of the patient from day to day in relation to the analyst—hostility, doubt, even fear, anxiety, &c., as well as affection and confidence—all the different experiences corresponding to the mental attitudes felt towards parents and others in earliest years.

This process of re-living early mental attitudes and so again obtaining control over an early situation is one factor in the cure of a patient. A systematic re-living and working over the past in greater and greater detail and thoroughness itself produces benefit and gives the patient power over his symptoms. His symptoms tend to disappear. The ground is cut from beneath them. The

mental causes are dealt with. How are they dealt with? What are the mental causes? We find in a number of analyses that the patient gets well without our being able to say what exactly the mental causes are. There are a whole number of different possible causes, different incidents and experiences, some or all of which may have had importance, and played their part. We cannot disentangle these factors with complete certainty.

Freud's explanation, in its general form, is in terms of the Oedipus complex. If this complex is taken in its usual sexual sense the explanation is too narrow, although the *general* reactions of the child to its father and mother are of fundamental importance for its future life and character.

Among the various factors of cure, two may at first be singled out as of general significance. One is the re-living of the past with great vividness (ab-reaction, removal of repression and re-association), and the other is the understanding, the self-knowledge (autognosis), that arises from this process of re-living the past. The two are not identical. On the one hand you may, from independent experience of other cases, be able to say in the case of a particular individual that such and such is the explanation of his symptoms. You may think you know what the cause of the symptoms is and you may tell him why he has become like that and he may understand what you say. But that will not benefit him. Instead of getting better he may sometimes get worse under such treatment, so that external knowledge of the cause of his illness is not sufficient for him. Self-knowledge is what he needs—direct awareness. He must live things through again, go back to the early situation, see it from the inside. On the other hand, after a certain amount of analysis he may himself guess what the true situation is and understand from the inside what has caused his illness, yet the illness persists. He needs much deeper analysis, much more thorough-going analysis to

produce much more vivid re-living of the past experiences. Conversely the actual re-living of the past experiences may benefit him even when he does not succeed in disentangling the various forces at work and in giving each force its due significance in the explanation of his illness. Quite a number of patients, after undergoing prolonged analysis and getting better, are unable to say exactly how they became ill or why they became well. They have a deeper understanding of their own nature, certainly, but far from a complete one. Conversely other patients may become convinced, in the course of analysis, that such and such are the reasons for their illness, and yet may not benefit. The whole matter is still in a state of uncertainty. We should not be too ready to accept a cut-and-dried theory that has been worked out by others. The need in this general method of deep analysis is for workers of an independent character, determined to see things for themselves and to draw their own conclusions.

As a matter of fact there are a number of factors at work, all co-operating to produce the final result. It is not merely (1) the recalling of past memories, and the re-living of past tendencies, living through in the present the phantasies that boil up from the unconscious; nor (2) the acquiring of deepened insight into one's mind—learning how one thing has led on to another in one's past life—the process of more and more definite self-knowledge, which produces recovery. Besides these there is (3) the general factor of 'transference'—the transferring of the mental attitudes that referred in early life to the parents and others (nurses, brothers, and sisters, &c.), to the analyst; again, there is also (4) the actual conscious idea which the patient has of the analyst. The patient responds to different analysts in different ways. His attitude is, of course, coloured by his own actual past experiences, the attitudes which he took up in years past towards parents, &c.

But he is also receiving direct influence from the analyst all the time, however little the latter says, and the benefit arising from the treatment is partly due to this influence. Freudians say that all this is the working of transference. They have their own explanation of it, in terms of infantile sexual reactions to parents, and contend that the transference itself must be resolved in subsequent analysis. The analyst must conduct the analysis further so that the patient can understand whence the transference arises. But beside this form of transference there is of course an active and creative process in the patient's mind reacting to what he thinks the analyst is, and what he thinks are the views of the analyst on different subjects. All this is of very great importance. It is of more importance in analysis than it would be in ordinary conversation because of the state of mind into which the patient has thrown himself for the purposes of analysis—the state of mind of passivity, receptivity, and lack of criticism. The patient under analysis becomes very *suggestible*.

Freud appears to hold that all suggestibility is an aspect of transference. In my own view transference is indeed a form of suggestion, but not all suggestion can be regarded as transference. In other words, the terms suggestion and transference are not identical as regards denotation. Transference is undoubtedly a form of suggestion, but suggestion occurring in the course of analysis is not all transference. So far as we mean by suggestion the influencing of the mind by processes other than those of logical reasoning or rational persuasion, suggestion occurs in the course of the analysis as the individual reacts to what he thinks and imagines, either correctly or mistakenly, the analyst to be thinking or believing. He is in a specially suggestible state, so that every word that the analyst says has a great influence on him either positive or negative—in the way of either agreement or disagree-

ment. You may say that this is transference—the analyst is put in the place of the father, say, and if the patient has a strong father-complex—an authority-complex—the patient may show resentment, or a feeling of negativism towards the analyst. This may and does occur so far as other situations are reactivated or recalled, but in a great deal of the analytic time the individual is speaking of the present and of the more recent years of his life, and his various problems, his doubts and difficulties; and here he would be influenced by what he knows or thinks that the analyst thinks. Analysis has been in the field long enough for us to see the tendency of different people when analysed to adopt the theories held by the analyst. A person analysed by a Freudian tends to become a Freudian. If he is analysed by a follower of Jung or Adler he becomes enthusiastic about their views. Some sort of corrective is evidently needed to make the results scientifically reliable. I was analysed by a Freudian for a fairly long time, and I can see quite well that if you just give way utterly to these various feelings you are really going to be robbed of your power of criticism as regards the science. You need a deeper, an independent point of view; that means not actually while you are being analysed—during the hour you must carry out the instructions of the analyst—but you should think of it at other times, think how your mind has reacted—use your own powers of thought. But what now happens is simply because people who take it up are not necessarily well trained beforehand in thinking philosophically. They are given a system ready made, a system of terms—very metaphorical for the most part—terms by means of which they can think about the mind. Their analysis is a sort of training for them in the technique of psycho-analysis. It is somewhat as if, in order to teach students psychology, I threw them into a hypnotic state and then taught them, told them this, that, and the other. When a person is lying

on a couch in a most defenceless position he is not in favourable circumstances for getting independent powers of thinking about psychological matters. Instead of going to an analyst in order to benefit from his treatment or to test it, some may go simply in order to be able to say that they belong to a definite school of psychology. The result in such cases must be unsatisfactory both for them and for the science. If they go with an entirely open mind, determined not only to give up their mind to the analyst while they are being analysed, but at other times to think hard about it and keep an independent power of judgement, progress will be made. At present we find different schools going ahead (?) quite independently of one another, seldom meeting one another, seldom taking part in one another's discussions, and often speaking disparagingly of one another. This sort of thing gives an opportunity for the Philistines to rejoice, and stands in the way of progress.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI

The following is a verbatim copy of a letter from the Oxford graduate patient referred to on p. 136. It was written to Dr. W. Langdon Brown, the well-known authority on endocrinology and the sympathetic nervous system, who, with the patient, grants me leave to publish it.

December 4th, 1928.

Dear Dr. Langdon Brown,

You may possibly remember my consulting you as a patient near the end of March 1926. I came on the recommendation of Dr. William Brown, who had just then started to treat me by analysis. I wanted to make sure there were no serious complications arising from my physical condition. You kept me nearly an hour and incidentally you helped me a great deal more than you realized at the time. (You were exceedingly encouraging.) You decided there was little amiss with me from your specific point of view; that, in fact, I was a clear case for psycho-therapeutic treatment.

Finally, on leaving you, I promised to let you know how the latter method succeeded.

Over thirty months have elapsed since then, and I have never lost sight of this promise. Unfortunately, I am not yet through the treatment; otherwise, I should have had several things to tell you before this. I now understand, however, that you will shortly be giving evidence before the B.M.A. Committee on Psycho-Analysis, and it therefore seemed to me that a few words from one of your former patients on this much discussed topic might not be (to you) unwelcome.

Well, as to the general result so far, I can express it very briefly. When I consulted you the year before last, I was suffering very acutely from what are termed (professionally) 'obsessional' symptoms. I had suffered from them constantly as a child and then (with one short interval) they had lapsed for many years, tending, however, to be supplanted by equally acute symptoms of the so-called 'anxiety' type. The original trouble had reappeared in 1922 and had persisted (with rather short intervals of quiescence) for nearly four years when I saw you.

Now for the subsequent effect of the analysis. Almost from the very first week it set up a very violent conflict of another type—a conflict with what its English exponents call 'resistances'. This conflict continued and continued. After every few months' time there would be a sudden—and always unexpected—breakdown of these 'resistances'. This breakdown was usually accompanied by a very keen physical sense of 'release'. The sequel was always a rush of early memories, such as figure so prominently in psycho-analytical literature, and excite so much scepticism among journalists and physiologists. Earlier and earlier memories succeeded—there seemed to be a system almost akin to stratification. But it is noticeable that up to a point they were always quite definitely memories of the past—not quite like ordinary memories of the past, for they seemed less distant, but nevertheless, unmistakably of the past.

Since about a year ago it has been quite otherwise. Memories of an exceedingly early past—my first three years of life—contrive to emerge at intervals, but they no longer present themselves to me as definitely past. They are like a different aspect of the present; that they *are* genuine memories of the past I can be sure, because

I have succeeded in confirming quite a number of them from independent sources. But this turning-point in the analysis was accompanied by two very well-marked changes.

(*a*) The memories themselves (which, as I have said, do not subjectively seem like past memories) are often of an exceedingly 'Freudian' character (comprising the stock repertoire of Freudian literature, the auto-erotic, &c., complexes of 'infantile' sexuality).

I was very surprised at this sudden change, for the memories evoked during the first two years had most noticeably not been of this description. I must add, however, that the matter-of-fact descriptions of such things which you read in the literature in question gives a very distorted impression of such phenomena, which are definitely more mystical, strange, idealized, if I may use the word. The objective content seems to be the same, yet I feel that the Freudians are still an enormous distance from the end of their discoveries in this region.

(*b*) It was hereabouts in the analysis that the 'resistance-conflict'—which had been going on strong all the time—seemed suddenly to 'absorb'—if I may say it—the 'obsessional' symptoms. It is hard to describe what I mean. I simply began to find that the symptoms themselves, instead of merely diminishing, or merely lapsing for a time, seemed to be transferring their virus to the issue between the analysis and the 'resistance'. The emotions which for years had accompanied the one were beginning to attach themselves mainly to the other; this has gone on increasingly ever since. It is only when the resistance is extraordinarily violent that there is a brief tendency for the previous symptoms to creep back.

(*c*) Originally the feeling of resistance had been almost exclusively confined to the analysis itself. From this point it began to spread all over my waking life. There is always something quite consciously present in me which is trying to hold something else back, and, at the same time, to interfere with my ordinary interests, quench all desire and generally induce a state of quietism.

The physical symptoms of 'resistance' are frequent headache and peculiar disturbances of vision: notably a tendency to confuse visual planes, to see things 'flat' (i.e. in two dimensions) and (very constantly) to make grotesque miscalculations of relative distances (there is a similar time confusion). Normally, I suppose, one would expect this constant disturbance of the brain to be accompanied by

indifferent physical health. Oddly enough, in my case it is otherwise. I am *physically* fitter now than I have ever been at any previous period of my life. (I was born in 1891.) I have definitely increased in chest measurement. During the six or seven years preceding the analysis my physical condition had generally been very poor.

Finally, I wish to confirm very emphatically the story related by Dr. William Brown to the British Association—the Mumps incident, which provided a rich sensational item for the press. It occurred a week or two after the decisive change that I have indicated above, and it happened just as Dr. Brown has related.

At present the completion of the analysis is being obstructed by a very determined resistance, greater than any previous phase excepting that of the first few months. Whether we shall eventually overcome it I do not know, tho' I believe we shall; but in my case, from my experience up to the present, I can verify the existence of many of the phenomena alleged by writers on 'deep-analysis'.

I should like to make it quite clear that my general agreement with Dr. Brown's views cannot be traced to suggestion during analysis. I had read his books years before I consulted him, and, in fact, consulted him because his general position appealed to me as convincing and reasonable. (I had previously heard of him from our common teacher, McDougall.) I cannot intellectually accept the philosophical basis (such as it is) of Freud, especially its rigid determinism, nor can I personally sympathize with his medical exactitude. Moreover, I feel that he and his disciples are preposterously exaggerating the advance made by psycho-analysis in its first generation. Every 'first generation' of scientific explorers seems to make this arrogant mistake, and this tends to become eventually a reactionary influence. (The Darwinians are an object-lesson.)

In conclusion I must ask you to pardon me if I have unjustly occupied your time; but it appeared to me that some of these facts from a previous patient, might be of interest to a witness before the Committee on Psycho-analysis.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed)

P.S.—The patient's point of view or testimony is virtually ignored in psycho-analytic literature.

XII

SUGGESTION AND WILL

WE will now take up the threads of the discussion, and consider the whole problem of suggestion, volition, and personality. We see that in suggestion there is a tendency to consider the mind in a momentary state under the style or form of ideomotor action. An idea, an impression, a thought, is in the mind, and that thought tends to pass over into action. Indeed, Pierre Janet's theory is that in suggestion an idea produces its maximum effect, and conditions favourable to suggestion do produce the maximum effect, keeping other considerations—competing considerations—in abeyance. In ordinary normal mental life idea follows idea, and you have a train of mental activity going on, as it were, on the surface of the mind, and any particular idea is not given time to produce its maximum effect, but is quickly replaced by another. But, in formal suggestion treatment, what is aimed at is to give this idea its full chance to express itself to the fullest possible extent. So suggestions of muscular power take effect as long as ideas of muscular feebleness, difficulties, and doubts are kept in abeyance. The idea of a sensory experience, such as a feeling of heat or pain, can be intensified, and allowed to produce its full effect. An idea of a burn or blister will actually raise a blister in a hypnotized patient where competing ideas are kept away. Ideas are not mere ideas, they are also forces. They carry with them not only a cognitive aspect but also a conative aspect, an aspect of striving, a tendency to bring about some change in the outer world or in the inner world. In suggestion an idea is given an opportunity of developing itself to its full extent. That is one way of thinking of suggestion.

W. McDougall defines suggestion as the acceptance of

an idea independently of logically adequate grounds for such acceptance. A subject of successful suggestion treatment accepts what is said to him independently of logically adequate grounds. The word acceptance has more than one meaning. The individual may consciously accept, and nothing may happen. Conversely an individual may consciously reject or doubt, and yet something may happen. The acceptance of the idea depends on the condition of another part of the mind than the conscious mind —viz. on the condition of the subconscious or unconscious mind, the background of the mind. That again is merely a popular term. The subconscious or unconscious is the sum-total or system of fundamental tendencies, urges, instincts, interests, which the individual has inherited from previous generations, and others which he has developed on the basis of his earlier inherited instincts. All these are of importance to him. In his conscious mind he may not have a clear and adequate view of what are the most important circumstances of his life. Consciously he may attach himself to certain aspects of existence, certain desires and wishes, whereas the desires and wishes that are fundamentally more important and move him more are in the subconscious. Suggestion appeals to these subconscious wishes and desires, and the realization of suggestion is the realization of such wishes and desires. Hence the surprising results often obtained in hypnotic suggestion. Certain suggestions are hardly accepted at all, are hardly reacted to, although the person seems to have obvious reasons for responding. Other suggestions are accepted, although there is no obvious reason in consciousness why they should be. This is specially the case with regard to pathogenic or bad suggestions. A person does not consciously wish to be ill. He consciously fears illness. What explains it still more is his subconscious desire for illness, because of a craving for sympathy or for power over rela-

tives, and his subconscious fears. He may cut these fears out of his conscious mind. There are two general forms of fearlessness, the fearlessness of the individual who has faced the ordinary possibilities of danger, and has recognized once and for all that fear is no good, and gives it up. Another person finds the experience of fear a painful process, and so turns away from it, but does not really face the matter, and then he can easily be taken off his guard, and the subconscious will surge up. I suppose a person cannot be considered to have overcome fear entirely unless he gets rid of frightening dreams. It is a matter of degree. Some are less subject to fears, less the prey of irrational fears, than others. Fear comes up in this matter of suggestion as a very important factor on the conscious level, but it is still more important on the subconscious level.

We see further that not only fear and desire will explain the realization of suggestion, but the working of every fundamental instinct. There is not a primary instinct that does not bring its own suggestive tendency. Self-assertion, self-abasement, gregariousness, curiosity, whatever it may be, brings its own suggestion. The secondary emotional tendencies also bring suggestion. Jealousy, which may or may not be a primary emotion, brings its own system of suggestion. A person under the influence of jealousy is ready to believe statements about a rival which he would not believe if he had a completely clear and rational view of the situation. Baudouin has put the matter in the following way. He regards emotion as an auxiliary factor, a factor that helps suggestion. This view needs modification and restatement. The truth is, firstly that the instinctive tendency underlying the emotion is in some cases the driving force of suggestion, and secondly that the emotion is often a sign of conflict, of a lack of unity of the mind. The mind is not at one with itself, and in this condition suggestion is more likely to be accepted. For

emotion is not so much cause as effect. (It is conation, mental striving, which is cause.) Emotion is sometimes a sign that the person is not in harmony with himself, and can be taken off his guard, and thus become the victim of suggestion. He cannot marshal his intellectual powers and ideas, to bring them to bear on the situation. He has been carried away by the suggestion before he has really begun to think about the matter.

Then the problem of suggestion impinges upon the problem of will, in the facts under the general 'law of reversed effort'. The facts had long been recognized, but Coué was the first to summarize them in a paradoxical and challenging way. 'Where the will and the imagination are in conflict', he says, 'the imagination always wins.' And he identified imagination with suggestion. In his book *La Maîtrise de Soi-même* the word imagination in French is interchangeable with suggestion. He puts suggestion or imagination higher than will. One feels there must be some error here, because, according to any systematic theory of psychology, will is the highest form of mental activity. Will, indeed, is the entire mind in action in its unity—so far as at any moment it is a unity; it is the character fully expressing itself. If the character only partially expresses itself, the man's actions are not entirely in harmony with his character. If the other sides of the character show themselves later, the person may feel remorse or regret. He would not feel this if his mind had previously been acting in its entirety. How are we to explain the law of reversed effort? Let us take examples. (1) A desire to remember a proper name. We are unable to do so; we make an effort, and we find the more effort we make the less we succeed. Whereas, before, the name was 'on the tip of the tongue', it now seems entirely to retreat, and leaves no sign in consciousness. On the other hand, if, instead of willing and making an effort, we calmly

say the name will come to us presently, and we will not bother about it, we find it does come. Or (2) when we are learning to ride a bicycle, if we see a stone in the road and become alarmed and make a conscious effort to avoid it, the tendency seems for the bicycle to make a bee-line for the stone. On the other hand, if we keep calm and cool and simply affirm that we are going to avoid the stone, we do avoid it. In the effort to remember the name or avoid the stone, have we will? We have wish and desire, a desire that is spasmodic, that is violent, but we cannot say that with our whole mind we have willed to avoid the stone or remember the name, because will in its complete form carries with it belief that we shall succeed. That is why, as Aristotle said, we cannot will the impossible. We can will what we believe to be possible, although it actually is impossible, and then we fail. Where we know the result is impossible we cannot will. In the case of the forgotten name there is a fear of failure, checking and preventing us from reaching the complete stage of will. If we can reach the complete stage of will, believing that we are going to remember the name, that will produce the maximum effect. But in the condition of effortful wish, the spasmodic effort arouses and intensifies the fear of failure, which prevents the belief in success. Belief in the possibility of success, the essential constituent of will, is absent. You have wish instead of will. You have suggestion accompanied by fear of failure, based upon the fear instinct or the danger instinct. And against that you can only put the desire to succeed, unaccompanied by any special emotion. This is put against the idea of failure, accompanied by fear of failure, which is what Coué means by the imagination. There is really a conflict between two imaginations, the imagination of success and the imagination of failure. The imagination of failure is accompanied by a feeling of fear. There is no real conflict between will

and suggestion, but a conflict between one suggestion and another suggestion. The state is a state of incomplete will. Coué is quite right in his practical conclusion that in order to get the maximum effect of suggestion treatment patients should avoid effort, because effort tends to bring with it the idea of failure and fear of failure, which tend to neutralize any effort towards success. Our deepened knowledge of suggestion derived from its use in psychotherapy has deepened our insight into the nature of the will. We still hold that patients suffering from psychoneurosis suffer from defective will. We entirely disagree with Coué when he says that training of the will is no good in the case of psycho-neurosis. The will needs to be helped to complete volition. In some directions a patient is unable to will; if he tries to will the law of reversed effort comes in. A typical example is agoraphobia (fear of open spaces); a patient suffering from fear of open spaces cannot walk down the street or cross the street, becomes more and more panicky and nervous, and has to return home. And the more he tries, the less he succeeds. It is not that his will is failing, but that he has not really completed the state of will in this respect, that he is unable to cross a street, and unable to reach that state of will which involves calm belief in success. A feeling of certainty is absent. Why? The reason can only be discovered by deeper analysis, going over the patient's past life, and seeing how the agoraphobia set in. The memories and tendencies of those early experiences are of importance to the patient, and to the doctor who wishes to cure him. The doctor helps him to will, to be capable of complete volition. In this volition, apart from analysis, what it means is to get rid of the spasmodic effort, because spasmodic effort brings fear of failure. If you encourage the patient to get rid of his fears, to keep calm, he will be more successful. And the way in which you encourage him is by advising him to make

the affirmation with confidence, with belief that he is going to succeed. If the patient calms himself down and says, 'I am going to manage it', he is more likely to succeed. He has to attack fear at the source by analysis. Suggestion treatment will help him to reduce the fear to a minimum. In a way, suggestion treatment is a supplementation of the will, or a help towards the completion of the will. The complete will carries with it the suggestion of success, an adequate control of the imagination. The individual has to train himself to imagine success. It is important for psycho-neurotic patients, and indeed for all of us, to train the imagination in this matter. That is why I am so emphatic that fear should be denied, should be turned away from, and in its place should be put confidence, and one should make affirmation to oneself that whatever happens, one is not going to be afraid or disturbed. This is more than the spirit of Stoicism. The spirit of Stoicism is that evil, though inevitable, should be bravely borne, but in this attitude of mind you go farther and deny evil. Having taken whatever steps are necessary to avoid danger you refuse to let the thought of danger play upon you subjectively and lower your vitality by raising a feeling of fear. It is obvious that, even in the extremity of death, people face it in different ways—one in a panic of fear, another calmly. So with lesser difficulties and dangers, it means controlling the imagination, so that the mind is as active as it possibly can be in its unity.

And this brings one to the question of personality. When considering the question of will, the question of personality is not far behind. It is the same problem looked at from a different point of view. When we speak of the will, we think of the momentary reaction of the mind, when we think of the character we think of the totality of the mind expressing itself in the will. We are at

once faced with the problem of multiple personality, and our best way of dealing with that problem is to avoid rushing to extreme cases of multiple personality, and drawing conclusions from them, but to consider closely the variations of the so-called normal mind. In the normal mind there is a tendency to alternation of mood and to multiplicity of ideals. Individuals have more than one ideal of themselves. Especially as children they find from day to day and from week to week that they have different ideas as to what they would like to be, which are mutually exclusive. So the mind oscillates from day to day and gradually settles down as one gets older under the pressure of circumstances, and a sort of natural selection goes on. Certain ideals are stamped out under the cruel influence of circumstances. The individual throws himself more and more into the following up of one ideal. But nevertheless he has to meet different types of people with different interests and ideals, and we find that he responds to them in different ways. He is certainly a different kind of person in one general environment from what he is in another. His business self is different from his social self, and both differ from his religious self. With every single person he meets he is slightly different. He does not show the same side of himself to different people. These different aspects are in a way subsidiary selves, and one can be encouraged at the expense of others. Besides that there is a more fundamental unification, the more fundamental self, of which these are manifestations. The question is whether that more fundamental self is something existing at the beginning and continuously present and active through life, or something that is gradually being developed. From the purely scientific point of view, there is much to be said for the theory of development—that the personality is created partly through identification with different types of people who call out admiration.

Besides that, there is the work of reason, which is so important. The individual learns from experience, and knows that if he follows up certain spontaneous fundamental tendencies he suffers for it, he is unhappy and makes other people unhappy. Besides this, he gets a feeling of lowered worth. Here we must admit an intuitional element. We must assume that the individual comes into the world with the power of discovering values. Just as he can discriminate values in beauty, truth, and goodness, so he can discriminate values as regards personal activities. This power is, to a certain degree, a power of creation. The mind pushes forward, develops out of the primitive levels, the earlier stages of evolution, and is continually pushing forward, and it is reminded of this especially when it fails, when there is regression. And of course in wrongdoing there is such regression. But especially in pathological cases, in nervous illness, is there a regression, and the symptoms are signs of such regression. The mind is failing in some directions to proceed, and is retreating from reality, and in order to save itself from the realization of this retreat it becomes definitely ill. Illness is a piece of extraordinarily bad fortune that prevents the mind from understanding the true situation and relieves it of the responsibility of failure. And in treatment we have to encourage the patient to face the situation more fully, and be ready to accept responsibility once more. But I admit that this is a hard saying, and in some cases really too hard. Often the illness is the result of failure to deal with responsibility almost too heavy for the individual's shoulders, and the main burden of responsibility should be placed not on the individual but on society. There is such a thing as collective responsibility, and in many cases the responsibility for the failure of some particular individual may be more the responsibility of the people around him. Where a person has become psycho-neurotic through unfortunate

experiences in early life, the responsibility rests on the shoulders of those who should have protected the child from such experiences rather than on the child itself. We find that just as auto-suggestion strengthens the will, because it gives the patient the opportunity of controlling his imagination, so analysis is an indirect means of training the will. Through analysis the individual is relieved from false personality, from undesirable influences of early life, undesirable identifications, &c., that have taken place. As the patient reviews his past life, as these influences come up, he sees them for what they are, and can simultaneously free himself from them. He realizes how much was just childish imitation. He can bring reason to bear and later experiences to bear, and see things in their true proportion, and so judge their value more truly.

Finally, we have to decide about the more extreme cases of multiple personality. We must bear in mind the possibility that they are artificially produced, or intensified through the hypnotic methods employed in investigating them. They are small in number, few and far between. One does not question the bona fides or genuineness of the scientists, many of them of high standing, who have reported such cases, but it is possible that in trying to describe the cases they may have made the facts too clear-cut. An investigator of such experience in these matters as Dr. Morton Prince has emphasized his belief that multiple personality is not a denial of the unity of the mind. These persons are one, and many in the sense in which they are one. These other personalities are aspects of one personality. The main reason for the limited aspect of the subsidiary personality is a breaking across of the memory continuum. That is not the only characteristic. You seem to have dissociation not only of past memories, but also of instinctive dispositions, and this shows itself in a selective influence over the memories. Certain sets of memories are

controlled by the self-assertive instinct, others by the instinct of self-abasement. The cause of dissociation may sometimes be physiological and ultimately physical. It may be that, through fatigue, toxins are produced which paralyse some of the synapses of the higher levels of the nervous system, so that you get a dissociation on the cerebral side, and the brain cannot function as a unity. So with rest and physical treatment sometimes these patients gradually recover. On the mental side, too, there is incompatibility of thought and feeling, mental conflict, a deadlock, and one side or the other has to give way. Here you find the problem of conversion coming in. In conversion you have a change of heart and mind, almost a new birth, a new person. Probably in its true form it is a process of growth. There has been a certain incubation period during which ideas have been maturing—a new outlook has been maturing—but it does not come into consciousness until a later stage of development is reached, and the person looks back on his past self as dead. He rises on stepping-stones of his dead selves, and it is quite possible that this is really the most accurate way in which we can describe the development of the mind. We hold certain general ideals which are superseded, we pass from ideal to ideal, and as we near the achievement of some ideal, we realize its weakness and shortcomings, and a new ideal, a further prospect, has been opened to us. 'New occasions teach new duties.' That may come sometimes very suddenly, in the form of conversion. In religious psychology, conversion is best defined as a turning away from a merely naturalistic outlook on life to a more spiritual outlook, a turning from the temporal to the eternal, a realization that there is an eternal aspect of life independent of whatever misfortune may befall one. But although this is the best and most normal way of using the word, you can use the term conversion in other matters. You say a person has

been converted from Liberalism to Conservatism, from Free Trade to Tariff Reform. There you have a sudden decision. The personality suddenly recrystallizes into a different general mental attitude. Again we must assume a period of incubation leading up to a catastrophic result.

XIII

RELIGION AND HEALTH

THE relation of religion and health is a problem which interests everybody; it is very prominent at present, and has been so from the earliest times. It is important not to look upon this as a distinctively modern problem, or of recent interest in theoretical and applied psychology. It has always been with us; in fact, the whole question of health and disease was first faced from the religious point of view. We find in the earliest times attempts at cure which are of a religious nature. Long before our era we find accounts, for example of the Asclepieion, or temple of Aesculapius at Epidaurus, to which patients made pilgrimages from distant parts. This temple had an inner shrine, a statue of the god, and rooms in which the pilgrims rested after their journey, and prepared themselves for their initiation. They listened to addresses from attendant priests and others, had their minds prepared, and were eventually admitted into the inner shrine, where they often spent the night on couches specially prepared for them, and much of the treatment was supposed to come to them in their sleep. They went to sleep with minds prepared, and the god visited them in their sleep and healed them. Before they went away they would acknowledge their cure, and make presentations of votive offerings to the god. These votive offerings in the temple I am describing often took the form of models in more or less precious metal or stone of the parts of the body which were supposed to be healed. What is of special interest for us is that one of these models is in the form of a foot in a state of hysterical contracture. The foot is drawn up and all the muscles contracted in a certain way—a typical attitude which we find in hysterical

contracture, where there is no definite physiological or structural change in the nervous system or muscles to cause it, but through the state of mind of the patient the foot has got into a position where it cannot be used. One of the patients, then, had suffered from hysterical contracture and had been cured by sleeping in the temple and had given thanks accordingly. Among the cases of cure described we find that of one Valerius Aper, a Roman soldier, who suffered from blindness. He was told by the oracle to mix the blood of a white cock with honey and rub this ointment on his eyes for three days and he would then receive his sight; and he did so and recovered his sight. Again, from our modern knowledge of medicine, we can be quite sure that the blindness was hysterical blindness. In these early days, then, long before the Christian era, and before there was any question of Christian healing, the methods of 'miraculous' healing were in use.

Passing over the early Christian period to medieval times, we find that it was the custom for patients to visit various shrines and receive benefit for different kinds of illness, some shrines gaining a reputation for special effectiveness in certain forms of illnesses. But the most famous shrine of all, that of Lourdes, is of much more recent date. Here, in 1868, a peasant girl had a vision of the Virgin Mary and recovered from her illness, after which the place acquired a great reputation for healing, and has continued up to the present day to produce impressive results.

In all these cases we have pronounced evidence of the influence of the mind upon the body, whether the mind be that of the individual himself or the mind of some external spirit, god, or saint. Here we have healing in its most general form.

The important movement of Christian Science in America had its immediate forerunner in the therapeutic activities

of a watchmaker named P. P. Quimby some sixty or seventy years ago. Quimby had studied the methods of the French magnetizers, and at first made use of a hypnotized subject for diagnosis and treatment. He discovered a youth of seventeen who was mediumistic or 'lucid', and was able to diagnose patients and prescribe remedies while in the somnambulistic state. On one occasion, however, he noted that the remedy prescribed was a rather expensive one and that the medium, on having this pointed out to him, at once substituted a cheaper remedy. Quimby realized that the second remedy would have just the opposite physiological effect from the first, but as the patient got well, he concluded that the cure was a matter not of the drug prescribed but of the patient's state of mind. If the patient believed the drug would cure him, the drug did cure him. The real cause of his recovery was his state of mind, viz. faith in the efficacy of the remedy. Quimby gave up clairvoyance, therefore, and proceeded to develop his own system of 'mind cure', of which the object was to inculcate in the patient's mind habits of right thinking about health and disease.

In 1862 there came to Quimby a poor lady, forty years of age, suffering from paraplegia, and other nervous troubles, and he cured her. Her name was Mrs. Glover, subsequently better known as Mrs. Eddy. She was a woman of remarkable personality and strength of will, although the accounts of her illness lead us to the conclusion that she was probably hysterical. In her early days she seems to have had hysterical attacks, and she herself is said to have discovered that life was bearable at that time only if she could be rocked in a cradle. This is interesting to psycho-pathologists, because this lying in a cradle takes the individual back to early years, and the fact that it benefited a hysterical patient is confirmatory of the regressive nature of hysterical illness. It is a ten-

dency to retreat from reality, and to step back into more infantile conditions. Although Quimby was able to cure Mrs. Eddy, which was a tremendous feat, for her hysteria, if it was hysteria, was of a serious nature—and all doctors know that while light cases of hysteria are easy, severe cases are difficult to cure—he was not able to cure himself of an abdominal complaint from which he died in 1866. After his death Mrs. Eddy proceeded to develop her own theory and practice of Christian Science. In 1875 the first edition of *Science and Health* was published. Mrs. Eddy's philosophy, if it can be called one, is summed up in a number of statements: 'God is all in all; God is good, Good is mind; God, Spirit, being all, nothing is matter; Life, God, omnipotent goodness, deny death, evil, sin, and disease.' Sickness and symptoms are unreal because matter itself is unreal. If matter is unreal, why do we get the appearance of matter? It is an illusion of 'mortal mind'.

Mrs. Eddy was not a philosopher, neither was Quimby. They were therapists or healers, first and last, and developed their vague philosophy to bolster up their method of treatment. It is a philosophy that cannot be thought out in detail, although it contains an important element of truth, as is shown by its practical results. The results of Christian Science are partly bad—that side has been sufficiently and rightly emphasized—but they are also in many cases emphatically good. There is no question that Christian Science has cured large numbers of people, and that it has thriven and spread so widely because of its pronounced success. The reason of this is undoubtedly that it emphasizes certain special factors in all healthy life—the factors of courage, confidence, optimism, a readiness to deny evil, to turn away from it, to refuse to be concerned with it at all, to refuse to do it the honour of even thinking about it. Such an attitude of mind has its dangers.

If a man is too optimistic, he may overlook danger signals. One may run past the red light, and great harm may be done. It is not necessary to quote illustrations—they will occur to any one. In spite of that, Mrs. Eddy's system is important because she and those who follow her are trying to produce a *philosophy* of disease. They look upon the distinction of health and disease as a metaphysical distinction, whereas in orthodox medicine one finds that disease and health are considered to be much on a level, health being regarded as the fortunate harmony of working of different parts of the body, and disease being explained in terms of disturbance of that harmony through the action of bacteria or mechanical or chemical injury. We do need a philosophy of health and disease as well as a science of health and disease. Such a philosophy may be more akin to the views of Christian Science than to those of orthodox medicine, since orthodox medicine is definitely materialistic in nature. Although individual medical men may be idealists by personal conviction, orthodox medicine is a materialistic system, and employs materialistic methods. The positive side of Christian Science is good and entirely true. It is borne out by the experience that the more a patient can conquer fear and refuse to think of disease and illness, the more he can trust in God, in the beneficent purpose running through all creation, and in the superiority of the mind over mere matter, the healthier he will be, the less likely to be ill, and, when he falls ill, the greater will be his chance of recovery. It is on the negative side that the danger lies. If you proceed to forbid any surgical or medical treatment, you are running great risks, you may be sure the results will sometimes be unsatisfactory. Christian Science is a method of treatment which is specially beneficial to the mental side of illness and in cases of so-called functional nervous disorder. Modern medicine has its own place,

reality, and value which Christian Science denies, and its dictates should be observed so far as required by the symptoms. All that can be done on the physical side ought to be done, but there is nothing to prevent everything possible being done on the mental side also. That is where so many fall short. Even at the present day there is no danger that the general public will put an undue emphasis on the psychological side of illness. They are still, in the main, too ready to depreciate the value of the psychological factor. As long as the medical and physical considerations are allowed full scope, the importance of the psychological factors cannot be over-emphasized.

These psychological factors are the subject-matter of the modern science and art of psychotherapy, which is thus in the direct line of descent from the early miraculous religious healing, through the work of the mesmerists and hypnotists, down to the more modern methods of Christian Science, faith-healing, and suggestion treatment. Psychotherapy teaches that different methods may be needed with different cases and that discrimination is necessary. The psychotherapist should *diagnose* the conditions on the medical side, determine what are the mental factors at work, counteract these factors, and use the modern methods of suggestion in order to arouse an enthusiastic expectation of cure. It is not easy to affirm health in a general way if the details have not been dealt with. A person with toothache may affirm health till he is blue in the face, but the tooth will go on aching, and the tooth should come out. In cases of obsession or impulsion it is something to help the patient to form more normal habits of thought and action, to distract his mind from illness by pointing out the better way, an enthusiastic belief in health and in God's goodness, but it is also desirable to find out why he became ill. The important factors of suggestion and faith must thus be supplemented by

more or less thorough mental analysis and self-knowledge (autognosis).

SPIRITUAL HEALING

We now come to the modern problem of so-called spiritual healing. Much of the difficulty in this vexed question is due to lack of psychology both on the medical and the theological side. The psychological line of investigation is the middle line which will be not a compromise but an actual solution. The solution must come, at least in great part, on the psychological plane. There is very great danger, in a subject like this, on the one hand of compromising religion, and on the other of stultifying medical science. We find a large proportion of the medical profession refusing to have anything to do with it, and in the other camp a large proportion of theologians and clergy adopting the same position. Both classes have a good deal of reason on their side, but their spokesmen are none too good at presenting their reasons. Similarly, the enthusiasts for spiritual healing have right on their side, but they also do not present the situation in a sufficiently convincing way.

As a counterblast to Christian Science and the New Thought Movement, there arose in America the Emmanuel Movement, a sort of alliance between the medical and clerical elements, rather surprising in itself to some people, who unkindly explain it as a defensive alliance against the common foe. It was a movement for getting doctors and clergymen to collaborate in the healing of the sick. The idea was that medical men should diagnose the cases and prescribe on the physical side, and then hand the case over to the clergymen to be dealt with on the ethical and religious sides. This seems a simple way out, but the difficulty is that life is not exactly made that way. The distinction between the physical, mental, and spiritual

is a distinction for thought rather than for actual practice. In the region of these various diseases, both physical and mental factors have been at work, and if we believe in the spiritual as relatively distinct from the mental, we may say that spiritual factors also have been at work.

The whole point of spiritual healing, the central tenet of the spiritual healer, is that the spiritual factor, as the most important, ought to be the most efficient in dealing with a case. It must, of course, be remembered that in various forms of disease the spiritual factor enters in different degrees. Some diseases present a more pronounced disturbance of a spiritual nature than others. Whole classes of disease seem to have nothing to do with the spiritual side at all. Most of the physical and many of the mental diseases have an hereditary factor which the individual himself cannot help, and added to that hereditary factor are factors of experience which find him unprepared. They are so intensive in their action, so disturbing, that he is absolutely unable to adapt himself adequately to them. The most glaring cases resulted during the war; exposure to prolonged shell-fire resulted in diseases predominantly if not entirely mental and nervous in nature, explained partly by bad heredity and partly by the severity of the mental shock produced. In such instances, the responsibility of the patient for the illness might be quite small. Responsibility in physical illness is often apparently nil, the moral factor as regards causation is almost completely absent. We can never say that it is completely absent, because there is the question, which we have already discussed, of the way in which the patient faces his incipient illness. When he realizes that he is ill, he may react mentally in different ways. He may realize it in a very disturbed way, and show real lack of faith, become a pessimist at once, expecting the worst because of his pessimistic outlook on life in general, and his depreciatory idea of God, and he

may rush down the slope still more rapidly than otherwise. His faith may falter, and the faltering of his faith, which is a spiritual thing, has to do with his system of values and his general religious outlook. Treachery to his theory of values and his general religious outlook may contribute, not to the onset of the disease, but to its increasing intensity, and make it worse and more prolonged than it otherwise would be. Conversely, a frame of mind of modified optimism that takes full account of all the chances as they come, and faces them without fear and with a determination to use every possible means to get back to health without panic, without neglecting any duties to others, is an attitude favourable towards cure, whatever the illness may be.

Are we to hand all this over to the clergyman, and to say that as doctors we have nothing to do with it—that we are concerned merely with the disease? The reason why it is difficult to reply to this question in the affirmative is that the relationship, the connexion of this frame of mind with the disease, may be much closer as well as somewhat mysterious. We do not even yet know with sufficient adequacy how these two points of view meet and are related to one another. This is due to the inadequacy of psychological science. But since the rise of the Emmanuel Movement a further step forward has been made in the application of the method of psycho-analysis, or 'deep' analysis. In this method the individual's past is explored as fully as possible from every point of view, primarily from the psychological point of view, but also from that of all the other mental sciences and from the point of view of his duty towards himself and others. A psycho-analyst, if he is to deal with the mind of man thoroughly, must be more than a psychologist; he must be a philosopher acquainted with the general history and problems of philosophy as they present themselves to the individual mind. He

must be able through his general training to see the world through the patient's eyes, and, in analysing the patient, go back deeper and deeper into his mind to the beginning of the attitude towards disease long before disease troubled him, the attitude of his parents and others round him towards disease, and the reaction of those attitudes upon the patient himself. All this is germane to the problem of the origin of illness, and of the feeling of illness that may arise from an infection or some other disease process. It is in a general way a psychological thing, and as psychological it certainly falls under the heading of medicine in the widest sense, although in the process ethical and other considerations have to be taken into account. In the process of analysis one realizes more definitely how great is the power of the mind over the body. In the earlier work of the hypnotists, the prominence this had attained, illustrated in the production of blisters and other physical disturbances through strong suggestion under deep hypnosis, showed how the idea of a physical and mental state could pass over into actuality. What we find in psycho-analysis is this—that when the patient has talked for a number of hours, as soon as he lies on the couch he passes into a dream-like, definitely hypnotic state. He is to a certain extent hypnotized. In that state, his powers of remembering the past and of reproducing past events, and describing them with great minuteness, are increased, till eventually he is reproducing previous experiences almost as if he were living through them again. One patient told me that he felt as though he were a little baby in the cradle again, and people were leaning over him. We find the re-living of these early experiences has a very pronounced effect not only on the patient's mental outlook but also on his general physical health. In so thorough an investigation as this, the practitioner sweeps up all sorts of influences; he is out for everything he can find of any sort, especially any kind

of difficulty the patient has experienced, bad influences or good influences in his past; he is discovering his early infantile religious outlook, his ideas of duty, his feelings towards parents, his tendency to identify himself with them, and to obey them, and the influences on him of these people's ideas of health and disease. All these things come up in analysis.

We can now reopen the question of spiritual healing on the lines of positive science. Those of us who are doctors, while sympathizing with the spiritual point of view, feel that so much of this is a matter of analysis, of a strictly scientific outlook on the situation, and of endeavouring to get the facts more and more into adequate focus, and into their right proportions. On the psychological side, we are attempting what is attempted on the physical side where one makes a careful bacteriological examination of the various excretions and secretions of the body, or of the composition of the blood, and the exact history and nature of the disease. Corresponding to all such facts which are so important on the physical side, we are getting together a set of facts regarding our patients on the mental side. And we do find in the course of this analysis that the patient's health as a rule tends to improve. If the analysis is pushed through, the final outcome is a tendency towards improvement in general health and increase in the general mental and physical powers. The mind is strengthened by this process. Has that anything to do with religion and the spiritual side? As a scientific method it has not. So far as you are encouraging the patient to work out his past, letting him convict himself out of his own mouth, you are merely doing things with scientific method. Of course, you can also indicate from time to time your own point of view, although you do this at your peril. You may intervene to help him to see why certain decisions of his past life were wrongly taken, why his outlook was inadequate

and led to an unsatisfactory result. So far as you are doing that, you are applying your psychology, giving help on the psychological side. But you are also giving help on the ethical and religious side so far as you are encouraging him on the basis of investigation of his past life to be more honest with himself, to scrap ideas that are proved to be unjustified and false, and indicating to him a possible ethical standpoint, and various alternative possibilities for his choice and decision. To that extent you are doing more than one does in ordinary medicine. Certainly you cannot say, 'I am going to do the analysis and then hand the patient over to some one else for all the rest.' That some one else would need to know the whole situation, and would need to have done the analysis himself if he is to be adequate in his advice, encouragement, and direction at the end. The general tendency of those who work at the subject with regard to the psycho-neuroses or functional nervous diseases is to deprecate the intrusion of the religious factor in the course of treatment. They would say that the problem of the patient's religion should be settled at the end of the treatment. The dealing with all the discoveries made in the course of treatment is in every case a problem for the physician, the psychotherapist, rather than for the clergyman.

Let us now look at it from the point of view of the clergyman who is interested in psychological problems, but who is not a doctor, and whose aim it is to give the patient adequate help on the religious side. The patient is ill, and his illness is due in a certain degree to ethical and religious factors. What would the clergyman need to do? If he were psychologically trained, he would need to do what a psychological doctor does—investigate the patient by deep analysis. That would be a very big business, and it would also mean readiness to be on the alert for complications of one sort or another. When a person is ill in

one clearly defined direction, you cannot be sure that there is not illness in other directions as well, and you should always be on the look-out for possibilities. In cases of pronounced mental disturbance there is always the possibility of severe mental outbreak, suicidal depression, homicidal mania, or various delusions. The clergyman *qua* clergyman is not adequately trained to deal with such situations. On the other hand, his training specially enables him to give advice with authority on certain matters of conscience, provided that those matters are clearly before him. If he does not understand the general mental make-up of the patient, and the extent to which special incidents in his past have gone to produce his later mental difficulties and so-called temptations, the clergyman may be giving inadequate advice. A doctor does not give advice at all; he helps the patient to form his own opinion. A clergyman may tend to advise and direct, but he needs to know the situation pretty thoroughly in order to do that. This situation may seem to bring us to the Emmanuel Movement again on a higher level. Again the desideratum seems to be an alliance between doctors and clergymen. The doctor carries out the analysis, and gives the clergyman information about the analysis. But in the course of an analysis there springs up a strong feeling of *rapport* with the analyst ('transference') which is an important factor in the cure, but which is strictly individual. This factor of the influence of the doctor is one which cannot be handed on to some one else. Nor can you hand on the patient himself to some one else. Since the physician has had the advantage of this *rapport*, he should use it as far as he can. He must use it with extreme tact, in the Socratic manner. If he is dogmatic, the whole process of analysis is disturbed. An analyst who tends to lay down the law is not a good analyst. If he is apt to express strong views while the patient is humbly displaying his past life,

he often simply succeeds in shutting up the patient entirely. In order to understand the real conditions of the subject, the physician must be self-effacing. Any advice must be given by implication, and the patient must feel that he has made the decision himself. This is one of the things psycho-analysis must achieve, to help the patient to face the responsibility himself. If the analyst gives definitely formal advice, the patient is tempted to take it and to put the responsibility on his adviser's shoulders. To that extent he has lost personality and has fallen in the scale of spiritual values.

What then remains for the clergyman to do? If the clergyman feels a special call to deal with psycho-neurotic cases, he should certainly get analysed himself and learn all he can about analysis, and although he may not have the opportunity of applying it, he should bear the facts in mind and apply them, and, when he deals with patients, take care not to be dogmatic. Many clergymen have realized this and have made a thorough study of analysis.

It might be objected that the above-mentioned method is appropriate only for a special group of illnesses, the so-called psycho-neuroses. But it is just these illnesses which have given the most considerable results in various forms of miraculous healing, Christian Science, and spiritual healing. This does not mean that such cases are always easy to cure, and if any method does produce a cure it is worthy of respect and consideration.

By implication I have suggested that psycho-therapeutic methods on the plane of positive science, viz. hypnotism, suggestion, and analysis, might have their beneficial influence upon more definitely physical illness. We cannot draw a hard-and-fast line between the functional and the organic. Although there is a practical gap between so-called functional cases and the others, we cannot be sure that a more energetic attack on the mental side might not

be more beneficial with the latter. Even in diseases where it is a matter of infection, it is a question not only of the virulence of the infection but also of the powers of resistance possessed by the patient. These powers have to do with his general vitality, and much to do with the state of the nervous system. They are closely related to his state of mind, outlook on life, and general mental make-up. By cultivation of the mind he may increase the powers of resistance to physical illness, and even where the illness has no ethical significance the recovery may be facilitated by development of greater force of character.

One modern school of spiritual healing is that represented by the Guild of Health. Its late chairman, the Rev. Harold Anson, has written a most important work on the subject.[1] His view of spiritual healing is that it is a healing of the entire man, and that one cannot otherwise distinguish the mental from the spiritual. If you are considering the whole personality you are dealing with the spiritual form of healing. You may heal any particular part of the personality, remove a patient's paralysis, or diminish his fear of some particular disease, and so help him in that way, and this may be called mental healing, but if you are considering his general outlook on life, that is spiritual. To this extent you may say that every form of healing from this point of view is spiritual healing, even the giving of a pill if it is given with the intention of helping the patient to adjust himself more satisfactorily to the demands of life and to realize his potentialities more adequately. Illuminating as this view is, it is doubtful whether it adequately distinguishes spiritual healing from mental healing. As psychologists, we always deal with the entire personality; even when we meet with apparent

[1] Harold Anson, *Spiritual Healing* (University of London Press, Ltd., 1923). Apart from this general question of definition, the book is full of valuable suggestions on the subject.

dissociation of one part of the mind from the rest, we are aiming at harmony and endeavouring to strengthen the mind, and to help the more healthy part of the mind to deal adequately with the unhealthy part. The patient is maladapted, and we endeavour to help him to attain more satisfactory adaptation. It is very difficult to define the conception of the spiritual.

There is another possibility which seems cruder, yet may be truer, viz. that the spiritual is something which can come to the person from within, if he prays for it in the right spirit, and makes adequate contact with this wider sphere of reality. There is a real spiritual world with which we are in contact to different extents at different times. We may under certain conditions increase our sense of the spiritual and our expectation of help. The spiritual in that sense would be distinct from the natural, and there would be a very pronounced dividing line between anything natural that has to do with the use of ordinary laws, mental and physical, and this appeal for spiritual aid.

This brings us at once to the vexed question of miracles. Do miracles happen? Is there ever an interference with the natural order of events? Within that natural order must be included the mental as well as the physical. Many people, including some theologians, say that miracles do not happen, because it would be derogatory to God to assume that He made the world so imperfect that He needed to interfere with it on special occasions. But this argument is of doubtful force. We come to the explanation of the purpose of individual existence, and one theory is that men have been created as separate individuals and given the power to achieve greater freedom in order that they may create or develop their own souls. There may well be an arrangement whereby these souls can be helped from within if they ask for it, just as in this life there is adjust-

ment even in the more naturalistic order for a person to get what he asks for. If one person is content with existence at a low level, he can become adapted to that level, and live a fairly happy life. Another person has divine discontent, feels he wants something higher, and by striving achieves it. Even in healing, the patient gets from the doctor what he deserves. Some patients get much more help from the doctor than others, because of their mental attitude. In the same way we as individuals can get varying degrees of help from God in accordance with our mental attitude. A miracle that may seem a miracle from the outside may not be a miracle in the sense of any disturbance; there is no overthrow of any of the laws of nature, but there is that *addition* which is possible, though we are not anxious to admit it too readily here. But we do so in other walks of life. In the realm of art surely the person who is most whole-heartedly devoted to his art and awaits an inspiration, is the one most likely to get it. Inspiration comes to the great artist. Can we not think of spiritual help coming in the same way to him who really, wholeheartedly desires it in the right way, not on an ego-centric basis, not for individual advancement and help, but for the sake of goodness as such, for the sake of a higher level of development in every direction? The final test is the pragmatic one. Let us try spiritual healing and test it by its results. Such testing is a very difficult problem; it is difficult to test these cases of spiritual healing. You need to know the diagnosis, whether it is reasonably accurate and made with adequate skill, the state of the patient's mind, the possible hysterical, or other psycho-neurotic addition to the illness, and how far the result is permanent. It is very difficult to get this evidence. It is hoped that evidence of value will be obtained by the new committee of doctors and clergymen which the Archbishop of Canterbury has set up.

In conclusion I may quote from my article on 'Religion and Psychology' in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, pp. 319, 320 (Sheldon Press, 1925).

'The process of spiritual healing is a process of arousing faith, the faith state, and that faith state may have different degrees of rationality, which is the same thing as saying that it may extend over a smaller or larger area of the self, and if it is limited to a small part of the self, it may mislead the individual instead of helping him. One reason why some of us are very doubtful of the wisdom of spiritual-healing services is that, for many who attend such services, it is an appeal to superficial emotion and to primitive credulity. There is the tendency to intensify that hysterical condition of mind from which many of the patients are already suffering. In some cases there may be a disappearance of hysterical symptoms and apparent cure, but only at the expense of replacement by another symptom—namely, reliance upon a quasi-miraculous possibility, the expectation of getting something for nothing, as it were, of getting direct gifts without full appreciation of corresponding demands upon personality. Mass-suggestion may produce startling results of a temporary and superficial kind, but individual treatment is more likely to produce deep and lasting benefit.

'The whole question of spiritual healing is one of extreme difficulty, and awaits further medical and psychological investigation. But among its more obvious dangers we cannot overlook the danger of intensifying the hysterical or the infantile attitude towards life that many neurotic patients have, and the danger of disappointment and of a set-back to their faith in the case of those who receive no benefit.'

Note. A fuller account of Mrs. Eddy's life and teaching, from the point of view of psychotherapy, is to be found in Professor Pierre Janet's *Psychological Healing*, vol. i, Allen & Unwin, 1925. The 'official' life is, I understand, by Sibyl Wilbur: *The Life of Mary Baker Eddy*, Harrap, London, 1908. There is also a life by Georgine Milmine: *The Life of Mary Baker P. Eddy and the History of Christian Science*, reprinted with additions from *McClure's Magazine*, Doubleday, New York, 1909.

XIV

PERSONALITY AND ART

IN these days of widespread interest in art-production and art-criticism, it is surprising that so little popular attention is paid to the ground principles of the subject. It is impossible to visit any of our picture-galleries and museums without hearing on every side remarks and criticisms which reveal ignorance of the very rudiments of aesthetics, and an absence of any kind of interest in the essential significance of artistic faculty and production. Catchwords of criticism are repeated, and praise and blame freely expressed, without any reference whatsoever to first principles. The only theory consciously relied on —if theory it can be called—is the belief that works of art give an immediate pleasure of a certain peculiar kind, experienced more or less fully according as the observer possesses more or less 'taste'. That there may be anything ultra-phenomenal in the productions of art, any significance or meaning in the metaphysical sense, is a question not even raised by the popular mind. It is, however, just this question which a philosophy of art attempts to answer, and the fact that almost all the great metaphysicians of the past have given the problem a prominent place in their systems is proof-presumptive of its very close connexion with the problem of life and existence in general.

In truth it would seem that just as there is a moral consciousness which has undergone continuous development from earliest times up to the present day, but which yet displays reference to a super-sensible ideal which gives it ontological significance, so there is to be found in the successive writings of the philosophers on art a record of the development of what has been called the aesthetic consciousness, involving ever deeper insight into the

nature of reality. A brief survey of historical theories will best indicate the essential characteristics of art-philosophy.

Speculation has lagged behind action in all but the most recent phases of human history, so that we need not be surprised when we find that Plato and Aristotle, living in an age which witnessed the productions of Aeschylus and Euripides, Pheidias and Myron, have given but a meagre and superficial theory of art. Apart from their formal principle of organic unity, rhythm, harmony, and proportion (now a commonplace of aesthetics), little appreciation of the inner significance of artistic faculty and production is to be found in their writings. Plato, we know, considered any work of art—as, for example, a picture—to be simply a copy or an attempt at a copy of some particular object of the phenomenal world, which itself was only a 'copy' of one of the ideas of his supersensible world: hence, to be twice removed from truth. Thus the poets were held by him to be either useless or dangerous. For him even Homer had only allegorical significance. Yet his own beautiful myths, written in the finest prose-poetry, rise far above allegory and might have been expected to guide him to a more penetrating analysis. Aristotle did greater justice to poetry and the drama, but except in his famous definition of the object of tragedy—'by pity and fear to effect the purification of such feelings'—his appreciation is equally formal and external.

Passing over the mystical utterances of the Neo-Platonists about an 'absolute' beauty, as doing little to clear up any of the difficulties of the subject, it is not until the time of Kant that we find any definite recognition of the inner significance of art as supplementing and elucidating its formal excellence. Kant attempted an explanation of the aesthetic faculty along strictly metaphysical lines, and may be regarded as the founder of the modern school of

art-philosophy. Briefly stated, his theory is that in aesthetic appreciation the details of perception are grouped by the free play of the imagination into forms in harmony with the laws of the intellect, the consciousness of this harmony heightening the mental activity involved, and occasioning the pleasurable feeling always associated with such appreciation. In the beauty of Nature it is an unseen Lawgiver who is responsible for such seemingly fortuitous harmony, in the beauty of Art it is the Genius who effects the harmony by clothing in sensuous material what Kant calls 'aesthetic ideas'—ideas which transcend the bounds of intellect and originate in a supersensible world.

All the great German metaphysicians since Kant have written on the philosophy of art. Schelling considered that every case of aesthetic production and appreciation involved the coalescence of subject and object, of knower and known. Hegel likewise ranged art as one of the three forms of mind involving transcendence of the subject-object antithesis, the other two, according to him, being religion and philosophy. Art is the lowest of the three, and is the sensuous expression of the unity of form and matter. In classical art this union is extremely intimate. Oriental art, on the other hand, is more symbolical in nature; in it matter predominates and form is only suggested.

The philosopher, however, who has written on the subject with the greatest vigour and most pronounced insight is Schopenhauer. His theory is closely bound up with his general *Weltanschauung*, and a short summary of both shall serve to bring to a close the enumeration of historical landmarks in this account of the aesthetic consciousness. According to Schopenhauer, the underlying reality of the universe is the will, primordially a blind restless striving which in the course of ages has 'objectified' itself in forms of higher and higher organization in the pheno-

menal world, attaining to self-consciousness in its highest form, Man. This 'particularization' of the universal will is mediated by a supersensible world of ideas. These ideas are more real than the particulars of perception and, moreover, are to be carefully distinguished from the 'general notions' of the logician whereby those particulars become knowable for science. In this system of Schopenhauer's, art is the representation of the ideas in their purity, and genius is the power of seeing these ideas as they are exemplified in the stream of phenomena, and fixing them for the gaze of the less gifted. Thus, to take the lowest of the fine arts as an example; works of architecture represent the interplay of the 'ideas' of *weight* and *support*. The aesthetic effect is the greater the more clearly the two 'ideas' are separated: a Greek column where the shaft and entablature, representing support and weight respectively, are easily distinguished is more aesthetically satisfying than a solid wall where support and weight are not separated at all. From this as a first principle Schopenhauer has deduced many of the rules for Grecian architecture in a very brilliant manner, and even the Gothic style, which he himself so detested, lends itself readily to the same explanation if we put weight *versus* rigidity for weight *versus* support. The arts of sculpture, painting, and poetry deal with 'ideas' higher in the scale of value and significance. Music is representative of no 'ideas' at all, but portrays the will itself in its infinite generality. Here Schopenhauer is at one with Schelling, who wrote: 'Music, as representing pure movement, is above all others the art which strips off the bodily.' Wagner openly adopted the theory as the explanation of his own musical productions.

Later philosophy has justly ridiculed the blind restless 'will to life' which Schopenhauer took as his first principle, and from which he deduced all his pessimistic conclusions.

That criticism, however, leaves untouched his theory of art, and if we replace the 'will to life' by the 'will to power' of Nietzsche and the later school of individualistic philosophers, or (better) by the 'will to personality' of the modern idealists, this theory still retains all its plausibility and all its impressiveness. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the art-philosophy of the future will proceed along the same lines as those laid down by Schopenhauer and his master, the 'marvellous' Kant.

The problem of art has yet to be solved, but the history of thought points with no uncertain hand to metaphysics as the key to its mystery. The attempts repeatedly made in modern times to explain it by psychological laws touch no more than the fringe of the question. Of these perhaps the three most promising are: (1) Alison's view that aesthetic effects are explained by revival of past pleasure through association. (2) The theory of Herbert Spencer that many of those effects, in particular all rhythmic effects, are the result of the perceived object being adjusted to the most economic expenditure of attention on the part of the observer. Here modern experimental psychology has something to say. (3) The modern psycho-analytical view of Freud. This is well summed up by Dr. Ernest Jones in the following passage:

'Detailed psycho-analysis of individuality shows that the aesthetic capacity and the artistic impulse proceed from peculiarly deep layers of the unconscious—indeed, the sense of inspiration itself signifies this—and that they represent one particular mode of dealing with the primordial conflicts existing in these layers. The artist's unconscious endeavour is to transmute in a particular direction the emotions arising from these conflicts and to express them in a pure aesthetic form. In this process there are some very special features that are in large measure peculiar to the artist's mentality.'[1]

[1] *Psycho-analysis*, p. 68, Benn's Sixpenny Library (Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1928).

As ultimate explanations, however, these hypotheses stand self-condemned. Kant told us long ago, and Ruskin throughout his lifetime assiduously preached, that the highest aesthetic effects are moral in nature and touch the very heart-strings of the universe. Higher than reason, higher even than a will completely fashioned to meet the demands of an every-day existence, is the well-trained constructive imagination as it functions in the production and appreciation of works of art. In its working we have one of the highest forms of relation between the Individual and the Absolute, and in its explanation, taken in connexion with that of the other two values, the Good and the True, is to be found the solution of the world-problem.

XV

PERSONALITY AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH—I

IT would not be easy in a few words to define the scope of Psychical Research, but we may perhaps state as its most characteristic problems: first, the problem of the extent to which one embodied mind can act upon another embodied mind otherwise than through the senses, either in the way of communication of thought or in other ways (telepathy); second, of the extent to which the embodied mind can foretell the future, can experience forebodings or premonitions, which eventually come true; and third, of how far the embodied mind can get into communication with disembodied minds, the minds of those who have already died, the minds that are to be presumed, either on the authority of religion or on the basis of fact, to be still existing elsewhere than in visible human form on this planet.

Many of the results obtained by investigators in Psychical Research have been obtained through the aid of what are called mediums, i.e. of people who appear to have and who may really have, a special power of receiving, recording, and communicating messages from others. These mediums are sometimes called clairvoyants, because the most characteristic power that they appear to possess is that of being able to see clearly, or fairly clearly, where for others there is no vision. They are responsive to influences that not only do not affect others appreciably, but of which others remain entirely ignorant.

One scientific question that arises here is as to how far the evidence gained through mediums is vitiated, if vitiated at all, by the mental state of these mediums; i.e. (1) whether mediums, some or all, are to be regarded as perfectly normal people, in perfectly normal mental and

physical health; (2) whether, if some or all are abnormal, if they *do* suffer from some degree of mental abnormality of a kind which would be regarded by a mental specialist as being similar to mental disease (such as hysteria) that he can observe in others less gifted, the messages that they purport to receive and communicate are thereby rendered more doubtful.

My war experiences in France with shell-shocked patients have bearing upon this question. While working as neurologist to the Fourth Army on the Somme I noticed that the strain of exposure to shell-fire produced apparently mediumistic or clairvoyant powers in a large number of soldiers; indeed, quite 15 per cent. of soldiers suffering from shell-shock were found, immediately after the shock, to be easily hypnotizable, and, in a large proportion of these cases, they were found to exhibit powers —characteristics—extremely similar to, if not identical with, the characteristics that one reads about and hears of as belonging to mediums; that is to say, not only could they be easily put to sleep, put into a second mental state which appeared to be quite different from their normal waking state, but, when they were in this state, they appeared to have telepathic powers, they appeared to have clairvoyant powers.

Let me take the powers of clairvoyance first. One found, when one hypnotized a patient who had perhaps left the field of battle within the previous day or two, that if one suggested to him that he would be able to see what was going on somewhere else, say in France or in England, and if one gave him a definite signal, told him, say, that one was going to put one's hand on his forehead and that then he would actually see what his father and mother were doing at home, one often got definite, positive results. That is to say, he would straightway appear to see something. He would feel that he was in England. In

one case my patient felt that he was back in Liverpool, and found his mother and father in the evening at half-past six walking along one of the main streets of Liverpool towards the cinema. He was able to follow, and seemed to follow them at the normal rate, i.e. the rate at which a person would walk. I had to wait for him to come up to them, and then until they reached the cinema house. He stood in the queue while they got their tickets, and followed them into the auditorium. Then the lights were turned down, the title of the play was flashed on the screen —he read the title and told me what it was—and he then proceeded to see the picture unrolled. Later on he took a look round and saw what other people were there, recognized friends of his in the audience and told me their names. I asked him to try and draw his mother's attention to his presence. He did so, and showed signs of great disturbance, but said no, she did not take any notice—she could not see him.

In another case, my most complete case, I obtained the following results, which are specially worth recording because I was able to get independent evidence concerning them, first by having a letter written by the patient to his relatives, saying that he had dreamt about them and would like to know what they were actually doing at that time, and then by getting him to write a second letter, stating more explicitly what he had thought they were doing, and asking for a more definite reply. The result was as follows. (I have tried to separate the incidents, so that we can put one against the other, successes and failures, although it is very difficult to arrange a unit of coincidence or of correspondence.)

(1) The patient saw his wife in the garden on September 24th, 1917.	Extract from daughter's and wife's letters: 'She *was* in the garden sowing cabbage, turnip, and onion seeds.'

(2) He saw one row of runner beans, and was surprised not to find more.	The letter said: 'There are two rows of runner beans, but they look like one from a distance, because the wind has blown them down.'
(3) He saw his dog, Bella, who looked as fat as a pig.	The letter said: 'Bella is in her kennel. She is looking very well on one meal a day. We always say she is on war rations when people say how fat she is.'
(4) *Patient:* The garden looks as if a lot of pigs had been routing there.	*Letter:* The garden does look as if it had been routed up by pigs, as the gardener has dug the potatoes.
(5) *Patient:* The children's flower-garden is gone.	*Letter:* The children's flower-garden is all right.
(6) *Patient:* There is a big heap of ashes under the water-tank.	*Letter:* The ash-heap is in its usual place up in the corner by the hedge, but there is a heap of rubbish from the garden opposite Mrs. M.'s front window (i.e. near the water-tank) waiting to be burnt.
(7) *Patient:* All the wire-netting is down.	*Letter:* The wire-netting is all right.
(8) *Patient:* They have repaired the gate and painted it red—the very colour I detest.	*Letter:* The gate is broken, but we tie it up with a piece of string at night. (The letter says nothing about the colour of the gate. I may mention that the patient was very annoyed indeed when he saw this. He woke up from his dream furious as a result of his apparent visit home, and when I suggested that it was only a dream he would not admit this.)

(9) *Patient:* The case of birds has been shifted, and the gramophone is in the place where the birds were.	*Letter:* The case of birds is in the same place, and the gramophone is still in the window.
(10) *Patient:* The sewing-machine is on the front window-ledge.	*Letter:* The sewing-machine is now on the little table under the back window.
(11) *Patient* (on a later occasion when he finds them at tea): They are eating eggs, bread-and-butter, and cake.	*Letter:* We did not have eggs or bread-and-butter for Tuesday's tea, but we did have a big cake.
(12) Patient was able to say how the people were arranged. He said: 'The school-teacher is sitting in my place, Jimmie opposite, and my wife in her own place.'	*Letter:* Y—[a daughter] sits in your place at table and Miss D— [the school-teacher] on her left, and Mother in her right place, J— on her right and I [the other daughter] in the same place at the end.
(13) *Patient:* My boy, Jimmie, looks well.	*Letter:* Jimmie does look well and he is brown.
(14) On another occasion (September 25th, 1917) the patient says: 'My wife is ironing clothes and C— [the daughter who writes] is folding them and putting them away.'	C— writes: 'I was folding clothes, but not ironing, nor was Mother helping me.'
(15) *Patient:* Some one has been doing the roof.	*Letter:* Mr. H— has repaired the roof.
(16) *Patient:* I cannot see my cat yet [a cat of which he was very fond].	*Letter:* As for Kit, he is no more. We suppose he got trapped, because we have not seen him for months.

It is only in that way that one can test the objective validity of clairvoyance of this kind. I quote this case in detail not so much because it shows a good many coincidences, although I admit that it shows more than some

other cases, but because I was able to get so full a record from the patient's friends. If we reckon up the coincidences in this case, we find that there is about 50 per cent. correspondence. What might one expect as a chance coincidence? It is difficult to say, because a number of these correspondences are what the patient might have expected—what his subconsciousness might have expected—to find. One sends the patient to sleep and suggests to him that he will see certain things, and naturally his mind becomes active and forms images of what he may possibly see. That is the tendency in any one. Ask any one to make his mind a blank, and then suggest to him that he will see what may be happening in another place, and an image of what he thinks is likely to be going on there will probably come up before his mind. These patients had previous knowledge of the people they had left behind them, and so it was possible that their expectations might find themselves realized. As regards the gate and the general state of the garden in the case I have quoted, I have no doubt that my patient did expect to find something of that sort. Although he had the greatest confidence in his wife in other matters, he had not much confidence in her powers of keeping the home fires burning satisfactorily. He was prepared for trouble and got it, but whether the troubles he saw were merely the products of his own imagination which chanced to coincide with reality, or whether they resulted from a power that he possessed in the hypnotic state of transcending space and visiting other places in thought, is difficult to say.

What I am most anxious not to do is to give you the impression that I am quoting these cases *against* Psychical Research. I am not necessarily quoting them *for* Psychical Research; I am only quoting them as cases of patients who were certainly pathological. The patients came to me because they were pathological, and the ease with which they

could be hypnotized corresponded to the degree to which they were ill, the degree to which they had become dissociated. But if you say that because of this the results obtained are certain to be mere figments, you will be going farther than I am able to go. These results can only be judged on their merits.

Apart from these apparent coincidences or correspondences I do know that, again and again, when my patients were hypnotized they showed distinct powers of telepathy more pronounced than one usually finds in normal waking life. Here again I made no regular experiments because we were working at very high pressure. The wards were always full of shell-shock cases, for, if there was no big push going on, we kept the patients longer in the hospital in order to be sure that they were completely cured. One was therefore not able to carry out experiments except incidentally, but I did from time to time test my patients' powers of telepathy, and on occasions I got remarkable results, which seemed to be absolutely inexplicable by chance.

On one occasion, with one of my hypnotic patients, I remember suddenly taking a book out of my pocket. The man's eyes were closed, and I was some way away from him, so that he could not possibly see what I was doing. I took out a book which happened to be an army book. I said to him before doing so: 'I want you to tell me what is in my mind. You will see certain letters and figures, and I want you to tell me what they are.' I took the book out, not knowing what I myself was going to see. Almost at once he said: 'A.B. 207'—an army book of a certain number. He gave me the whole thing absolutely accurately. In criticism of that you might say: 'This patient had probably seen such army books before. He was sensitive of hearing, and this sensitiveness was increased in the hypnotic state, and, hearing the rustle of the bringing

of the book out of your pocket, he rapidly put two and two together and guessed the number, deceiving himself without knowing it—his subconsciousness had got it by deduction.' As against that I would say that this army book was an army book that was used in the hospital, one that I kept on my desk in my office and also carried about in my pocket, but one that I do not think I had ever had occasion to show in the ward. The man had been treated by me two or three times, but I do not think that he had had any previous opportunity of seeing the book. I admit that there is a possibility that he had—I cannot rule that out. Assuming that he had not seen the book before, and that he had not subconsciously deduced what he should see, the chances against that picture coming to his mind by coincidence are of course enormous.

I turn now to experiments with numbers. (No very satisfactory experiments have been attempted in thought transference with numbers, because these have so little meaning, and carry no emotion with them.) Here one did notice correspondence, but it was of a curious kind. As I was thinking the various numbers of the series—I used to have them written on different slips of paper and look at one after another—the patient would be saying what came to his mind each time, and I noticed that there was a much closer correspondence between his guesses and the number *preceding* the number I was actually thinking of, than between his guesses and the number I was thinking at the moment. If the actual numbers were 2, 7, 3, 9, 8, 4, (I did not look at these all together—they were on separate slips of paper), I would look at the number 2, and he would guess, say, the number 0. I look at the number 7, he may give the reply 2. I look at the number 9, he guesses the number 3. I look at the number 8, he may give the number 9. I look at the number 4, he may give the number 8. If you take into account delayed effect, if you

regard it as a reasonable scientific hypothesis that numbers in the subconscious can be more readily experienced in another person's subconsciousness or in the hypnotic state than numbers that are actually in consciousness, this 2, say, that I have just experienced and that is now at the periphery of my field of attention on its way to subconsciousness may be the number that presents itself to my patient's subconsciousness. It acts upon the patient's consciousness later. You would thus be able to work out a correspondence which, if borne out in a large number of experiments, would outweigh chance. As I said before, I did not work steadily through a series of experiments, so that I can only give impressionist views about this, but, as regards figures, one did get results of this nature, and the hypothesis I have outlined may possibly explain them in terms of telepathy.

The curious thing about experiments in telepathy is that one so frequently gets bald patches, where nothing seems to happen. Then, at another time, one seems to get a lot of correspondence. The statistician would say that this could be explained by mere chance. If you took a sufficient number of series the law of chance would work in this way, and I am willing to admit that, if I had taken a large enough number of cases, this might have been so. But in telepathy correspondence is often much more significant than want of correspondence, because it is often accompanied by a curious subjective feeling on the part of the percipient. One noticed that here. Where the patient was right he was much more certain than in other cases. A recent work on telepathy, in which emotional factors are taken more into consideration, is regarded by the Society for Psychical Research as giving evidence of closer correspondence than earlier work based on more neutral material. Feeling-tone seems to be very important in these cases. Even in connexion with these figures it should be

remembered that the patients came to me in a highly emotional state. They were worked up. They had already been cured of their disabilities by hypnotism, and everything that went on had significance for them. They were extremely grateful for what had been done for them, and were delightful people to work with, and this mood suffused everything that happened, and might also explain the high degree of correspondence that one observed in these cases.

If we turn to the alternative theory, which explains these phenomena in terms of pathological psychology, if we turn, for instance, to the possible explanation of clairvoyance along these lines, we should have to say that the patient was in a very suggestible condition, that he dreamt to order (i.e. at the order of the operator), and dreamt at a definite rate, at a normal rate, instead of at the rate of ordinary dreams, because it had been suggested to him that he would do so. It had been suggested to him, either implicitly or explicitly, that he would see his people at home, that he would see what they were doing, and he would expect this to be going on at the ordinary rate, and so would see all that he saw at the ordinary rate. In many cases I feel that that explanation was sufficient.

Even in the case of the patient whose results I have reported in detail, on another occasion a result was obtained which did not in the least correspond with the facts.

I think one can exclude fraud in these cases. These patients had no motive whatever for deceiving me. I was very strict as regards malingering, and it was quite easy to be sure about the genuineness of hypnotic cases because patients who pretend to be hypnotized are easily recognized. In these cases no fraud would have been intentional. The deception would have been self-deception as well as deception of me. But even though one finds a good deal that is mere coincidence, a good deal, too, that can be explained in terms of pathological psychology, I think

that, if one keeps an open mind on the subject, one should be ready to put other correspondences down, and to accept them as possible evidence. No one can expect here to get evidence all on the side of Spiritism. The mind at work is an embodied mind, and its own memories are likely to interfere with and modify the results. The fears, anxieties, and wishes of the medium are likely to be a disturbing factor. The question is whether, after allowing for all this, there is a residuum that needs a further hypothesis. If one takes individual cases one may feel inclined to dismiss the residuum as mere coincidence. Again, if one takes a large number of cases in the bulk one may be inclined to say: it is all coincidence. But if one considers each case on its merits, and finds again and again correspondence, say, in the matter of possible telepathy, and verifiable results in the matter of alleged spirit messages, all accompanied by strong emotional feeling, that, it seems to me, is evidence in favour of the spiritist hypothesis.

I would quote here a case that I can guarantee in all its details, a case which any one who did not know it inwardly might be tempted to dismiss as mere coincidence, but which to the person who experienced it seemed to be more. The little son, aged two and a quarter years, of a scientist lay dying of a serious illness. He was in a nursing-home, in order that he might have the best of care, and his parents had been spending all their time with him, sitting up at night by his bedside. At last he reached a stage where he seemed a little better, and it was necessary for them to get rest, as the nurse felt that the child could be safely left to her. Early the next morning, as the father happened to be looking in the direction of the clock on the mantelpiece in a house some distance away, he heard a loud noise behind him, a sudden bang, and the thought flashed through his mind: 'That is my little boy's

photograph which has shot off the edge of the piano.' He noticed the time—it was twenty to eight—turned round, and saw that it *was* the photograph which had fallen. Shortly afterwards the telephone-bell rang, and the message came through that the little boy had died. The parents hurried round to the nursing-home, and, as they entered the door, the father saw the nurse coming down the stairs. The first question he asked was: 'When did he die?' and before she had said anything he *knew* that she would say, 'At twenty to eight'. He had already communicated the fact to his wife, and she too knew that that was the time. The incident carried with it a strong emotional feeling—curiously enough a feeling of intense relief and peace. The whole incident might, of course, be explained as a coincidence. One might say that it was certainly a coincidence that the two clocks should have recorded exactly the same time. As against that one has to consider the father's inward feeling of certainty, and the curious circumstances of the case: firstly, the fact that the photograph did shoot right off the piano, and there was no reason why it should do so. If it had slid off in the ordinary way it would not have shot right across the room as it did. Secondly, the thought came at once into the father's mind as to what had happened. There were other things on the piano. The person to whom the incident happened, although he was a scientist, ready to allow for other possibilities, was fully convinced by it, and certainly at that time he did not actually believe in survival. He naturally hoped that his own child would survive, but he hoped more that it would continue to live. That was the thought which was uppermost in his mind, not the other. If you consider the whole situation, that again, I think, is a kind of correspondence which is most difficult to fit in with any of the ordinary facts of life. It is peculiar. I can answer for this incident entirely, but instances of a similar kind seem to be occa-

sionally happening, and people find them very difficult to explain. Apparent telepathy and kindred phenomena are sometimes explicable in terms of expectancy, but manifestations of this kind seem to be outside the range of ordinary explanation.

> I dimly guess what Time in mists confounds;
> Yet ever and anon a trumpet sounds
> From the hid battlements of Eternity;
> Those shaken mists a space unsettle, then
> Round the half-glimpsèd turrets slowly wash again.
>
> FRANCIS THOMPSON.

XVI

PERSONALITY AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH—II[1]

OWING to the kindness of Sir Oliver Lodge and to the exceptional help given to me by his secretary, Miss Nea Walker, I was able to obtain four private sittings with the famous medium Mrs. Osborne Leonard in January and February 1926, completely incognito.

Few of my readers need to be reminded of the way in which Mrs. Osborne Leonard works. She very kindly instals her sitter in a comfortable chair; she herself chooses a hard-backed chair, and sits opposite one, slightly to one's left. Oneself is sitting in the comfortable chair opposite the fire; the curtains are drawn; the room is in semi-darkness. She sits in this hard-backed chair and proceeds to pass into another mental state. She seems to undergo a sort of anaesthetization; it is as if she were giving herself an imaginary anaesthetic, breathing deeply and slowly, and after a few seconds a sound of gibbering is heard, and as if some one is coming. Then: 'I am coming; I am coming. Good-morning; Good-morning. There is two spirits here that wants to speak to you', and one has the impression that Mrs. Leonard is being controlled by some separate mind or personality. This control exhibits certain dramatic features. When she gets excited, she tends to move up and down in her chair, and may clap her hands. She talks in rather a baby language,

[1] Being the substance of a paper entitled 'Some Personal Psychical Experiences and Experiments', read before the *Society for Psychical Research*, on Feb. 18th, 1926. Since this date I have had many more sittings with Mrs. Leonard. I had verbatim reports made at all the sittings, and have published one, as it stands, in the Appendix. The reports were made by Mrs. Muriel Hankey, and I take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude for her painstaking and accurate work.

pronouncing R's as L's, and in several other ways slightly altering the English language.

'Feda', the control, is supposed to be an Indian girl. Space does not permit the record of Feda's history, and that does not concern us here, although it is of interest from the general psychological point of view.

At the first interview, on January 1st, four people came to me, or were supposed to come to me, and these four people were just the four people I would be interested in hearing from. There are very few people on the other side that would interest me, but these four certainly would. One was a lady who died in 1916; another, a young man, my brother, who died in battle on the Somme in 1916; another was a little child who died at the age of $2\frac{1}{4}$, in 1909, and the fourth person described was an elderly gentleman whom at first I could not recognize at all because I was trying to think of some one else who had recently died, and then I suddenly realized who it might be.

It is that fourth person who contributes something of special scientific interest in this paper, but let me first clear away the other cases.

The lady—she is described, but I need not bother you with her description; all I need say is that I very clearly got the impression who it might be, that it was this lady who died at the age of a little over 30, early in 1916. The description was correct, as, e.g., of her hair:

> 'It shows her forehead but it goes a little bit down one side of her forehead more than the other. It isn't short like the peoples wears it now; she has got long hair and it is coiled at the back of her head, not on top nor low down, but here between.'

That was characteristic.

> 'She passed over through illness—not an accident or anything like that but illness, but she came to rather a sudden end as if she was not really expecting to pass over, and she was surprised when she did.'

That was quite true. She was suffering from tuberculosis of the lungs which had lasted for many years, but she was optimistic and hopeful and did not expect to die. Further facts [in the record] I need not bother you with; they are correct.

'She comes near you—and she brings with her a young man.'—

Now she proceeds to describe this young man, whom I took to be—if it is a discarnate being—my brother, whom she knew well, and of whom she was very fond. He met his death on the Somme in 1916.

'His eyes are blue—&c.'

Again the description has no meaning for my readers. If, or where, descriptions are wrong or incorrect, I will mention it.

'I feel that he knows you, and knows you very well, and I know that you have got a photograph of him that has been near to you lately.'

As a matter of fact, it is the only thing of his I have, a little round photograph that I have always had on my writing-desk, or mantelpiece, in a silver frame. A short time before, the glass had got broken, and my wife had taken the photograph away, and I had wondered where it was; it had passed through my mind, 'I must find that photo.'

'The photograph that he is showing me is not in a flame—not in a frame! It is—wait a minute—not in a frame, not in an album, not in any of the usual places that you keep them. Looks as if it was just stuck in between papers—papers. I don't know if it is fixed in the papers, but I feel as if I got to turn papers over to see the photograph, which is not a large one, and I don't think is awful good of him.'

Quite true; it is not good of him.

'He is only just mentioning that you have got this, and you can look it up soon.'

At that time I did not know where it was, but when I came

to read the notes to my wife afterwards, she got up and rummaged at once in a drawer, among foolscap papers, and found the photograph. We shall see, in another later sitting, this same spirit (?) refers to the finding of the photograph.

> 'You have got another photograph of him too, and that one—the one he is speaking of now, the second one—is not by himself, and it will be taken several years ago with a good many other people taken with it. I get a feeling of a gloup—a group—rather a large group.'

This may refer to a large family group.

> 'What do you mean? What are you showing me? What are you showing a shield for on the group? I don't know what this means, but I get this and I got to tell you that he says it, even if you don't understand it. Well, he is showing me this photograph and he shows me a peculiar shape like a shield, and he puts this shield, this shape—I think it got a drawing or design on it too—and he put it on the photograph. I not sure that it is on the photograph, in the middle of the picture or anything like that, but I feel it got something to do with it.'

This doesn't apply to the group, but it might have applied to my parents' copy of the single photograph, for it might be the Royal Berks regimental badge; but that I pass over.

There is a great deal that is non-evidential, in so far that I could not find any correspondence later, but in this first interview so much could be fitted in, could be accepted.

Perhaps the following is worth quoting:

> 'What do you mean that you help him to write? He says that he can help you to write, but he doesn't mean automatic writing quite—more inspirational, and he is bending over you, taking hold of your hand as if he was trying to write through your hand, but not ordinary writing quite, more helping you to get ideas as to what to put.'

I should emphasize the fact that Mrs. Leonard had no

idea whatever who I was. I feel quite satisfied about that.

> 'Something you have got to do shortly, important, that he is going to help you with. It isn't a story or anything interesting like that. It is more a sort of article or serious writing, and it is very 'portant, more 'portant than you yourself know, and he wants you to remember that he is helping, but look for the photograph. You will probably find one much more easily than the other, but he will help you to find them both, but one may take longer. He says he will have to impress your mind where to look for them.—I got a feeling that this man has often been with you, talking over things with you, when he was here on the earth, like arguing, discussing, and yet that he would listen to you and take notice of what you said, but he wouldn't like to take it all; he would like to argue a bit about it, and as if you didn't mind him arguing, because I see both of you in a room when he was here in the earth body, in a room at either side of the table, not sitting down to it. I don't know what you were doing at it, but as if you stood up near the table. (Why didn't you sit down? "Because we didn't want to," he says), but it was something you were doing, I feel, because you were looking at each other over the table but yet looking down at the table, and you got something in your hand as if you were pointing with something.'

As a matter of fact, years ago we used to amuse ourselves with table-tilting, and he was quite expert at it—and I think quite genuine. All of us at home could get results with planchette-writing too, and this was how I first began to take an interest in the subject of psychology.

> 'He seems to be looking down, too, at what you are looking at, and then looking up in your face as if he was asking questions about it. The room is a light room, &c.'

This might refer to the room, but it is rather general. The impression is a familiar one. One did get, as it was coming through, an impression that it might very well be this particular boy—man.

Then suddenly one's name comes—it is a common one, unfortunately for the evidence.

'Will—Will—Will—some one calling out Will. I don't see the person yet who is saying that, but just hear the name called out, and then I heard this: "I am helping in the new conditions, helping you in the new conditions," as if you are going into some new conditions, going to do new things, some new work in a new place, and as if they want you to know that they will be supporting you. That is a funny word to use, but that is what they call it, "supporting" you and helping you in it. Has he got to go in front of some kind of Committee? Have you got to go in front of some kind of Committee soon? You need not answer because you may not know. I only say it like a question because I see you in a place with some other people. I think men, not women, and I feel it is some kind of Committee, something very 'portant, and important to you too, mixed up with it, and that the spirit people are going to help you. They don't quite like the word "Committee" and yet Committee is the only way I can describe it.'

Possibly this may have referred to a Spiritual Healing Committee (appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury) of which I am a member. We had not yet had any meeting of the Committee at that time. Or it may (very improbably) have referred to the Psycho-Analysis Committee (of which I am also a member) set up by the British Medical Association in 1927. It must be remembered that Mrs. Leonard knew nothing whatever about me at these first four sittings.

'But Committee will do. It is like judging something, &c., &c. I don't understand it, but I got to say that, and they keep on saying, say what they say, &c., &c.

'And then I see the figure of an elderly man, and he didn't get close before, and suddenly he has come close. He is quite gley colour; he has a very fine face, what you call a thoughtful face, and yet a very kind face too, a clever face. Wait a minute! His hair is gley; it is a little thin just on top of the temples. His features are good, but it is not so much that he is pletty or handsome; it is more a fine and a very clever face. His eyes are not plonounced; they are deeply set, and I can't quite see the colour but I think they might be grey, not full eyes at all but deeply set.

His mouth is fine shape, the underlip a little full and he got a little bit of a habit sometimes of . . . it sticks out more than the upper . . . closing his mouth up like that ! It is a kind face, but very thoughtful and serious looking. He, too, is on the tall side. He has been a well set-up looking man, but towards the end of his life he stooped a little and let his head go a little bit forward like that. I feel him being very tired sometimes, but trying to cover it up. He is a little bit impatient; he wants me to go on and on just this minute, and he keeps on telling me to go on and go on.'

I may as well say at once that the impression I got, and still have, is that this man might have been[1] my friend, W— A—, who died a year before rather suddenly, after an operation. I had had a long discussion with him about Psychology within a short time of his death, and he very kindly allowed me to collaborate with him slightly in his last (unfinished) play.

'He had been very active, not only active in body but active in mind, and he had really sometimes worked his mind too much. He would worry himself rather over things too. He was a good man, not always just in the way other peoples thinks is good, but good in what he thought right to do. He would do good as he saw it. I feel he had helped a good many people in his life, and yet he was rather a peculiar man.' . . .

I leave out some things—

'This gentleman was able to keep working, and he kept doing things up to a little while before he passed over. He had still kept in touch with things. Have you got books of his, printing of his? Books—books—books. That is what he says, books.'

'He only holds up one book, but he said books, so I suppose you got more than one, but he just showed me one, so I suppose that is a book belonging to him because he put it against himself and then handed it over to you.'

The book might possibly be one of his, of which I had quite recently been reminded by an article in the columns of *The Times*.

[1] Except that he never stooped.

'You used to like this man. I feel that you have liked him very much and he liked you.'

I did like this man, and I felt very deeply the breaking of the friendship through his death.

'He wants you to try and remember him. I am sure he has tried to come to you before, not perhaps so much in this way, but just helping you and looking after you. This man had been interested in places away from here, places a distance away as well as in London; he hadn't been limited to one place or a few places. I get a feeling he had travelled and had interests in a good many places.'

That might apply very definitely to W— A—.

'He, too, is speaking of writing. I am sure you must have some important writing to do because I see you writing, but I see you getting up and speaking too, but as if—I don't mean just speaking to one person at all—but as if there you are having to address a good many people and I think there is something coming in that way that will be very important indeed, not just to a few people, but to a great number like a Conference, a special sort of big meeting. I see you getting up and saying gib—gib—gib—gib—gib—gib, and he says, "Yes, we have got to help you there too. It is all part of our work." It isn't on spiritualism, but it is helping the world. That is what they are doing with you. Helping humanity, he says. That is your work, he says, Your work is not quite—oh, what a nuisance !—he says your work is not to spread the fact that communication is possible; you have got different work to do. He says, helping humanity in a wider, more general sense, helping them physically as well as mentally and spiritually. It wouldn't be right for you to give up what you are doing now to try and spread this. They are not asking you to, not wanting you to, but they are wanting to be able to help you sufficiently so that you may be able to tell people that there is another life and people can communicate, but that it isn't everything to know that. They have got to live here on the earth, not live mentally on another plane for which they are obviously not yet fitted.'

As a matter of fact, with regard to these words, 'They have

got to live here on the earth, not live mentally on another plane for which they are not yet fitted'—that may be telepathy, because I had used almost those very words myself that week.

'Go on as you are at present. Don't alter things too much. . . . Do you know a little boy that comes up near you? I don't mean on the earth, but a little boy passed over, who passed over with something to do with the throat. I feel I get a choky feeling. It is not only the throat, it goes up a bit to the side here too, and breathing is bad, &c.'

That description might possibly apply to a little boy of $2\frac{1}{4}$ years, who died in 1909. We shall find a further reference to him later on.

If there is anything in it, if there is any spirit world, and if there is any power of communication, I should be surprised if he did not come, because I was more fond of him than of anything in all my life.

Then again, about the one I thought of as W— A—,

'I am sure you ought to know him. I feel you have been doing things quite lately that should have reminded you of him, quite lately, as if you have been reading something lately that is very much linked up with him. Wait a minute. The reading—I am not sure it was a book. I only feel that you were reading something that didn't take you long to read. What he is referring to I am sure is not a book. It was only some words, not very many, but it did make you think of him, though you may not remember that now, but it is quite lately that, too.'

This may refer to an article in *The Times* at the end of December 1925, in which a brief reference was made to one of W— A—'s books. I was very vividly reminded of him as I read that article.

'He keeps saying to me, "I am well and strong again." He says, "It is so much better over here; one isn't limited with all these physical difficulties. It leaves one's mind free, one's spirit free, to work, to make progress instead of being shackled with all these petty physical limitations".'

This, too, reminds me of him, because the vague feelings of illness towards the end of his life discouraged him. He wanted to get on with his last play, but made little headway. He had written two acts, but the third act wouldn't come because of his failing health.

'He must have felt them rather a lot here, because his head seems full of them now. He says he wishes you could be there too, with them. You would enjoy it over there, but he says, you can't go for many years, for your work here yet. (Isn't it a nuisance?) No, he says, it is not a nuisance. It is necessary, and Will, Will, Will; W. A., W. A., W. A., W. A. is helping you from our side, he says.'

Here his initials appear.

'He didn't always live in London; he lived in rather a nice place, quite in the country that he used to love.'

That again might refer to his home in the country.

The lady who continued to be there all the time throughout the four sittings now speaks:

' "I was not expecting really to go over. I thought I should be all right." [And Feda explains]: She had been making so many plans for living on the earth, not for dying, and up to a very little while before her passing she had been arranging things, and doing things, not only telling other people, but thinking them out for herself and doing them herself, for all she was going to do on the earth. I feel that her passing over at the end must have come very quickly.'

She had that great optimism of the phthisical patient, and wouldn't entertain the possibility of not getting over her illness ultimately. All this was in my mind, and the coincidence might therefore be explained in term of telepathy.

'She wants to get in touch with you direct, herself.'

She was very good at table-tilting and planchette-writing in those days more than a score of years ago, and she used to threaten (in fun) that if she went first she would haunt me.

'All love; all love. She wants to get in touch with you herself, direct. She—will—leave—no—stone—unturned. Good-bye. Good-bye.'

That is a typical ending to these séances.

That is the first séance.

Now I will turn to the final sitting, so as to take up the thread of what I feel might refer to W— A—.

It was right at the end of the sitting. I knew it was the last sitting that I should have before writing this paper. As a rule I sit back in the chair, hiding my face to avoid giving Mrs. Leonard any inkling, consciously or subconsciously, of what is passing through my mind. W. A. had been mentioned in the first séance, and the trouble was that this other lady would insist on speaking the whole time, all through the four sittings, and although I did not wish to stop her speaking, I was anxious to get something of a more evidential nature for the sake of my audience (the Society for Psychical Research). So I said, 'Who is W. A.?' and Feda replied:

'It is somebody over there, not on the earth.'

I asked, 'Can he speak?' and she said:

'Alice—Ellis—Alice. Do you know if the name Alice, Ellis, Alice, if that is a name that would be very close to him, of some one very near to him?'

I did not recognize this name, but have since been told by Mrs. A— that Alys is the name of their daughter-in-law, of whom W— A— was very fond.

'You will be able to find out about that afterwards.'

That is what I was able to find out.

'He is giving this name, Alice or Ellis very plainly. Wait a bit. This W. A. passed over rather suddenly, but she says not exactly through an accident. She doesn't mean that, because he had some illness, but as if he wasn't expecting it to end fatally.'

Of course, that is quite true.

'At least, she says, though it might have come into his mind he hadn't acted on it. He didn't expect it to get fatal and people connected with him didn't either, but he did something rather peculiar. Towards the end, or very near the end of his earth life he did a thing that looked rather peculiar afterwards, as if he had a presentiment about it.'

'Something he had done unexpectedly in a very peculiar way within a few days of his passing, something out of the ordinary for him; something against his ideas and nature altogether that looked like an unexpected stroke of the imagination for him.'

W— A— was noted for his intensely rationalistic outlook on life, and intense honesty of thought, and I may take this opportunity of saying that he himself visited Mrs. Leonard some time ago, and was greatly impressed by the result of his interview. But he was anxious to get an independent opinion, so he came round to my rooms and asked if he might read the whole account to me. In it there were references to his son, who lost his life in the war. There was a great deal of evidence there of what could be called telepathy, and I gathered from W— A— that he was impressed by the evidence although not completely convinced at that time.

'It was noticed. It was commented upon directly after his death, "How strange he said that and did that!" It looked as if he knew, and yet other things seemed to point that he didn't know, because there were things he ought to have done, and should have done if he had known, but he didn't do them: he left them; he left some things in rather a difficult way, and had a lot of trouble to clear them up, but there was one thing he said and did that was not in the ordinary run of things at all—looked as if he had had a sudden thought he was going to die. Wait a minute.'

This may refer to what he did in the nursing home just before his operation, from which he died. He left a written statement to the effect that he had definite

evidence of communication with relatives on the other side. It was a rather peculiar thing for him to do, and I was somewhat surprised because he had kept in touch with me before, and I might have expected that he would have discussed this matter more fully with me. We had had a long discussion on religion a few weeks before he died, but at that time he may not have had his evidence, for he did not bring up this question at all; he was arguing from recognized facts and discoveries of science.

'I feel that W. A. was rather a clever man. I can't see him; I am only feeling him as if he was rather clever. Funny I can't see him. He says I both saw and heard him at the very first sitting, and that I gave a description of him and several conditions connected with him. Has he spoken about him through Feda before? She said, Yes.'

From here to the end of the sitting Feda's voice was getting very low, fading away to a low but clear whisper.

'She says, Of course he has.'

The person communicating is supposed to be this lady to whom I have referred.

Then I asked right at the end, when I recognized that Feda was departing, 'If it is the man I think, he has already mentioned my name to Feda.'

'Yes; that is the one she is talking about, she says. That is the one she means, and he wanted you to help him with something. I thought before he was helping you with something, but she says, No. It is not only him helping you, but you doing things for him here on the earth. He wanted you to finish something—to complete something. Louise. Louise. Louise.'

Well, as I said before, he was writing a play—about Psychotherapy. He had written two of the acts, and he was hoping to complete it, and he was turning to me for the psychological side, for facts of pathological psychology.

'Difficulty in doing it. Opposition. Difficult. Charles—Charles—and another name beginning with W. Ch, isn't it a nuisance. I am losing the power.'

Then I asked in desperation, 'A book, or a play, or what?' because I realized that my previous tactics of saying nothing and giving nothing away were evidently holding things up, so that I had to begin asking questions, and certainly I found it worked better. Whether the scientific results are of equal value is another matter, of course.

'Difficulty finishing it, but he began it. Wait a minute. He had got an essential part done, but not by any means all; there is a lot to be done to it, but the idea had been worked out, but it would have to be elaborated; it had to be worked out properly. It had to be worked out after the theme was there; the situation was there, but that was all. No; No; part of it had been done; as well as the situation part of it had been done, and there had to be a little reconstruction. It was necessary. It couldn't be helped.'

That was quite true; the first act stood perfect, and was a very brilliant act, and held my attention very strongly as I read it. The second act he was in process of modifying, to prepare for the third act.

'He is pleased with something that has been done quite recently, very pleased, and he feel it will be all right if given a chance. A—, A—, A—.

That is the first occasion—right at the end—that his name is actually given.

'Wait a minute, given a chance. Oh, I can't get any more. Isn't it a nuisance ! She sends her love again. He says he will come again. . . . But he is pleased with things—pleased with George.'

I asked, 'George who?'

'Arler—Arler—Arler—Arler. It is something like that, she says, but don't say it. When you come again she might be able to get it.'

This 'George Arler' might be the well-known actor, George Arliss.

With regard to this particular character, who reminds me, and reminds me strongly, of W— A—, it

gives me the impression of his personality as I knew him, although I really have tried to be as critical as possible in preventing 'projection'—that is why one is so glad to get verbatim reports of the sittings.

As far as the actual sitting is concerned, the impression is different at the time of the sitting from what it is when reading the results afterwards. During the sitting one gets frightfully disappointed; one feels there is nothing in it. One thinks: 'Why doesn't she come to the point?' There are so many things that she could easily say but does not. When one comes to read it afterwards, however, so many things one thought were quite useless and non-evidential are just the things that seem to be of value.

That is especially so with regard to this lady—whom I will call 'M'. She was a well educated lady, who took an especial interest in Psychology and Psychical Research, and she would be the very person to avoid the commonplace, and try, if she could, to get through something of an evidential nature.

So I turn back again to her talking about helping me to write. That was very characteristic of her, and before her death I used to read to her everything I wrote. She had a literary gift, and used to take a great interest in all I wrote, and helped me all she could.

> 'She had never thought really that she would pass over; she had thought that you might, but she didn't think—(Why did you think that he would?) There was some reason she had been anxious about you, but didn't really expect it. Somewhere you had to go on a visit, but didn't think she would go so soon.'

I went out to Egypt (Alexandria) with the 29th Division in 1915, not going to France until 1916, and she died early in 1916; but early in 1915 I had been extremely ill with broncho-pneumonia, and she might be referring to this.

I think a great deal of this is non-evidential, but I am quite sure that later on some of it is more than mere coincidence.

'Who's Mollie? Then I get Mollie.'

Though many of the names are wrong, Mollie is correct as the name of my wife.

'There is another name that she wanted to get and tried to get last time. They giving the letter P. Not an ordinary name like Paul—more like a nickname—a made-up name. She puts it near you. A short name, but I think has two syllables. I catch two sounds, not one. That's important, and she seems to think that you ought to remember it at once. She looks at you in an anxious way as if you ought to know a little name used much in her earth life, accustomed to it. I feel, used by her. A little letter after P—not a long letter like h or l. I feel she would use it in two ways. She is trying to make me get the name. Two names. One a little longer than the other; both begin with P.

Here I did break my rule of not saying anything, otherwise I felt I might lose something entirely. I said: 'Shall I make a suggestion? Is it P—?' She nodded her head.

'But there is another name beginning the same way but not ending the same way. She had like several funny names not quite ordinary for people and things around her, not for everybody she says. Not for everybody, but there were some people that she was used to calling by names. P— is right. She seems contented.'

The name referred to is simply a nickname she had for me. I admit I had to help it out, and it might not be very evidential, but one gets so much that is not evidential at all that one is only too glad to get anything that seems to fit in. Telepathy would explain the result.

From time to time one gets remarks on the general relationship of the spirit world to this world.

'She says she tried to give it in another quarter, because over here we know there is no separation; it is you who feel and have the separation, whatever separation there is, but, she says, we can see

and to some extent hear you so often, so often, that it doesn't leave us with the sense of separation as it does you, and then we can always look forward to night time, night time, when you come over to us in your sleep.'

That is evidently a theory of Mrs. Leonard's subconscious, if it isn't something contributed from outside.

'She asking a funny little question, not important, something she noticed. No, she tries this way of putting it now. Superfluous diaries, note-books. Don't know if note-book's right word. Diary I think better word. Something you got; she doesn't know how you are going to use it. Silly having it. Get another one more suitable. Call it diary. Dates, to put down everything. Don't know if she is joking. She says, Give it away while it will be useful. She's joking, but it is true. Pretty and neat. Knows you won't use it. Might as well give it to some one who will. Not quite right kind for you. When you see it you will be quite sure. Remember what she says. Don't think she is really interested in it. A good deal of letterpress, unusual amount explanatory. Some refers not to the present time which you would expect in a diary, but things that have happened quite a long time ago, stupid things that she can't see what they have got to do with purpose of book. You will find it and be amused that she has got it so correctly. She isn't satisfied with the word "diary": it will do. It isn't what you would strictly call a diary, but that will do. It will explain it with the other things she has said.'

I thought this was more ridiculous than the rest, but when I pointed it out to my wife she at once went to her writing-desk, and said, 'Here's the diary. I got it out this morning, and wondered if we should use it.' It was 'A Nature Lover's Diary', not the kind I should use, and she was wondering what possible use we could make of it.

'I feel some one quite young now, some one she is very interested in and attached to. Some changing condition round this young person that she is trying to help with, to make satisfactory. I can't get any more about that, not important, and especially

important the change in condition. She trying to get the right people or person. Trying to arrange the right condition.'

If there is anything here again, it would mean her own son, a boy who had just gone on from preparatory school to public school.

'The young lady is the important one all the time. She is the one that sticks and sticks all the time. She never will move far away from here.'

That was very characteristic of this lady to whom she refers. I asked what her name was.

'I could get a name on the table. . . . Will you have a table and try to get it through the table with Feda?'

So we arranged for that. Feda disappeared, before the power went, and Mrs. Leonard (normal) got the table, and sat on one side, and I sat at the other. Here was something very familiar, that we used to do frequently twenty years ago.

Here again, especially with the table, if the sitter is to be one of the collaborators, he knows all the things are in his own mind, and it is very difficult to keep consciously passive, and of course still more difficult to arrive at results of any evidential value.

Before Feda went I asked one final question, 'Used she to do that when she was alive?'

'She smiled and she nodded her head. It is something that she knows about, this, and that is why she impressed Feda to sort of suggest this part. I feel she will have the power for it, do you see? and that she will know somehow what she is doing, and be able to control it. I get a feeling of use. I am sure she has done something of this kind before. I am sure she has done something of it before she wented over, and that is why it will come easy to her.'

Well, at the table one asks questions, and the table tilts in reply. I asked, 'Is there some one here?' and the table

tilted three times for yes. I asked for the name, and it spelt it out, but here again I knew what the name was. It is frightfully difficult to make one's mind a complete blank so as not to influence the replies. The name, the place of her death and the date of her death were all given, tapped out correctly. Then:

DONT U REMEMBER HOLDING IT DOWN.

Here Mrs. Hankey (the shorthand-writer, to whom also I was then unknown) was noting the results, and I simply didn't know what the letters were, but I must confess that while her name was being spelt out, I found it quite impossible to keep it out of my mind. No doubt one's subconscious is very anxious that Mrs. Leonard should not tap the wrong name. 'Holding it down.' Of course that might refer to anything, but many years ago we used to hold the table down when it got frisky and moved round the room. Then it tapped out:

BOOK HELPED I DID.

I may mention, here again I asked a question. Immediately after her death I found my pen moved automatically in my hand to write 'yes' and 'no'. Nothing else would be written, but if I sat down and asked questions, my hand would be automatically moved. So I said, 'I want to ask one thing, but I know if I do I shall get the answer 'yes', and the table tapped out 'yes'. Then it began to tap out a message.

M. I CAME BACK FEW DAYS AFTER.

At this time I did not know what was being tapped out. Mrs. Hankey noted down the letters, and asked the later questions. She asked:

After what?

DEATH.

Did he know?

YES.

Can you tell us how he knew?

SAID SO.

Mrs. Hankey, who has had experience of a large number of Mrs. Leonard's sittings, noted on the transcript:

'During many sittings with Mrs. Leonard for the past ten years I have never known Feda to close a sitting and work through table-tilting.' [1]

Mrs. Leonard herself said she wasn't very keen on this mode of communicating. The explanation is, if—and I say 'if'—it were that particular person it wouldn't be very strange, because she herself was very skilful in getting things through the table—not necessarily evidential things, but long stories of murders, &c., which amused us.

As regards this table-tilting, I may say my earliest experience did begin that way, and we found the table worked with us vigorously. On one amusing occasion, when the table tapped out that the guardian spirit of one of us was Nero—much to her annoyance—it went on to tap out that buried treasure could be found under the fourth step of the cellar stairs. We proceeded to dig it up, but found nothing. We went back to the table, which tapped out that it was a mistake, and the treasure was under the third step. Still no success, so we went back to the table again, which then said the sixth step! Incidentally it may be noted that Nero was interested in buried treasure (*v.* Tacitus, *Annals*), although this was not known to any of us at the time.

Just two more points:

'That is a funny thing, that, about the other boy you have got with you. Do you know the other boy that he has got with him? the one that passed over very young? I get a feeling he must

[1] Sir Oliver Lodge writes, of this: 'I have had table-sittings part of the time in the past with Mrs. Leonard. They used to be employed to get names or such details more precisely.'

have either been a baby or been one of those that is born without earth life. He had so little. I am sure he didn't go to school, or be educated or developed here.—I can't tell you how long it is since he passed over, nor how old he would have been if he had been here, because the development on the spirit side of life is different to the development on the earth, and because he is grown up now doesn't help me to tell how long it was before, because it isn't according to time that they grow; it is just according to how much they develop.'

That might again refer to that child of $2\frac{1}{4}$ who died in 1909, and in whom—if the spirit hypothesis be true—my brother would be very interested.

'Who is she talking about, taking care of fire?—What is that you are mentioning? Who's been setting fire to themselves? I am not sure if she means lately or some time ago. Fire—fire—fire.'

I knew nothing about this at the time of the sitting.

'It is something that occurred only a little while ago and made her feel very anxious indeed, though she knew at the time it hadn't resulted in anything very bad, but it made her feel that if it happened again it might be very very dangerous indeed, and I don't think that she thinks it might only be dangerous to furniture or to a room, but it was because she thought it would be dangerous to some one that she was so very anxious. That some one wasn't you, but it was some one near to you, somebody belonging to you. I feel people belonging to you knew about it, and she thought that they would have told you about it, but she is not sure of that. It is as if she thought that perhaps as nothing very bad did happen they have just kept it quiet. They may not have said anything, but you could ask now, as it has all blown over; perhaps they won't mind saying anything about it. I can see that she thinks that this thing, or part of it, may have been kept from you for fear it would worry you, especially as it wasn't necessary after, and no damage much was done, but it is fire I get. I get that word very, very strongly, and she would like you to investigate it. She rather hopes you don't know it, because what they wanting to do so much is to try to let you know that the things they tell you are not just in your mind.'

I read this to my wife, and a curious expression passed over her face. It appears that not long before, in the early morning, she was frying something on the gas-stove, in a cottage in the country, and the frying-pan caught fire, and that worried her because the gas-meter had been foolishly fixed just above the stove, and she was afraid it would also catch fire and burn the cottage down. She was a bit disturbed by it, but she didn't tell me about it at the time. I quote that for what it is worth. I didn't know anything at all about it at the time of the sitting. I merely thought 'Here 's more waste of time on the part of Feda'. It is the impression one gets so frequently in these sittings.

Then Feda relates more and more about this lady, and everything does fit. The more she says, instead of taking something away and making you feel it is some one else, the more it fits.

A possible psychological theory is that Feda is a secondary personality of Mrs. Leonard, part of her subconscious self—working as a dramatization of her subconscious self. The question whether this dramatized portion of the subconscious self obtains the evidence by telepathy from the sitter, or from outside, or in both ways, is entirely a question of fact or observation.

There is coincidence to such an extent that it is far beyond the possibility of chance. I feel sure of that. What I have got satisfies the statistical part of my mind that it is beyond chance. The explanation may be entirely in terms of telepathy and clairvoyance, or it may be partly in terms of these factors and partly in terms of outside spirit influence.

As regards the telepathy part of it, what one feels is that there is so much that might be expected to come through telepathy—emotional experiences that you are only too anxious to hear of again, just the sort of things that would move you most—and these are just the things that you do

not get. All through, you have the feeling that the person on the other side is trying to find something that isn't obvious to your own mind, and even where it is fairly clear to your mind it comes as a surprise to you and often only becomes fully clear later.

As regards the personalities that come, the objection might be made that here 'projection' is strongly at work. The sitter is thinking of some one, and as soon as he decides who it is, he gets into an intellectual and affective state which emphasizes all that corresponds to that person, and obliterates all that does not. But these manuscript notes were taken verbatim.

During the sitting the results seem to be less satisfactory, less impressive than when one reads them through quietly afterwards, because during the sitting one is hoping for all sorts of things, and they don't come, and so much is vague and veiled, and one may become impatient, and towards the end feel thoroughly disappointed. Afterwards one finds there is more in it.

Then there is this question of personal identity. It is often objected that the messages that come through are not characteristic. Of course I must leave my readers to judge. All I can say is that they definitely give me the impression that they are characteristic.

Then, why does so little come through? Why such a rigmarole and so little evidence in it? That doesn't strike one as extraordinary when one thinks of the complexity of the nervous system, and the complexity of discarnate beings—if such there be. You have only to contemplate the difficulty of speaking over a defective telephone, especially where the exchange is open and you hear other voices sounding through as well; and that is the impression one gets in some of these communications. Some of the messages seem to be not for one at all, but for other people. If there is a chance of communicating,

a number of people on the other side seem ready to compete for the opportunity. But of course the whole impression may be mere illusion.

NOTE.—In quoting these results of sittings with Mrs. Leonard, I am fully aware that nothing in the nature of *scientific proof* of personal survival is furnished by them. Apart from *chance coincidence* and the working of known psychological processes, the factor of *telepathy* between medium and sitter would suffice to explain the correspondences observed. Yet telepathy itself is but another name for such observed correspondences, and not really an explanatory process, at the present stage of our knowledge. It will not have full scientific standing until we have discovered the *conditions* under which it occurs and the means by which it may be controlled. The same remarks apply to the factor of *clairvoyance*.

I present the reports merely as illustrations, obtained at first hand, of the kind of phenomena which occur in the mediumistic trance and which have bearing upon our scientific conception of the nature of personality and its possible survival of bodily death.

XVII

CONCLUSION: FAITH, LOVE, AND PERSONALITY

IN this final chapter I wish to touch on a number of topics. First as regards Faith. In my *Mind and Personality* and elsewhere I have always emphasized the active nature of the faith state, urging that the faith state is an active frame of mind corresponding to, if not identical with, the will to believe of which William James speaks. It is not the same as credulity, nor is it the same as belief on the basis of scientific evidence. It is, in its fullest form, a determination to trust in the good and to act upon the noblest hypothesis. It is a belief in value and it is a determination to pursue such value and do one's best to increase it if possible, at any rate not to betray it. As such, as an attitude of mind akin to will or volition, it is the underlying force of all therapeutic suggestion; suggestion is based upon faith. Faith is not to be explained in terms of mere suggestion, mere ideo-motor action. In much suggestion treatment the faith involved is an unconscious faith; it is a faith belonging to the unconscious mind rather than to the conscious part of the mind. Individuals who have no conscious belief or expectation of benefiting from treatment may nevertheless benefit from suggestion treatment. Further analysis of such a case shows that in the unconscious there is this active attitude, the attitude of an active will to believe, the active valuation of something as worth while, the expecting a result because it is good. It is a fundamental belief in the goodness which is at the back of things, a belief in the friendliness of the universe, that the universe is not absolutely alien to us, not hostile to us, but friendly.

I have drawn a parallel between that situation in regard to the active side of life and the situation in the realm of the intellect. In science we collect evidence, observe facts and form hypotheses to explain those facts, and proceed further to verify the hypotheses with reference to additional facts. The scientist considers that in doing this he is avoiding metaphysics, avoiding any non-empirical assumptions, and basing his work entirely upon experience. But thinking further we see that observation of facts and colligation of facts, forming hypotheses and testing hypotheses, would be impossible unless we held the fundamental assumption that nature is uniform, that there is a rationality in things, that *A* remains *A* and does not change into *B* except for some sufficient reason. If *A* becomes *B* there is a sufficient reason for it. Everything in the universe, we believe, is *relevant* to everything else. There is no irrational or purely fortuitous alteration from one state to another without a cause. There is a belief in the uniformity of nature, a belief in the rationality of things, which is a background to the scientist's work, which is the fulcrum by reference to which he can produce theories of the universe. So the analogy is this. As the belief in the uniformity of nature is the background of scientific reasoning and investigation through the method of hypothesis—the formation and testing of hypotheses—so faith in the friendliness of the universe, in the goodness at the heart of things, is the background, the support of the therapeutic method of suggestion treatment. If a patient is completely without this underlying faith, it seems to me that he would fail completely to respond to suggestion treatment. If you turn to the recent book *Adventure*, edited and partly written by Canon B. H. Streeter, you will find an article by Professor John MacMurray on the matter of faith, in which he takes a similar point of view, without any reference to what

I have already pointed out on the subject. In the same chapter he develops further the position I have been lecturing on for many years—the relation between individuality and personality. I have repeatedly pointed out that personality is more than individuality. It develops from individuality. In everybody there is a universal element—something that transcends the individual. I worked it out before in my article on 'Religion and Psychology' in *Science, Religion, and Reality* in 1925, and also in a chapter in *Mind and Personality*. We find the same kind of argument followed by Mr. MacMurray in his essay.

These two matters, faith on the one side and the nature of personality on the other, need to be taken together. They are linked up with one another. We bring them together in order to get a more satisfying view of Religion. Religion is my central problem in this concluding chapter. If we ask for the nearest analogy to religious experience (analogy is at the basis of most constructive intellectual and philosophical work) we should say that it is of the nature of love. In the love of one person for another there is a direct relationship—a relationship which cannot be adequately understood from the outside. It may have a biological significance and purpose, but that does not completely sum it up. Over and above that there is a direct intuition, a direct insight, which is ultimate. In a similar way, so far as a person has a religious attitude, it seems to me, it is a feeling of love—love for the universe, and for other people in the universe; as I said in earlier lectures, a belief in the worthwhileness of things, a feeling of worship and adoration. The sense of sin upon which the Freudians rely in their analysis and explanation of religion is not so ultimate. A sense of sin may arise—bad conscience may arise from a feeling of inadequacy, of falling away from one's ideal, of disloyalty, of being untrue to this experi-

ence; but the experience itself is an experience of love, similar in quality to love between one person and another, but higher in the sense that it has a much wider scope. One may love parts of the universe, one may love a science, or an art, any particular art or any particular science, any particular place. One may love individual persons and things. One may love one's country, or one's nation, one may love humanity; and this love is a real thing, and as love it brings with it, carries with it reciprocity. Whatever you love, you feel in a way loves you. It may seem absurd to say that an object, a house or a village or town loves the individual that loves it, but in the most complete forms of love there is reciprocity. We feel that it is at any rate a plausible hypothesis that, widening our scope of love, we eventually reach something similar to that which Spinoza reached in his philosophical pilgrimage. He was driven by a desire, by a craving, a determination to search for something the love for which would completely satisfy the mind. He found that in the love of God or Nature, *Deus sive Natura*—the *amor intellectualis Dei*. He took the path of the intellect, although a great deal of his work was on the emotions. He dealt with the emotions along intellectual lines, after the manner of geometry, so that his is a very special case. But in a more general way we may see that the individual can widen his love to include the totality of the universe and that his feeling for the universe may vary from time to time, from day to day, or from year to year, just as the love of one person for another may vary, and that at certain moments and under special conditions the love may blaze out with great fervour, with complete sincerity, and complete conviction of worth. Those experiences I would call mystical experiences. What I mean by a mystical experience is a feeling of union with the divine, a feeling of love, a feeling of love which is reciprocated, which may

come to a person, not always as the direct result of merit although not independent of merit. Some may strive for it and fail to get it; others may be more fortunate; but when it comes it does come in relation to worth in the individual in the sense of striving, of aiming high, of really endeavouring to find God. It comes from a search for Him, a belief that He is there to be found. 'Thou wouldst not have sought Me, hadst thou not already found Me.' The person who does not care about such things does not get that experience. The Gallios of life are not the people who would get that experience. On the other hand, many earnest people are too earnest, they strive too hard, they stand in their own light and through over-anxiety miss their way.

A theory like this cannot be demonstrated. It is suggested by analogies and can be tested by experience. Difficulties will be found at once—the pain and suffering in the world, the cruelty and the apparent prevalence of blind chance. Further insight shows us that much pain is avoidable pain; it is due to error, stupidity, blindness of insight for which a person is not entirely free from responsibility. And the theory does not seem so far-fetched and indefensible if we remember that in the beginning we do come from the universe. We have developed from mother earth, our ancestors have developed eventually in connexion with the burning mass of material torn from the sun by the pull of a passing star, and the sun has been developed out of more profound chemical and physical reactions in the abyss of space. On the principle that the stream cannot rise higher than its source, we believe that the source of all this is something that is at least as intelligent as the highest form of conscious life on this or any other planet.

A more difficult question is as regards the personality of God.[1] We find that Mr. MacMurray is quite definite

[1] Miss Hilda D. Oakeley has an interesting discussion of this problem in

about this—holding that God is a Person and that relationship between the individual and God is a personal relation; but it seems to me that there is a difficulty. I have always felt that He cannot be a person in the sense in which we are persons, even in the sense in which we are more than individuals, because a person is in relation to an environment, in relation to something outside himself—a spacial and temporal relation on the lowest level, leading up to the highest form of personal relationship. But God has no environment, nothing is outside Him. Moreover He has made us. 'It is God that hath made us and not we ourselves.' We have come from Him and the relationship must therefore be a one-sided one. It cannot be completely reciprocal. More comes from God than from us in essentials and nature. 'We love Him because He first loved us.' Love comes from that direction, just as in the case of parent and child. A parent who loves his child calls out love from the child in return. Religious experience, it seems to me, is the consciousness of this love—the awareness of it. That may be masked and neutralized in all sorts of ways. One of the most obvious ways is self-centredness, self-love; self-love is the enemy of every other kind of love. It is the vampire which seeks to draw everything into itself. It is the thing from which we must obtain deliverance. It is the dragon which must be slain. This it was to which St. Paul might have referred when he spoke those words: 'Oh wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?'—struggling to get away from himself—to get beyond himself. Other factors may work in the same direction, like disappointed ambition and disillusionment, which are simply a secondary narcissism. A person who becomes

her recent book, *A Study in the Philosophy of Personality*, Williams & Norgate, Ltd., 1928. See also Professor C. C. J. Webb, *Divine Personality and Human Life* (Gifford Lectures), Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1920.

disillusioned has set up false ideals which cannot be realized. He is out of touch with reality. Instead of dying to live, killing the love of self in order that the higher self may develop, passing on and on, that is too much for him. Instead of that he creates an imaginary world around him, he sees the world in colours which he himself has projected upon it, and so he makes the world part of himself. He puts himself at the centre, he is ego-centric, and that does not work. He fails, and when he fails his emotional tendencies are turned in on himself. He turns from God to himself. He is like a child who turns away and says he won't play. The extreme instance of that is the suicide who decides to end it all. The great crime of the suicide (in certain cases) is that he presumes as an individual to pass judgement on the universe. These are negations of religion.

There are degenerate forms or perversions of every kind of feeling, and one may meet with perversions of the religious feeling. One may hear of a person making some one else or something else his god or his religion—making some subject or some pursuit his sole aim in life, feeling towards it something analogous to the feeling of intense devotion or adoration appropriate to religion—a readiness to give himself for the sake of that object. From the purely intellectual point of view, such a position, such a mental attitude, can only be completely satisfied if it does include the entire universe; anything less than the totality of things is not suitable to be taken as God, since it contains an inner contradiction. It is not self-sufficing. For this reason, if for no other, any form of polytheism or pluralism must be wrong. If you have only two universes you have the further problem of how they are related to one another, and you are thus forced to look for a wider system which includes the two. Just as with the intellect you must believe that truth is one, so in religion you must believe that God is one.

Of course what I am saying is a repetition in other terms of what you find in any of the great religious literatures, especially in that of the Christian religion. God is love—the essence of it. It is in Him that we live and move and have our being, and He cannot be a person in the sense in which we are persons, because if we become more than individuals, if we gain personality by acquiring an element of universality, of being a particular universality, God is universality itself. God includes all the various values, the eternal values of the good, the beautiful, the true, in quite a different way from that in which we partake of those values. We can fall away from them. We can be untrue to them. But we do not (except in a qualified sense) ourselves make them. We endeavour to discern them, and by discipline of the soul we get a clearer view of them and get inspiration from them; but, although we play a part in developing them by the creative power of personality, through the faculty of choice, we do not make them as God makes them. They are a part of God, and I have already suggested in general terms how they are related to Him. They are aspects of His nature. I said just now that God was universal, but He is individual too. He is a concrete universal, the most concrete universal of nature. So that in one sense it might be said that God is the perfect personality and that all other personalities are imperfect—fall short of that personality. But I have always felt sympathy with the view which F. H. Bradley sets out in the last chapter of his *Appearance and Reality*, when he says there is a certain amount of intellectual confusion in those who speak as if the absolute had personality in the sense that individuals have, in the sense that one can attribute selfhood to the individual. One denies personality to God only because one considers that God is beyond personality, as we know it and understand it. It is no question of adopting any theory of pantheism, any

view of drab uniformity and mechanical necessity of the entire universe; but there is no reason whatever to hold such a view. That could only come from adhering too closely to the more elemental and general sciences of physics, chemistry, and biology. I don't think any one who takes psychology seriously could be a pantheist. We hold that there are gradations, differences of degree in the universe; that just as there are different degrees of truth for individual minds so there are degrees of value, and that God is the system of values in their true order. He represents the hierarchy of values in their completeness, and it is because we see no reason to deny a certain degree of freedom to the individual that we would say, looking at it intellectually, that the Absolute is entirely free. And so conversely we could look on our freedom as something which is derived from the Absolute. There is another article I should like to draw to the notice of my readers in relation to what I have been saying—Sir Francis Younghusband's article in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* for March 1928 called 'Religious Experience and Philosophy'. The account I have given is in the closest harmony with the view which he sets out, although he goes farther. I think he goes beyond the scientific evidence when he states his belief that there are greater individuals, that there is life and personal relationship in other parts of the stellar universe reacting upon our universe as if every part was in relation by some special channels. It may be true, but we have no evidence for it. The evidence we have is that, firstly, we come from the universe, we are parts of it, and therefore we should expect a community of that sort, and secondly, that this experience of world-love, the religious experience in its highest form, is normal and not pathological. People who have it are the better for it. They do not become morbid and neurotic through it. There are forms of experi-

ence sometimes called mystical which really are morbid, and a good deal of it is narcissistic, is an introversion of love upon the individual himself. The individual has a feeling that he is transcending space and time, because he is returning to an earlier stage of his life now reactivated in his unconscious mind where tendencies are out of time, where they act timelessly.

It is extraordinary what similarity and convergence there is in the views of different people at the present day on the relation of science and religion. I have read a great deal of the literature lately and that is what strikes me—not that different people have different views, but that they all have much the same views, almost as though they were quoting one another. The differences are less pronounced than the differences between one creed and another. On the psychological side the beginning of this study was made by the American Professor Starbuck, who sent out a questionnaire on the subject of religious experience. William James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* analysed the results thus obtained. The answers boiled down to a few conclusions which I quote in *Mind and Personality*. Discounting the discrepancies of the creeds he found some central nucleus of agreement, and it is interesting to note that one element was the reality of prayer. We are parts of the spiritual universe, with which we can come into relation, and in which, as James says, work is done in the sense of actual transfer of energy—energetic effects are produced. Prayer is central to religion. There are all sorts of definitions of prayer. One comes to my mind—'He who rises from his knees a better man, his prayer is answered' (George Meredith, *The Ordeal of Richard Feverel*). James said, 'We pray to our ideal self'—in doing so we give a chance for our ideal to lift us up.—'He prayeth best who loveth best,' &c. Prayer is in its essence a form of affirmation of faith, an avowal of confidence, trust,

worship, adoration, a readiness to accept the will of God. Petitionary prayer is secondary to that. The only justification we should have for making any petition would be because of that. Any petitionary prayer apart from that is like the prayer put up to an idol, a sort of magic, just a formula for producing effects. It is really an element of practical science rather than an element of religion. Magic launched science. Magic came before science. Spells and incantations failed, so people set to work to learn more about the laws of nature, and commanded nature by obeying her.

Sir James Frazer has his own theory about the relation of prayer and magic. According to his view, this transition occurred when individuals found that magic failed. At first they adopted the imperious method of magic and incantations, they strove to bend the forces of nature, the spirits of the universe, to their will; but, failing, they became more humble and changed to an attitude of entreaty and supplication. But it seems to me that such a theory misses the essential nature of religion. It commits the fallacy of explaining a later development in terms of an earlier. It is not only legitimate and desirable, but also necessary, for science to work out an historical description of the processes of development or evolution, but it is another thing to explain the later in terms of the earlier. Theoretically it is obvious that the later would explain the earlier in matters of intellect, and we see that this is so. Likewise in matters of ethics, of aesthetics, and ultimately of religion. In the later stages of development, aspects become explicit that were merely implicit in the earlier, and therefore likely to be overlooked in any description of the earlier. It is all very well for us to dogmatize about the way primitive peoples thought, judging their thoughts from their actions. It is quite possible that certain essential characteristics may thus be overlooked. What is de-

scribed is the more prominent and noticeable characteristics of their superstitions. But the essential spiritual element of their religion which may be there, will be there from the earliest times but not so pronounced—as it may not be so pronounced in a young child as it is later on in life, in our modern civilization. It may be there. That is the essential thing. The outward forms and ceremonies are relatively unimportant. Savages may consider that sort of thing important, in the sense of being necessary or indispensable. It need not be held that they attach any more importance than this to it. Then why do they insist that it shall not be omitted? Just *because*, it seems to me, they attach overwhelming importance to the spiritual as such.[1] That is their way of manifesting the spiritual. It is only at a very high level of development that rites and ceremonies can be dispensed with.

One may go farther and say that it is doubtful whether they can ever be entirely dispensed with. Though an individual may, at a certain stage in his or her mental or spiritual development, feel relatively independent of rites and ceremonies, yet with a further development of his life he may feel the need of them again. People I have spoken to on the subject say that without that their spiritual life tends to fade and lose clearness and precision. While recognizing that the spiritual life as such is not the same as the rites and ceremonies, yet they realize that the ceremonies are helpful in keeping it fully alive—just as a person who is interested in a particular subject is helped by reading books written by others on the subject and by going to discussions and lectures. He gets stimulus from outside. It prevents him from falling too much in on himself. That is a real danger. Many who think they can do without forms and ceremonies may tend

[1] Also because fear and ignorance play an important part in their general religious attitude.

to scoff at those who need them, thinking that they are in an infantile stage of religious development and are in danger of the other extreme of narcissism. But the same danger threatens the person who does without forms and ceremonies. He may fall back on himself. There is one line of action which will save both alike from narcissism—living for others, living for a wider system, forming part of a group, living for the group, living outside ourselves as much as possible. It looks as though that is essential. What sums up the Christian religion better than any other is the phrase 'dying to live', a phrase you find in Hegel. Hegel has a number of illuminating phrases somewhere or other in his writings. 'Be a whole or join a whole'—if you are not part of a community, living its life, you have to be complete in yourself, and you find you can only do that if you are God. So that means we have to live as members of one another. Hegel says elsewhere, 'Be a person and treat others as persons'—adopt the personal relationship, the personal attitude which is the universal attitude. The same thing was put forward in the statements of Kant—'Treat every one as an end and never merely as a means.' 'Act so that the law of your action can be made a law universal.' That of course is practically the same as the golden rule—'Do unto others as you would they should do unto you,' 'Love your neighbour as yourself.'

It is very easy to criticize these statements—to show that in special instances the ideas of morality are self-contradictory, that they are not logic-tight. Yet they are greater than logic; as ideals they are therefore real, and they have a real influence on all who accept them. They do not mislead. There is no danger of those following such rules falling short in their ethical conduct. The difficulty is that the intellectual formulation of ethics is difficult.

I think it was Lord Balfour who said before the war,

'It is extraordinary, in comparing the great variety of ethical systems, to find so great a unanimity of their conclusions.' It means that the heart of man is sounder than his intellect in this matter. One conclusion might be drawn from it—that it is a form of justificatory reasoning (Ribot), a rationalization. You have rules of conduct that you accept intuitively and then you look for reasons for them afterwards. You do not act because of the reasons; you find reasons for your actions. You cannot live by intellect alone. It is an abstraction, or rather a set of abstractions—a 'ghostly ballet of bloodless categories', to use F. H. Bradley's phrase. Reality is wider than that, fuller than that.

This brings us to the general theory of values. We have cravings, desires, and wishes, the satisfactions of which are values. As Adam Smith said, 'Value is the satisfaction of desire.' But these values are not all on the same level; some have more importance than others for the individual and for the race, and the question is whether there are any such things as ultimate values, or absolute values. Even if we deny this, we may yet find reason to believe that there is an absolute *order* or hierarchy of values. The values are related to one another according to degrees of precedence. The main classes of values are: (1) Aesthetic values or degrees of beauty, (2) Moral values or degrees of the good, and (3) Logical values, or degrees of truth. These values must be objective. They are general or super-individual, and are relatively permanent—if indeed they do not transcend time completely. This is obviously the case with logical values. But it is equally so for the other two general classes of value. Moral action is action that takes the individual out of himself and lifts him above mere individuality. Artistic creation is likewise super-individual. If it were merely an idiosyncrasy of the artist, he would not care to claim for it an art-value; and in calling it an art-

value he himself attributes to it a value that other people ought to appreciate. Moreover, one such art-value should be appreciated as higher than another—there is a scale of art values.

INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY

It remains for us to sum up, and put in more precise terms, our doctrine of personality. Personality should be distinguished from individuality. The term individuality, when used in a technical sense, may be regarded as indicating a mere difference from other people, but personality means more than this. Considered from an evolutionary point of view, it may be said that individuality arises out of a certain kind of generality and passes into another kind of generality. Individuals develop out of the general characteristics of the species. The individual man belongs to the genus *Homo Sapiens*. He has a distinct character developed in the course of evolution, represented by his various instinctive or primitive tendencies—tendencies to take notice of different incidents, different kinds of objects and facts in the outer world, and to react to them in more or less definite ways. He comes into the world inheriting certain tendencies, both to perceive and to react to his perceptions; he also feels in particular ways about things, and strives in special directions. All this is something general or common to him and to others of his class. He differs from the horse, the ox, and the dog in the nature of his instinctive tendencies. But besides this general character represented by his various instincts, there is something individual in each man. Various instincts are inherited with different degrees of intensity and differentiation, and the individual also manifests a certain degree of *spontaneity*. Biologically considered, as manifested in other domains of the animal and plant kingdom, it may be called *variability*, or a tendency to spontaneous

variation from earlier forms of inherited tendency. And this spontaneity, associated with gradually developing powers of thought, is what contributes freedom to the human race. If an individual had no spontaneity he would not be free; he would be simply like a gramophone record grinding out results that had been produced ages before. Spontaneity is a tendency to vary, though not lawlessly or irrationally—a tendency to try new methods of reaction and test new kinds of experience. Reasoning is something more than this. Reasoning is observing, comparing, abstracting, drawing conclusions from data, and in that way producing something new. So something new is produced, on the one hand, through spontaneity, and on the other through the working of reason.

One may describe in terms of spontaneity the working of the aesthetic powers, the power of appreciating beauty, of discriminating between the beautiful and the ugly or between different degrees of beauty, and the striving to create further beauty.

The fulfilment of moral obligation or the pursuit of the good is also based on spontaneity. So far as it is more than mere convention, more than a mere sheep-like following one of another, doing things because our ancestors did them, or because our neighbours do them—so far as it is a following of the inner light and a striving towards a better, so far it is creative. The three classes of values—the good, the beautiful, and the true—are all of the nature of creations. They are not static, they are dynamic, continually unfolding, continually expanding. These values, as we create them by our persistent and painstaking discrimination, are general values. So that we pass from the generic of the race through individuality to gain a more general outlook. We start as parts of one another, inheriting similar though not identical powers, and we separate ourselves off from one another. As we reach adolescence we

become more acutely aware of our difference from others, and find a tendency in ourselves to assert that difference; but as we develop further, that development carries us towards the pursuit of values classified under these three headings: goodness, beauty, and truth, which values again are general, teaching us that we belong to one another, and are all members of one universe. We find ourselves in the universe. This is what I call personality. We see the paradoxical nature of the term. Personality is general, but it is also creative. The universality of personality is creative because it partakes of the creativeness of the totality of things. Descriptions of the creative process of working given by geniuses in science or art seem to illustrate this. They all speak of something coming to them as if it came from elsewhere, yet they know that it belongs to themselves. In creation there is a point of junction between the Absolute and the Individual—universal elements of their own nature making use of the material provided by their individuality. One may, then, speak of personality as being on the one hand general and universal, and on the other creative. Nietzsche considered that the chief thing a man had to do was to transcend himself—that manhood was something to be overcome. The objection to that, in the form in which Nietzsche sketched it, is that it is too vague, too indefinite, and allows too much reality to the time process. The time process has undoubtedly a degree of reality, but it is something one is overcoming all the time in the course of one's life, so far as one is following the light of value-discrimination. So far as we seek the highest good in its various forms, we are transcending the time process. Our mental states do not simply fall outside one another, they are not joined up end to end like pictures in a cinematograph film, nor do they merely overlap. They raise us to a form of experience that is above the experience of transition, of sequence. Indeed, so far as we

begin to get the experience of sequence, we are above sequence. The mere fact that we can discriminate, that we can put *A* before *B*, and know that *C* follows *B*, shows that we are seeing things from the point of view of the Eternal. In human life transcendence shows varying degrees. It is high in the highest products of value experiences. In the appreciation of a symphony, or a picture, or a piece of architecture or sculpture, there is something which is in its essence eternal. It reveals itself in time, every experience lasts during time, but so far as experience is of any value to one it is beyond time. Similarly with truth; in considering any truth about the world, one finds that it is beyond time. It may take time into itself, but it is in essence beyond time. And if one considers a noble action of heroism or self-sacrifice, although it occurs in time one feels that it has its place as something eternal, as something beyond time.

When one asks how these classes of values are related to one another, one finds that they are abstractions or aspects of ultimate reality or the absolute. One reaches the conception of the absolute or God as the concretion or realization of all values, beyond time; because time must be within God, God cannot be in time. The experience of the absolute, whatever it is, is something that is eternal. We perhaps get some faint reflection of what that experience may be in our highest moments of appreciation of these different values.[1]

These new values are values for everybody. We have to be intensely democratic and communistic in this matter. We cannot be exclusive. So far as salvation as a religious conception is concerned, it must be for all. God is no

[1] All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good shall exist;
Not its semblance, but itself; no beauty, nor good, nor power
Whose voice has gone forth, but each survives for the melodist
When eternity affirms the conception of an hour.—Robert Browning.

respecter of persons, and although people vary in their powers of appreciating values, these powers are not mutually conflicting but represent varying degrees of approach to an identical ideal, which we believe to be real and which is realized in the absolute. It leads to at-oneness, and that is why one is anxious to distinguish personality from individuality. Mere individuality, which is so much a craving to be different from others and to get special advantages not shared with others, is a bad thing, a regression towards a more childish outlook on life, and is not in the line of progress. Nevertheless, courage to take an individual line is an essential element in personality.

We may consider further this question of privilege and distinctiveness. No one wishes to see the world degenerate into a universalism of crude mediocrity. Rivalry has its part to play in calling out the powers of individuals, encouraging them to make the best of themselves, and to get the best out of themselves; but that best when it is observed is something not merely of themselves, it is beyond themselves. *So that we can regard personality as a process but not a product, for it is never completely produced. It is a process that is creative on the one side and intuitional on the other. As personality grows, it produces something new, something that was not there before, and also brings with it increased insight into the nature of things, into the values of the world.* In the concluding chapter of *Mind and Personality* I emphasize the side of intuition or revelation—that as we purify ourselves, as we become more sincere with ourselves, and get away from the merely individual, the deeper will be our insight into life, and the greater our power of appreciating values. But the creative aspect is equally important. Both intuition and creation are involved in the living world of values as we know it, and also in the conception of genuine personality.

APPENDIX

VERBATIM REPORT OF A SITTING WITH MRS. OSBORNE LEONARD[1]

SITTER: Dr. William Brown. DATE: 5th August 1927.
NOTE-TAKER: Mrs. M. Hankey. TIME: 8.25 p.m. to 9.45.

'Feda', the Control:

Want to talk about resistance? Resistance? All right. I come. Yes, I come. Good-morning. Good-morning.

He is here, and he says tell you that he very pleased to talk to you again, what you used to call the W.A. gentleman but I call A—, but he here, and he says been wanting to talk to you, and I wasn't to forget that he wanted to speak a little about the evil of resistance, the evil of resistance. The stupidity of resistance, and he wanted to talk of it because there is something you were thinking of doing, working on just a little while ago.

Wait a bit; and he says, 'You know I talked to you some time ago about the art of substitution, of substituting a good for an evil thing or a bad thing, but I have been working with you and I am going to work with you still further on the theme of resistance, the evil of resistance, the folly of resistance.' Something about wholeness too. Wholeness—wholeness—wholeness. He says, 'We only resist when we are incomplete, when we are wilfully or even unconsciously, ignorantly living in a part of ourselves.' Wait a minute; wait a bit.

And he say, 'We have got to help people to live completely, with the whole, with the higher self that doesn't always get a look in.' Wait a minute. 'That is why I want to stop this resistance that makes ninety per cent. of the trouble in the world.'

He says, 'Resist advice; resist any encroachment on what is called the p'logatives of the personality'—wait a minute—'resist encroachment on the mental enclosure that is labelled "Mine".' Mine! Mine! Wait a bit. 'The sin of exclusiveness.' No, that isn't right. Yes, it is. 'The sin of exclusiveness', he says, 'that breeds resistance, subconscious as well as conscious resistance, so

[1] I have had many other sittings with Mrs. Leonard, of which verbatim reports were taken. I print this one in full as an illustrative example.

that the whole organism is in a condition of futile struggle and resistance. We have talked about fear, but fear and resistance run hand in hand.' Yes, that is all right. Wait a bit.

He says, 'We have got to work on this; I feel it coming up; I feel something coming up that will compel us to work very much on these lines.' He says, 'You have worked on them, but there is something more to be done,' and what? Wait a minute. Oh, well wait a bit then. He heard you saying just before the sitting, to her, about going to 'Merica, but he says you are not just going to one place in America. It is rather like travelling when you get there. Most peoples goes to a place called New York, and they does big things there because it is an important place, and comes back, but that isn't what you are doing. He is showing me you are going about to some different places. Wait a minute. Oh !

He thinks it possible that you may go—and he pointing south—south like that ! but that also as well as the strong possibility of you going south, he thinks you will lay foundations for going to South America again later on. This visit is only a preliminary one, as if you begin things there now that you will have to go back to finish.

(I am not shouting). He says,—What? I am not. I wasn't shouting.

He says it is an important journey. It is important, but it is not so much important thing that you are going to do now as the foundation stones you are going to lay, but later on'—then he laughed ! And he says, 'I meant that metaphorically, but as I said it I got a feeling that you are to be asked to lay a—Yes,' he says, 'I think I can call it that—to lay a foundation stone. I want you to remember that, and see if it happens. I feel you will be asked to do it under rather peculiar circumstances. I am speaking in a literal sense now.' Yes, that is right. Where do you see that? Why do you see a very—isn't it a funny place? Wait a bit. Isn't it a funny place. Not a brick place ! He is showing me a place that he will be with you at, that he want you to remember his description of it, because he thinks it will interest you later.

It is nowhere you been before. He is showing me a place looking white or very very pale, like a cream colour. It isn't bricks because it has got sort of as if it might be made of large lumps of stone all stuck together but not bricks. Wait a minute. At each end of it there is like—almost like a tower thing, as if the ends of the building

is higher than the middle. Sticks up high at that end, and that end too; they sticks up much higher than the rest of the roof, and there is a kind of ground—garden place—in front of it with very stiff looking trees, and beds—beds of flowers. Wait a minute.

There is a sort of very light sandy looking drive, very clean and glisteny looking, and the trees that I notice, stiff trees, very long tlunks—trunks—very long with not a great deal of top to, but sticking out like a umbrella at the top. Wait a minute.

He says there is something important going to happen in connexion with this building, and the people in it and with you. It is a very large building. 'I feel as if it is very close to water, as if it would stand on the sea or on a wide expanse of water', he says. It isn't very towny. It isn't in the middle quite of a sort of outside part of a town. It feels as if there is a good deal of air and space like clean air and space and not a lot of bustle and noise like in a city. Yes, and yet the place does seem awful busy in the building. It seem like a very busy building, and I feel as if you have to go to that place, as if you going to a place like in a little journey. You are not staying in the place, in the town where it is. You are going after a little journey, and going there on a special visit but not staying there long, only a short time. Wait; wait; wait.

He says, 'I want you to remember that; it strikes me as being of importance.' He says, 'I told you once before I don't know much about the future, but I occasionally get glimpses of it, unexpected glimpses sometimes, but I can't see the future', but he says, 'I do see this, and I attach some importance to this place.'

(What was that about then? Wait a minute;) He says, 'Do you remember the previous sitting we talked about some lights I had been showing some one?' He says, 'I have been doing it again lately, showing lights.' Wait a bit. Something else as well as lights he has been doing. Ringing a bell? And he said, 'Ringing a bell; ringing a bell.' Wait a minute.

Now he is wanting me to be a bit careful about this because he says I am mixing up the two conditions. He says, 'I am not talking about Alice[1] now at all; not talking about her.' He says, something he has done to you. Something he has tried to do to you about ringing a bell to let you know he was there. I do not know if he means a real bell or he pretended to psychically ring one, but some-

[1] Alys, W. A.'s daughter-in-law. See chap. xvi.

thing he has tried to make you hear—a bell—a sound like a bell. He says, 'I believe that you heard it but probably you attached no importance to it. It is only a little while ago, and other things have put it out of your mind. I want you to know I am going to try and do it again shortly, so if you think you hear a bell and prove it not to be a bell, in any normal sense, you will know it is what has been done before.' Wait a minute. I do not think he would like to hear noises of things in his head much. 'No, it won't be in your head', he says. You will hear it outside. 'No, no', he says, 'it will be unmistakable; you will know what it is. I am sure I shall be able to do it again. I have a feeling I shall do it soon.' But he says, 'I have been showing lights. I have been showing, too, a pink light rather particularly, not a brilliant light; not a bright sharp light, but what one might call a glow; a glow.' Yes, that is the right word for it. Wait a minute. Wait a bit.

. . . . . .

(And what did you say? What did you say about that then? Oh !) Oh, but I don't think he is disappointed.

Were you a little bit disappointed about the book [1] ? A little bit disappointed as if you had wanted it to do more?

Well—

He says, he doesn't think you ought to be. He doesn't think you ought to be, because you see, he says, 'It is not a thing that is going to flare up and go out again. It is something that has got to go on. It is going on now steadily.' Wait a minute. But he is expecting a fillip for it just now, something that soon you will be saying, 'Oh, that is good. I am pleased about it now,' like that, like it going very very strongly, like a new life for it, but he doesn't think you ought to be disappointed, only he thought that you felt it could do more; it could do more, and he says, 'Yes, but it will. It is going to do more. 'Tisn't finished with yet.' And he is pleased with it. He says, 'We are all pleased with it on this side, all of us,' and he says, 'You would be 'stonished if you knew the number of people over here who are interested in your work.' Wait a minute. (What do you say about that then? But I don't know. This is a Friday. Day after tomorrow?)

He has got a feeling that almost immediately, he believes about

[1] *Mind and Personality.*

the day after to-morrow, you are going to be in a condition in which you will be very much reminded of him. Gets a feeling you will be thinking of him very much within the next two days, as if something is going to happen to bring him very strongly to you. Wait a bit. Going away from London is it? Going just away from London, not to America? He seem to think, too, that you have got to make a little journey away from London very quickly now. He doesn't mean—he is not talking of America but somewhere quickly. (Has there got to be a little bit of an alteration about the time of going to America?)

Will you notice if there is going to be a bit of an alteration about the time of going to America?

Couldn't be; I have booked the passage already.[1]

Well, do you know he has got such a feeling about it. He says, 'I have a got a strong feeling that something may happen, nothing to worry about, nothing to worry about—something may happen that either it will make an alteration, or you will say,' he says, '"I see now why he thinks I might alter it."' Like a cause for an alteration, and yet—he says he has looked round and he can't see himself what it is, and yet that is what he feels so he wanted to tell you, because he thinks something will crop up, you will see. You will say, 'Well I am going to go, but I see the cause; I see why it would be so easily arranged for me not to go,' as if, if you go, it will mean that you will have to sort of twist something, rather settle something very forcibly. That is what he is giving. It is something, as if it is something you will know about awful quickly too. You will know about it quickly, but he says, anyhow he just telling you for what it is worth because he just feel it. He senses it. It isn't something that he got from your mind, he knows, but he does feel it very

[1] I was due to sail for the States in October, in order to be in time to deliver the Terry Lectures at Yale towards the end of that month. At the time of the sitting I had strong reasons for desiring a postponement of the date, but feared that I had left things too late, and that a postponement would be out of the question. A week later my reasons for postponement became so desperately strong that I cabled to Yale, and received the reply that the lectures could be postponed until the following March. I therefore cancelled my October sailing, and crossed in March. Telepathy would suffice as an explanation of the ' prediction ' at the sitting.

strongly. He doesn't think it will matter. It is nothing that will be a worry, but he knows that you will just see why he sensed it.

Oh! Some one—(do you mean on the ship?)—that you will be interested in. Wait a minute. There is some one going on the ship that he feels he is interested in. He says, 'I know more about it than I can explain in this way'. Not you; he doesn't mean you. (He only sneezing.) He didn't know what you had done for a minute. He says, he feels somebody that you will meet on the boat he means, that will be a link with him, so will you remember that? I think he knows who it is and he knows more about it, but he can't quite get it through, but he thinks that when you been on the ship a little while you will understand who it is. All I do see is a big letter 'R'; he is giving me that R. Wait a minute. It is funny, because there is a link with this journey with him with you, and especially with him. There is some cross link between you, and he says he is glad that you managed to come to-night. Well, that is what he call it. He is glad you managed to come to-night he calls it, so that he can tell you things, because he knows this, that you will be reminded and interested, saying so—so—so—so—so—that way.

Wait a minute. (What was that then? I don't know.)

(You tried to do what? Oh, wait a minute then.) To do with his home. To do with what he calls his home on the earth. He says, 'I do not mean the flat; nothing to do with the flat at all; the other place, the other home. There has been some alterations taking place there.' He says, 'I am not speaking about things just affecting people but affecting a place.' He wondered if you knew if something had been taken down like undoing or unbuilding something and building up new, like demolishing something and building up new, taking part of a place down, sort of erecting things and building up new on it. There had been some alterations. He sensed it very strongly. It doesn't matter. It isn't important, but he wondered if you knew about them. Wait a minute.

He says, 'As well as the person I told you about who passed over whom I have met and helped, there is another one who has passed over recently too, somebody I shall be much more with, and some one I shall be closer to than the woman of whom I was telling you.' Wait a minute. He says, 'The woman I was telling you about I have just helped, she doesn't concern me. I shan't see much of her now, but there is some one who has passed over recently that I have

been pleased to see, that I shall be with, some one closer to me.' He is drawing up a letter. I can't get it quite plainly, but it is like this. We have to wait a bit to get it clear, but it is a G or a C, and it is to do with the person that he is interested in and that he will be seeing a good deal over there who has just passed over, and again he is speaking of some one who passed over since you came here last time. Not people he got before, but people he has met quite lately.

He says, 'Do you know,' he says, 'I am under a difficulty we all are on this side in'—wait a minute—'in distinguishing between the immediate past and the very near future.' He says, 'I did try to tell you that once before.' He says, 'Sometimes we feel a thing as if it has happened when it is just happening or just about to happen.' Wait a minute. He says, 'That comes about, you know, it is the merging—the merging of the—' (say that word again, the one—) Oh, I have lost the word, a long word the one—wait a minute. I get it in a minute. He says he will get the word in a moment; 'she has lost it, but I will get it again in a moment, but it means the condition, the one condition, our condition and yours. When we come to that point I talked to you before about, the No-Man's Land, I lose the sense of time.' He says, 'Of course again we are verging into the Eternal Now—eternal now [1]—and I can't distinguish what has just gone from what is just coming or what is this moment, because it all is; it all is.' And he says, 'Sometimes we have from this side said that a death has taken place which has not taken place but rather is about to take place,' and he says, 'I am so afraid I am telling you that now, about this person; I am so afraid I am telling you that something has just happened which is just happening, and so I wanted to mention that, in case I ever at a sitting tell you something as if it has just happened when it is only just happening.' Wait a minute.

He says, 'For one thing that we can't explain to you is how it is that things are, that they are with us when they are just going to be with you.' (I think that all dreadful mixed up and difficult.) He says, 'Yes it is, but we are trying to simplify it; we are striving to make it plain. We are trying to understand it so that we can explain

[1] That same afternoon I had been at the bedside of a delirious patient who was repeatedly exclaiming 'Life is an eternal now'. The phrase at the sitting might therefore possibly be the result of telepathy from my subconscious.

it to you.' Wait a minute. He says, 'Do you understand why he was referring so much to resistance at the beginning of the sitting?' it is because of something you were thinking and doing only a little while ago. Things he talks about here, he says, are often because of something you have been thinking out or working upon. And when he is helping you, he says, with people, treating people, trying to help people, he often sees the way they are wasting their energy and their own healing force in this resistance. He says, 'And we do want them to find their own healing power.' He says, 'From this side I see the wonderful power, I was going to say of Nature.' He says, 'No, I won't call it that; the wonderful life force to re-establish itself when something has temporarily stemmed it.' He says, 'All disease, all difficulty in the human organism, is caused by something, a stemming of the life force. It can be stemmed mentally, but', he says, 'it can be more easily stemmed unfortunately mentally than it can be in a purely physical sense.' He says, 'One example of that is the person who doesn't worry. A purely physical illness, an injury to them, and they don't stem the life force; the life force flows through and helps the injury; heals up the body, but the person who fears, the person who thinks too much, who worries too much, stems the life force. That is why we have got to teach people not to stem, not to thwart the life force.' He says, 'This life force that we cannot understand, analyse, which just is life, we shall not be able to create this force, to manufacture this force on earth. We shall not be able.' (S'Oliver says you will.) He doesn't care what any one says, he says. I know S'Oliver thinks that we will be able to make things that walks and moves.

Yes?

Well, he doesn't somehow agree with that. Isn't it a nuisance? But S'Oliver is cleverer than he was. 'Well,' he says, 'I am merely giving my opinion. I feel we shall never create the life force. We may create a mechanism that will be dependent on a run of'—Oh dear !—'clockwork activity, that will run down and finish till it is wound up again but', he says, 'we cannot create the life force in matter. I wasn't created on earth. It doesn't belong to earth. It only functions on earth. It only has an effect on the earth.' And what? And he says, 'It is to encourage the life force that we have

got to work, to encourage it, help it, not thwart it, because,' he says, 'all disease springs from some temporary withholding of the life stream.' Wait a minute.

He says, 'We can mentally induce it to flow. We can help it. We can help it. It is more difficult sometimes than others, but we can do it. That is what you do. You don't do it for people but you help them to do it for themselves'. He says, 'You help to set something going in them that allows the life stream to flow again.' And what? Who is he, a window-cleaner? He says you are a window-cleaner. That is what he say. And he says, 'That is what we want to do. We want to clean the windows of the mind. Directly we can do that, things are ali right again,' and he says, 'That is what we are working with you for, to help people to do it for themselves, but mind, we have got to help sometimes to begin to clean them because they won't believe they have got a window till we have cleaned some of the fog and the mist off it, and shown them it is there. Directly they have an inkling that the worst of the window can be cleaned, hope comes in, hope—hope—' and he say, 'We have begun the good work. We have begun it then. We know we have started them.'

He says, 'I have got an organism, you know. That I am always trying to impress upon you. I am not a thought form only. I have an organism, a vehicle, a mechanism to work upon.' He says, 'It appears to me'—oh dear, I don't like livers.—He says, 'It appears to me that I have the duplicate of my physical organism, duplicates of my physical organs. It appears to me I have a heart and liver and kidneys. I am sure I have got them.'

What Sir Oliver calls the etheric body and the etheric brain?

He says, 'Yes, I have got a brain,' and he says, 'The brain that I am functioning through now was in some way contained in my' —oh dear !—'in my physical organism on earth. It was a part of it and yet independent of it, and all impressions from a higher source—am not sure that even impressions from a lower source—do not have to come through the etheric brain first, before them come through the physical brain. I know the higher impressions have to, and I think the lower ones do.' (You ought to have been sure before you began talking about it.) He says, 'No, I am not sure, but I think the lower ones do. I think all impressions come

through the etheric brain, and then through the physical one, and that is the reason why when the etheric brain is separated by what we call physical death from the physical brain, the physical brain no longer functions. The etheric brain, which was the vital part of even the physical brain, is gone, separated, has an independent existence, with', he says, 'as much an independent existence as a child has in the ordinary physical process known as birth.' Oh dear ! 'Yes,' he says, 'our etheric bodies—the body I have now, was in me, was part of me, was there when I was walking about and functioning in the physical body, and', he says, 'a man may lose his physical leg but he can't lose his etheric leg and he feels a sensitiveness in his limb, the physical limb that is no longer there.' Wait a minute. 'It isn't imagination, but it is the sensitiveness of the etheric limb that is there.' Wait a minute. 'Our etheric brains which we have, mind, on the earth, could be reached, there could be a much better connexion between the etheric and the physical than there is. Being conscious of the etheric brain, believing it is there, we can reach out and draw a great deal more inspiration and knowledge from that etheric brain.' Wait a minute. He says, 'I feel the life stream on the etheric brain before it works on the physical one.' He says, 'I think when a shock' (a shock? Yes, that is right), 'a shock of any kind separates for a period the etheric from the physical'—wait a minute—He says, 'I think when a shock that causes unconsciousness, a long period of unconsciousness or a certain form of insanity, means that the etheric brain is no longer working in harmony with and in conjunction with the physical one, and that what we have to do to restore order is to bring the etheric brain back into its natural place in relation to the physical.' He says, 'When the greatest shock of all comes, which is physical death, that of course is the culminating, the great shock to the physical, the etheric brain has to leave; the cord is broken; the connexion is broken; it cannot be brought back. It leaves and it draws with it all the component parts of the etheric body. That is the reason the physical body cannot last long without some artificial help, as embalming. Left to itself it collapses. It disintegrates; disintegrates.' He says, 'Because the etheric part has been the material part.' He says, 'I must use the word material—it has been the material and essential part of the physical body. Yes. It lives in the etheric body. The etheric body lives in'—he says, 'Here I am trying to use

language which can be taken up by this'—this is Feda !—he says. 'It dwells in the fluids of the physical body. You understand? It dwells in the water, the fluids of the body partly and partly it lies outside. That causes—causes—causes—that causes the phenomenon we hear of as the aura. The etheric body, that which is within the physical partly—it cannot be entirely in, but is a little outside the physical, may reach two or three inches outside—causes this emanation which is perceptible to—perceptible by clairvoyants and is called the aura or the auric emanation. At death we know there is no aura. How can there be? The aura, with the cause of the aura, has gathered itself together and departed.' Departed? That is right. Wait a minute.

He says, 'It takes a little time for the etheric body to gather itself together. That is why cremation, in fact burial too, should be delayed till a certain point is reached.' Point? 'Yes', he says. 'The majority of people are buried or cremated too soon.' Isn't it a nuisance?

He says, 'There should be no burial, there should be no cremation till a sign of mortification sets in, unless', he says, 'there is some artificial severing, but that in itself is not a good thing.' He says, 'The best and most natural way of the soul which inhabits the body drawing to itself the different parts of the etheric is for it to quietly loosen itself. It is really a natural birth'. He says, 'We talk about death, but I liken it to birth. We like a natural birth if we can have it, a natural birth that takes its time without artificial help, therefore we like a natural death, which is birth into the spirit world again. It is birth again in the real body, the spirit body is attempting to draw itself, to pull itself together, to have a separate existence in a natural way, just as a child has a separate existence in a natural way, or should have at the physical birth', and he says, 'I would very much like to impress that on people, the insuring of the natural birth into the spirit life.'

He says, 'What happens when the cremation is too soon is there is a sudden shock to the etheric system. There is a compulsory pulling together, drawing together, which results in a kind of unconsciousness, a state of coma,'—coma—coma. (That is right. Semi-commas!) He says, 'It results in it, and is bad for the spirit. It is no good for it'. He says, 'It is a very bad condition.' He says, 'The man who is blown to pieces is in very much the same condition

as the man who is prematurely cremated, or buried,—it is the shock to the etheric system.'

He says, 'There is always help given,' and he says, 'we are compelled in your present system to have hospitals on our side, convalescent homes on our side. They ought not to exist but you'—him? No; no;—'You compel us to.' Oh dear! Wait a bit.

He says—wait a minute. What is that? Oh! 'Cremation is the best way, cremation is best. Cremation,' he says, 'after the spirit exits. The spirit exits and mortification sets in. Don't worry about hot climates,' he says. All right. 'Because mortification sets in more quickly there. There a quicker burial is permissible, but it isn't always waited for there any more than it is here,' he says.

He says, 'On our side we often have to help souls to rest, to recuperate who should be immediately—immediately!—well, conscious of the new life.' He says, 'Doctors and nurses have a busy time on our side through the manner of death and burial on yours'. (Will he be busy when he comes over?) Yes, he thinks you will, 'if things haven't altered you will', he says.

He is going back to something now, he says. 'When you think that you are helping a man's mind or helping his etheric mind,' he says,—he says, 'I would like to put it that you are helping his etheric brain.' He says, 'The materialist says because a man's physical brain is destroyed there can be no future life because he has got nothing to work upon. He ignores, because he hasn't proved its existence, the etheric brain. He hasn't located it, therefore he ignores it.' He says, 'We always ignore that which we haven't yet located, but it is there, and we must locate it.'

He says, 'When I say we must locate it, at least we must admit its existence; that is locating it; it is locating it admitting its existence, and at least it locates it for a useful purpose.' Wait a minute. 'It places it,' he says. 'The etheric brain is the machinery through which the mind works when it is finished with the physical. The mind can work on but it must work through the etheric brain first. It must,' he says. 'I am more and more convinced the etheric brain is the essential brain; the physical brain is only the outcome of the etheric, and is useless if the etheric separates itself or is separated by any shock or difficulty or at death, hence it is their etheric brains that you work through. You are linking up their etheric brains with their physical brains.' He says, 'That is

why we can only appeal, you see, through goodness. We can never appeal to the etheric brain through destructive channels, through evil, through fear, through doubt. I think that those are the things that may appeal to the physical brain through the medium of the senses. There are things that do appeal to the physical brain, at least affect it through the senses, but they are only the destructive forces, —fear—doubt—uncertainty—misery—yes,' he says, 'I think these must, they do appeal to the physical. They don't touch the etheric.' 'The etheric', he says, 'contains all the constructive and healing processes.' Wait a minute. 'The destructive forces work through into the material brain.' He says, 'I would call them the man-made forces; the God forces, the God-made forces, the constructive forces are temporarily withheld. They are,' he says, 'They are what you are still contending with', he says, 'the outcome of destructiveness of any kind, and the outcome of poverty, the outcome of want, the outcome of misery.' He says, 'That is all appealing to the destructive forces, the man-made forces,' and he says, 'We see how the etheric brain has been divorced from the physical brain because of this condition. When we take a hungry, poverty-stricken person into a better condition, we think we simply feed him and clothe him, but in a way we are linking up his etheric brain with his physical brain because we are giving him harmonious conditions,' and he says, 'Directly we link up the two brains we are giving him hope; we are giving him confidence, so all those exterior things that we think we are giving him, the better food, the better surroundings, the better clothing,' he says, 'is really an etheric linking up, an etheric connexion between the two brains.' (I think it is very difficult.)

He says, 'No, I am merely talking about this to-night because I wanted to tell you about my body, the fact that I have a body—that I have got something to work through'.

. . . . . .

Wait a minute. But he says, 'I want to say this before I stop. I am pleased with the progress you have made this year.' He says, 'I am talking about personal things now.' He says, 'I am pleased', and he thinks you ought to be satisfied too because everything is going well, and he says, 'You know there are many others who send their love to you, but I am afraid I take up all the time now,' but

he likes talking, and he says, 'I shall be with you part of the time you are in America.' He will be with you, and he wants you to notice what he said about what might cause the alteration.

Yes.

It may not make it, but you will see the cause of it that made him think about it. All right, then, I go.

Thank you Feda.

Yes, yes, all right. Good-bye. Good-bye.

Sir Oliver writes to me of the above report: 'A good sitting, and W. A.'s views about the etheric brain, &c., are consonant with my own, as you know.'

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